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The thesis has looked at the application of competition law of the European Union to 
sport. The main objective of the thesis is to understand whether the European 
institutions have adopted a sport-specific approach when applying competition law, 
and to identify problems connected to it.  
Sport presents a number of characteristics that differentiates it from any other industry. 
It is an area where private and public interests arise and demand protection. These 
range from private economic interests, to the protection of cultural aspects, health and 
well-being, and employment. 
The European Union has moved from an approach according to which sporting rules 
were not falling under EU law, to one where any sporting rule is capable of having 
economic effects and could therefore be assessed. In parallel, Sport Governing Bodies 
have stopped rejecting the intrusion of EU institutions in sport, and have accepted that 
the role of the authorities could be channelled to guarantee an area of autonomy. 
The thesis provides an original contribution to the body of knowledge in assessing the 
intensity of the economic analysis adopted by the EU institutions when examining 
conduct of Sports Governing Bodies. This aspect is particularly connected to the 
specific characteristics of sport, and of the sporting market. 
The research suggests to adopt a system of governance that is more collaborative and 
inclusive, and that is capable of representing the needs and protect the interest of all 
the industry stakeholders. This would require a greater involvement of the 
stakeholders in the rule setting and enforcement procedure, in order to channel the 
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1. General Introduction; 2. Questions; 3. Methodology; 4 Structure of the thesis 
 
1. General Introduction 
The research presented in this thesis focuses on one of the most important areas of 
modern society. Sport has a phenomenal ability to attract interests and passions, to 
boost them and exploit them. Sport is capable of educating people and facilitate their 
inclusion into a society. While participation is one of the idealistic messages of sport 
and Olympism,1 the commercialisation and consequent professionalisation have 
drastically changed the attitude of fans, athletes, Governing Bodies and Authorities 
towards sport. 
This study focuses on an area where EU Institutions, Member States, Sports Governing 
Bodies, clubs, and athletes all have an interest at stake. In particular, Member States 
tend to protect their sovereignty in regulating the sporting sector. Indeed, this is a 
sensitive area, where aspects related to economics, culture, education, and national 
traditions overlap.2 This resistance affects the role and the abilities of the EU 
institutions: the Commission has the main role in applying EU competition law, but the 
Council represents the interests of the Governments of Member States, while the 
Parliament has to protect the interests of the citizens.3 
In this limbo, Sports Governing Bodies have been very effective in their lobbying 
efforts. In the history of the relationship between Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs) and 
EU institutions, the former were starting from requesting a total exemption from EU 
law and, in particular, competition law. The development of sports related case law and 
decision practice of the EU institutions have convinced SGBs to move towards a 
                                                     
1 The Olympic Charter adopted by the International Olympic Committee states that ‘Olympism is a 
philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending 
sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy found in effort, the 
educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental and ethical principles.’ See 
Fundamental Principles of Olympism, Olympic Charter, 2016 version, p.11. 
2 See Geeraert, A. (2016) The EU in International Sports Governance, A Principal-Agent Perspective on EU 
Control of FIFA and UEFA, Palgrave Macmillan UK, p. 142. 
3 See Craig, P. P. & De Búrca, G. (2015) EU law: text, cases, and materials. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; 6th Ed., pp. 33 et seq. 
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position that accepts the competence of the Union. Through dialogue, this approach 
endeavours to guarantee an area of autonomy for sports governing bodies, to limit the 
exercise of the EU competence, and ultimately decreasing the likelihood of EU 
sanctions.4 
The EU institutions have recognised the role of Governing Bodies as private regulators 
of the sporting sector. Indeed, their expertise make them best suited to engage in a 
dialogue with the Commission and promote the autonomy of sport and its specific 
nature.5 In this context, however, the EU institutions have always maintained the need 
for a case-by-case analysis of the conduct of sporting entities and their compliance with 
EU competition law.6 This approach has neither increased the certainty in the area, nor 
it has contributed to reducing the number of complaints.  
The general aim of this thesis is to understand and analyse the relationship between the 
European sport system and EU competition law. This will require the discussion of 
aspects related to the governance system in sport. In particular, it is submitted that a 
vertical system of rule setting and enforcement may have to be replaced by a horizontal 
and more cooperative system, whereby all the industry stakeholders can find greater 
representation. 
 
2. Fundamental Questions 
In light of the general objective stated above, the research has sought to answer three 
fundamental questions.  
Does sport have specific features that require a different application of the law? Far 
from relying on a mere assumption that sport is special, the thesis seeks to undertake a 
systematic review of the characteristics of sport, in relation to the product market, the 
sport market and the labour market. By identifying the characteristics of the sport 
                                                     
4 See Garcia, B. and Weatherill, S. (2012) Engaging with the EU in order to minimise its impact: sport and 
negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon. Journal of European Public Policy, 19 (2), pp. 238 – 256 
5 See Geeraert, A. (2016) The EU in International Sports Governance, A Principal-Agent Perspective on EU 
Control of FIFA and UEFA, Palgrave Macmillan UK, p. 144, and European Commission: C (2014) 7378 
final, Commission Decision of 14.10.2014 adopting the Arrangement for Cooperation between the European 
Commission and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). 
6 See European Commission, White Paper on Sport, COM (2007) 391 Final, at para. 4.1 
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system and assess their weight, the research aims at understanding whether their 
relevance is great enough to require the EU institutions to exempt sport or to grant a 
different treatment to the sector when applying competition law.  
Once these characteristics have been depicted, it will be possible to move to the second 
main question: is there a sport-specific approach applied by the European institutions in 
relation to sport? In order to provide a comprehensive analysis, the thesis will firstly 
discuss which are the goals pursued by competition law, and whether there are 
legitimate objectives that may outweigh the pursuit of economic efficiency. The 
research will therefore seek to understand what is the intensity of the economic analysis 
applied by the EU institutions in assessing restrictive conduct on the market. The rules 
of the sporting industry will then be categorised on the basis of the objectives pursued 
and the reasons put forward by the governing bodies to justify their adoption. While it 
is accepted that the general approach is a case-by-case analysis, the thesis will seek to 
assess whether the rules of the sport system are capable of pursuing legitimate 
objectives. It will therefore be important to analyse the approach of the EU institutions 
in relation to the different type of rules and discuss whether some justifications have 
been more easily accepted than others. 
The third question that the thesis aims to answer is related to the impact of Article 165 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU) on the application of 
competition law to sport. With this provision, sport was for the first time mentioned in 
EU primary legislation, granting the EU a legislative competence in the area. The thesis 
will consider if Article 165 TFEU has had any impact on case law and decision-
practice of the EU institutions. Assessing the relevance of this provision will allow to 
discuss what would be its likely effect in the future as well. 
 
3. Methodology 
In order to answer the fundamental questions and provide an original contribution to 
the body of knowledge, this research has mainly employed a black letter approach.7 A 
                                                     
7 See Salter, M, & Mason, J. (2007), Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction And Guide To The Conduct 
Of Legal Research: Harlow: Pearson. 
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black letter approach is a method of research that aims at providing a systematic 
overview of the rules governing a specific legal category, by analysing the relationship 
between rules, explaining areas of difficulty and predicting future developments.8 
This methodology consists of a critical legal analysis of relevant legislation, including 
European Treaties, policy measures, case law and decision-practice concerning the area 
under study. Finally, the body of materials consulted includes also reports from 
relevant stakeholders and relevant academic literature, which have been used to 
interpret the other sources mentioned. The research therefore uses a number of primary 
and secondary sources, which have been collected mainly from libraries and official 
websites of institutions and Governing Bodies.  
The research has implemented deductive reasoning, which applies the set of given rules 
to factual scenarios discussed in the thesis. It has also adopted inductive reasoning, 
whereby it has used specific cases to draw general rules.9 And finally analogical 
reasoning, which applies the principles drawn from a set of cases to another set of 
events.10 Through these reasonings, the information collected have been systematically 
presented and analysed in connection with the fundamental questions that underlie the 
thesis.  
Furthermore, the thesis has adopted an interdisciplinary approach in relation to some 
aspects. Indeed, sport has a number of different facets, and in order to discuss the 
subject in a comprehensive manner, the research should take into account the economic 
aspects, the societal and the cultural aspects of sport. The research will assess how 
these aspects have influenced the setting of rules and their enforcement.11 
 
4. Structure of the Thesis 
                                                     
8 See Hutchinson, T. and Duncan, N. (2012), Defining and describing what we do: Doctrinal Legal Research, 
Deakin Law Review, 17, 1. 
9 Chynoweth, P. (2008) ‘Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research 
Methods in the Built Environment, Wiley-Blackwell, p. 37. 
10 See Farrar, J.H. (2010), Legal Reasoning, Thomson Reuters, p. 92 
11 Chynoweth, P. (2008) ‘Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research 
Methods in the Built Environment, Wiley-Blackwell, p. 30 
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The thesis does not present a literature review as a distinct section, but the literature 
consulted is discussed throughout the entire project to draw conclusion and identify 
common trends, and gaps. 
The first chapter of the thesis looks at the rules of the market within the European 
Union. This section aims at depicting the framework into which the research will 
develop, by identifying the rules of EU competition law that may apply to sport. The 
chapter therefore provides the definitions of the terminology that will be subsequently 
used. It also discusses some aspects that are of particular relevance in the context of the 
remaining parts of the research. Indeed, the chapter intends to identify the objectives of 
competition law and the interests it is set to protect. 
The second chapter presents a categorisation of the sporting rules on the basis of their 
objectives and the justifications put forward by the Governing Bodies. It further 
discusses the specific characteristics that differentiate sport from other industries, in 
light of the product market and the labour market. The chapter finally offers an 
overview of the development of the EU sports policy and sports law. 
The third chapter of the thesis discusses the first two categories of sporting rules, 
namely integrity rules and regulatory rules. This section seeks to identify whether the 
EU institutions have adopted a common approach in relation to the two categories. It 
will be shown how rules and conduct that aim at guaranteeing the integrity of the 
competition are likely to be exempted from a strict application of competition law. 
Furthermore, Governing Bodies may pursue objectives of public interest when they set 
and implement integrity rules, but also regulatory rules. Indeed, the need for a 
structured organisation of competition, to safeguard the safety of participants and fans 
and the fairness of the competition, represents one of the fundamental characteristic of 
the industry.  
Chapter four discusses the application of EU competition law in the area of the sporting 
labour market. This section identifies a number of rules and conduct that affect the 
sporting labour market and are likely to breach competition law. The specific 
characteristics of the sporting industry affect the features of the labour market, and the 
setting of rules that are believed to be necessary to guarantee the protection of the 
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above mentioned features. In this regard, it is submitted that it should be made greater 
use of Social Dialogue, as a way to include interested stakeholders in the setting of the 
rules that directly affect their interest. Social Dialogue constitutes a powerful 
instrument of control of rules and conduct, and may lead to bargaining agreements that 
will escape the application of competition law. 
Chapter five provides an analysis of one of the most profitable commercial areas in the 
sporting industry. This section discusses the commercialisation of sport broadcasting 
rights, its features and its legality. This area is particularly delicate, as the analysis is 
affected by the commercial goals pursued by Governing Bodies and professional sport 
clubs, but also from a number of other considerations. Indeed, sporting events may 
have a significant cultural importance for the citizens and for the community. 
Therefore, the approach taken by Governing Bodies and EU institutions has to be 
flexible enough to balance the requirement for conduct that produces efficiency on the 
market, with the need to guarantee consumers and citizens the possibility to see events 
of cultural importance. 
The cultural and political relevance of sport is also one of the underlying themes of 
chapter six. This section looks at the application of State aid rules to the sporting 
industry. The chapter examines two main categories of measures: first, the chapter 
discusses the granting of funding for the construction or renovation of sporting and 
multifunctional structure, that are assumed to provide benefits to the community at 
large. Secondly, the focus will be placed on the direct granting of measures to 
professional sport clubs. The two categories present significant differences, but the 
cultural importance of sport for local communities is relevant in relation to both of 
them. Moreover, the chapter will discuss the application of the private economic 
operator test to State aid measures granted to the sporting industry. According to this 
test, the conduct of public entities on the market is not relevant if a private operator 
would have acted in the same way. The chapter will seek to assess whether and to what 
extent the characteristics of the market are taken into account when this test is applied 
to sport-related cases. 
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The seventh chapter seeks to draw conclusions from the analysis undertaken in the 
previous sections. It therefore focuses on the lack of economic analysis that has been 
highlighted in the decision practice of the EU Commission in sports-related cases. 
Subsequently, the chapter presents the outcome of the analysis in relation to the 
different categories of sporting rules. For each of them, the chapter seeks to identify the 
effectiveness of the justification put forward by Governing Bodies, and the level of 
engagement of the different stakeholders in the industry. Indeed, the chapter aims at 
demonstrating the need for a switch from a vertical model of governance to a horizontal 
one, through greater use of cooperative instruments, such as Social Dialogue. This 
means a greater involvement of the stakeholders in the setting and enforcing rules, that 




CHAPTER ONE: EU Competition Law – Market Value 
 
1. Introduction; 2. The European Union; 3. Principles of competition law; 3.1 The 
Institutions; 3.2 The Modernisation; 4. The application of the rules of competition law in 
the EU; 4.1 The definition of undertaking; 4.2 The effects on trade between Member 
States; 4.3 The Relevant Market; 5. Restrictions under Article 101 TFEU. Rules and 
Derogations; 5.1 Article 101(3); 5.1.1 Benefit of Consumers; 5.1 2 Economic Efficiencies; 
6. Abuse of Dominant Position under Article 102 TFEU; 7. The role of the State on the 
Market; 7.1 Article 106 TFEU; 7.2 Article 107 TFEU; 7.2.1 The Market Private Operator 




This first chapter will present the rules of EU Competition Law, and discuss those that 
may be relevant for the sporting system. A proper analysis of the theme of the 
application of competition law to sport cannot disregard an excursus on the general 
framework of competition law within the European Union. To better tackle the 
questions that will be presented further on, the primary task is to define the terminology 
that will be used and the scope of the provisions of competition law in general terms, so 
to understand the context in which the research will take place. This section of the 
study will thus provide an analysis of the norms in force within the European Union in 
regard to competition within the internal market and the developments that might affect 
the matter in relation to sport. 
The objective of this chapter is to establish the Constitutional foundation of EU 
competition law. This comprises the study of legislative norms, soft-law measures, 
decisions and case law of the European institutions that inform the application of 
competition law on normal market conduct. This discussion is relevant in the context of 
the thesis, as sport may have specific characteristics that differentiate it from other 
sectors, and the conduct of the market players in sport may pursue aims that are not 
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merely economic. Hence, this section, alongside the following chapter, will try to 
establish what is the relationship between sport and competition law, and whether the 
characteristics of sport are so important that specific consideration by the institutions is 
required. 
The European Union was created by the Maastricht Treaty12 but it is the resulting 
development of the original European Community, created through the Treaty of 
Rome.13 The primary political project and goal of the Community, which was the 
establishment of peaceful relationships over the commercialization of scarce resources, 
had to be pursued essentially through economic measures.14 In particular, starting from 
the Single European Act,15 the aim was perfected with the constitution of the internal 
market, which would have amounted to an area where direct and indirect barriers to 
trade between Member States had to be removed, and a common import and export 
policy related to commercial transactions occurring with third countries was to be 
adopted.16 Other elements had to form part of the process of the constitution of the 
internal market, such as the protection against restrictions on the free movement of 
goods, workers, services and capital. Furthermore, to guarantee the effectiveness of the 
system, a competition policy was needed to ensure that private operators could not 
divide the market alongside national barriers. And, finally, the intervention of the State 
in the economy had to be regulated as well, in order to prevent further distortion of the 
competition.17 
                                                     
12 European Union, Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht [1992], OJ C 
325/5; the most current versions of the Treaty have been enacted in Lisbon in 2007. See Treaty of Lisbon 
amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community [2007] OJ 
C306/01. After the Treaty of Lisbon, the primary source of legislation within the European Union are thus the 
Consolidated version of the Treaty of the European Union, OJ C 326, [hereinafter TEU] and the Consolidated 
version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
13 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
14 See Craig, P. P. & De Búrca, G. (2011) EU law: text, cases, and materials. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, c2011; 5th Ed.  
15 Single European Act, 1987 O.J. L 169/1, [hereinafter SEA] (amending Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community 
16 See Judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case 15/81, Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v 
Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, Roosendaal [1982] ECR I-1409, para. 33. 
17 See Chalmers, D., Davies, G. & Monti, G. (2014), European Union law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom, p. 14. 
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The creation of the common market, in this regard, was not a specific goal to itself, but 
it constituted a means to achieve the objectives of promoting peace, the values of the 
European Union and the well-being of its people.18 In order to guarantee the attainment 
of such ambitious goals, it became necessary to enact provisions capable of eliminating 
any unreasonable and not justified distortion of the market within the internal market. 
The economic integration was therefore pursued through the protection of free 
movement of persons and capital, and the adoption of the rules of competition law.19 
 
2. The European Union 
The European Union was created through International Treaties, which bound the 
signatories to transfer a number of areas of State sovereignty to the new born entity.20 
In light of the original status of the Union, its competencies were strictly limited to 
those areas that the Member States agreed to cede.21 
This principle of conferral, now set out by Article 5(2) of the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU), was meant to guarantee the Member States that some specific areas, 
considered particularly sensitive, were to be kept under their respective competence. 
The same Article provides also for the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of 
proportionality. The first establishes that, in the areas that do not fall within its own 
exclusive competencies, the Union shall take action only insofar as the objectives 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States. The principle essentially imposes 
that matters should be dealt with at the closest level to those affected. Similarly, the 
                                                     
18 These were provision inserted in the original Treaties and now they can be found at Article 3 of the TEU. 
See Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 5th ed, p.34. Indeed, the Community has not only economic objectives but it also pursues social 
goals. See Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri [2007] ECR I-11767, paras. 104 – 105.  
19 See Cruz, J.B. (2002), Between competition and free movement: the economic constitutional law of the 
European Community, Hart, Oxford. 
20 See Borchardt, KD (2010), The ABC of European Union law, Publication Office of European Union, 
Brussels, p.10, and also Bulmer, S. (1993), The Governance of the European Union: A New Institutionalist 
Approach, Journal of Public Policy, 13, pp 351-380. 
21 This is confirmed in Article 4 TEU, whereby the competences not conferred on the Union remain with the 
Member States. See Craig, P. P. & De Búrca, G. (2011) EU law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, c2011; 5th Ed., p.75. 
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principle of proportionality contends that the action of the Union should not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objectives set by the Treaties. 
Throughout the years the Union has eroded the areas of exclusive competence of the 
Member States,22 by virtue of further agreements signed by the latter, and also in light 
of the activity of the Court of Justice.23 
The European Union, after the reform enacted through the Lisbon Treaty, can exercise 
its competence in various forms, depending on the degree of penetration and 
harmonisation chosen in relation to the legislation of Member States. Article 2(1) of the 
TFEU establishes the category of exclusive competence: in the areas subject to this 
provision, only the Union can legislate and implement binding acts, which will have 
effects in all the Member States. The consequences of the inclusion of an area in such a 
category are very severe, since it implies that Member States have no autonomous 
legislative competence in that relation and they cannot adopt any legally binding act, 
either legislative or not, unless specifically empowered by the Union.24 The rules on 
competition within the internal market are of exclusive competence of the Union. 
However, whilst the enactment of provisions related to competition is of exclusive 
competence of the Union, the discipline of the internal market falls into the 
competencies that have to be shared between the Union and Member States. In this 
other area, Member States can take action only when the Union has not already 
exercised its own competence, or in the case it has decided to cease from exercising it. 
Finally, the Union can also carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the 
action of Member States. This third type of competence is the one that entails the 
lightest form of penetration and restraint of the sovereignty of the Member States. In 
these areas, the Union cannot carry out any form of harmonisation.25 However, the 
                                                     
22 For a discussion on the area of sovereignty and policy making within the European Union, see Richardson, 
J., ed. (2006), European Union: Power and Policy-Making, 3rd ed, Routledge, Abingdon. 
23 See S R Weatherill, (2011), 'The limits of legislative harmonisation ten years after Tobacco Advertising: 
how the Court’s case law has become a ‘drafting guide’,' 12 German Law Journal 827. 
24 Craig, P. P. & De Búrca, G. (2011) EU law: text, cases, and materials / Paul Craig and Gráinne de 
Búrca. Oxford: Oxford University Press, c2011; 5th Ed.  
25 See idem. p.85. 
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institutions may still adopt other forms of binding provisions that, although based on 
other areas of competence, might still affect this area.26  
Amongst others, the area of education, culture, vocational training, youth and sport is 
subject to this form of competence. The inclusion of sport under the area of 
competencies of the European Union was formalised for the first time with the Treaty 
of Lisbon. Article 165 TFEU, in fact, provides for the first time a legal basis for the 
activity of the European Union in the field of sport. As mentioned before, the real 
impact of this Article is debatable, since the competence granted to the Union is the 
weakest possible.27 
 
3. Principles of Competition Law 
Within the framework of the internal market, competition law pursues the objective of 
protecting and maintaining a fair competitive process.28 In this perspective, it aims at 
encouraging an optimal allocation of the resources, industrial efficiency, and technical 
progress.29 A highly competitive market, however, should also deliver the best possible 
outcome to consumers.30 
Hence, there are a number of different goals and approaches to competition law:31 on 
the one hand the aim of competition law could be interpreted as limited to the 
preservation of fair conditions of competition within the market, therefore pursuing the 
                                                     
26 For example, public health falls under this type of competence. The Court of Justice has allowed some form 
of harmonisation in this sector, justified under the need to regulate the internal market. Consideration related 
to public health were therefore held to be taken into account in this perspective as from Article 114 TFEU. 
See S R Weatherill, 'The limits of legislative harmonisation ten years after Tobacco Advertising: how the 
Court’s case law has become a ‘drafting guide’' (2011), 12, German Law Journal, 827. See also Case 
C‐376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council [2000] E.C.R. I‐8419. 
27 See infra §2 for a discussion about EU sport policy and the role of Article 165 TFEU. 
28 Protocol 27 annexed to the TFEU clarifies that market integration constitutes the specific aim of 
competition law. See Lianos, I. (2012) Competition law in the European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, in 
The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, Ed. By Ashiagbor, D. Countouris, N., Lianos, I., Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 252 – 283. 
29 See the XXIXth Report on Competition Policy of the European Commission [1999], Sec (2000) 720 Final, 
p. 19. 
30 See Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
[OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004], para. 33. 
31 See Odudu, O. (2010) The Wider Concerns of Competition Law, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 30, 
no. 3, pp. 599-613. 
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objective of consumer welfare.32 On the other hand, it is the prevention of consumer 
harm that should be seen as one of the milestones of competition law: hence, it should 
focus more on the individual needs of consumers, rather than the general conditions of 
the market.33 Finally, one objective that might be pursued and that is not fully included 
in the previous two is the protection of the freedom to compete in the market.34 
It is therefore apparent that the objectives of competition law can be manifold; this, 
however, means that they might be pursued in a number of ways and that different 
factors might influence the process.35 One of the main questions is thus whether 
considerations that are not strictly economic should be taken into account within the 
application of competition law.36 
The remaining part of the chapter will present a discussion on the individual provisions 
of competition law,37 and the scope and objectives of each of them will be discussed 
through relevant literature and case law. 
 
3.1 The Institutions 
Having briefly introduced the main goals of competition law, it is necessary to provide 
an overview of the institutions that are mandated to apply and enforce EU competition 
law. 
                                                     
32 See idem, para. 13, and Marsden, P. and Whelan, P. (2006) ‘Consumer detriment’ and its application in EC 
and UK competition law, 27(10) European Competition Law Review, 569 - 585. 
33 For a discussion about the notion of consumer harm, see Lianos, I. (2013), Some Reflections on the 
Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law. CLES Working Paper Series 3/2013. Available at  SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2235875 Accessed on 21, Nov. 2014. 
34 See Akman, P. (2014) The role of ‘freedom’ in EU Competition Law, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 34 No. 
2, pp. 183–213. 
35 See Townley, C., (2011), Which Goals Count in Article 101 TFEU? Public Policy and its Discontents, 
European Competition Law Review. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1894837, and Rompuy, B. 
V., (2012). Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust policy? Non-efficiency considerations 
under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International. 
36 And thus, Article 7 TFEU states that the Union shall take account of all its objectives when implementing 
its policies and activities; similarly, horizontal provisions might be found in the Treaties that mandate the 
institutions to take in consideration some particular factors in any of the activities of the EU. See Jones, A. & 
Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 5th ed., 
p. 49, and Townley, C. (2008) Is Anything More Important than Consumer Welfare (in Article 81 EC)? 
Reflections of a Community Lawyer. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol. 10, p. 345, 2008. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1358646 
37 See supra, § 5 – 7. 
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In the areas where the European Union has exclusive competence, a fundamental role is 
held by the Commission. This institution has the task of enforcing competition law, and 
it has also been granted special powers of investigation and sanction in relation to 
conduct that might infringe European Union Law.38 The power to investigate suspected 
infringement of EU competition law may also culminate in a Decision ordering an end 
to the breach, or sanctioning the undertaking involved with a fine, under the scope of 
Council Regulation 1/2003.39 In this context, the Commission may act on its own 
initiative or following an instigation of a Member State, or after a complaint of a legal 
or natural person whose legitimate interest has been affected by the challenged 
conduct.40 The Commission might impose structural or behavioural modification to the 
undertakings involved in the conduct. It can also issue a Decision exempting a specific 
arrangement when it does not restrict competition, or the restriction itself is justified, or 
when such an exemption is considered to be in the public interest.41 Under article 9 of 
the Regulation, the undertakings themselves may offer specific commitments in order 
to eliminate antitrust concerns, and the Commission can issue a Decision to make them 
binding if they are deemed satisfactory.42 This allows the Commission to conclude an 
investigation and resolve the case without having to establish whether an infringement 
has in fact occurred, and which are the grounds for a possible exemption.43 
Furthermore, the Commission may also adopt other legislative measures: the Council 
has empowered the Commission to adopt Regulations granting block exemptions, 
through which some specific types of agreements are excluded from the scope of 
                                                     
38 See Article 17 of the TEU, and Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU competition law: text, cases, and 
materials, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 5th ed, p. 102. 
39 See Article 18 and 20 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on 
the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2003] OJ L1/1. 
Article 18 grants the Commission the power to request information to the undertakings involved in an alleged 
breach, while Article 20 gives the Commission the power to carry out inspections at the premises of the 
undertakings involved.  
40 See para 33 et seq. of the Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004. 
41 Article 7, of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. 
42 The Commission has used this approach in relation to infringements under both Article 101, see infra the 
Bundesliga and Premier League Cases, and 102 TFEU, see Cases No COMP/39.65, Reuters Instrument 
Codes and No COMP/39.230, Rio Tinto Alcan. 
43 Rompuy, B. V., (2012). Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust policy?: Non-efficiency 
considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International. 
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application of Article 101(1) TFEU.44 The Commission can finally adopt 
Communications and Notices to clarify the way it intends to deal with certain matters. 
These measures, which usually fall under the category of ‘soft law’,45 do not have 
legislative force, and they cannot bind the Court of Justice.46 However, they might 
constitute useful guidance for the undertakings, and the Commission itself cannot 
depart from them in an individual case without breaching the general principles of 
law,47 such as equal treatment and legitimate expectations.48  
The way the Commission decides to act in relation to conduct restricting the 
competition on the market may therefore range from a strict application of the rules, 
with no possible flexibility, to a structured dialogue with private regulators and actors. 
In particular, when the Commission does not get to the point of bringing a case before 
the Court of Justice, it liaises with private operators in a number of way. Through the 
opening of an investigation, negotiations and commitments on the part of the 
undertakings, but also through the issuing of guidelines and soft law measures the 
institutions aim to steer the conduct of the private operators towards forms of better 
governance.49 
                                                     
44 The authority for adopting block exemption regulations stems from Article 103 TFEU. This provisions 
allows the Commission to exercise the power on the basis of the experience gained in the application of EU 
law to this specific sector. See Marco Colino, S. (2011) Competition Law of the EU and UK, Oxford 
University Press, p. 206, and Lianos, I. (2012) Competition law in the European Union after the Treaty of 
Lisbon, in The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, Ed. By Ashiagbor, D. Countouris, N., Lianos, I., 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 252 – 283. 
45 See Senden, L. (2004), Soft Law in European Community Law, Hart Publishing. 
46 See Joined Cases 501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline [2009] ECR I-9291, 
para. 63. However, the CJEU has long affirmed that EU and National Courts have to take soft law measures 
into account when deciding cases before them. See Case C-322/88 Salvatore Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies 
professionnelles [1989] ECR I-4407, para. 18. 
47 The General Principles of Law are included in the hierarchy of norms of EU law. 
48 Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 5th ed, p.118. 
49 This form of dialogue between the Commission and private operators is the preferred one in the sporting 
sector. See Geeraert, A. (2013). The role of the EU in better governance in International sports organisations. 
In: Alm J. (Eds.), Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organisations. Copenhagen: Play the 
Game/ Danish Institute for Sports Studies, 25-37 
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On the other hand, the power held by the Court of Justice of the European Union50 has 
to be considered as well. The role of the CJEU is to ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties the law is observed.51  
The Court, however, may address a question in the area of competition law only in two 
specific instances. First, the Court might be called upon to review the legality of acts 
adopted by EU Institutions,52 thereby including the decisions of the Commission in 
relation to the competition in the internal market.53 Challenges will normally be heard 
before the General Court in the first instance, and appeals on a point of law can be 
brought to the Court of Justice.54 Secondly, a national court might seek a preliminary 
ruling on the interpretation of an EU norm that has to be applied in the case at hand.55 
The Court of Justice will thus give a ruling on a point of EU law, necessary to interpret 
a provision of domestic law in a case before the national court. However, the Court will 
refuse to rule on a reference where this is not made by a Court or Tribunal.56 Moreover, 
the CJEU cannot act on its own initiative to clarify a point of EU law that might have 
been misinterpreted or misapplied by the Commission. 
The same principles apply also for rules of national competition law, which are usually 
drafted to mirror the respective EU rules, and have to be interpreted in line with them.57  
 
                                                     
50 The Court of Justice of the European Union, also CJEU hereinafter, is formed by the General Court (GC), 
court of first instance in some matters, and the Court of Justice (CJ). The CJ is assisted by a number of 
Advocates General, whose role is to make impartial and independent submission on any case brought before 
the Court. These submissions are not binding for the Court. See Article 252 TFEU. 
51 See Article 19 TEU. 
52 See Article 263 TFEU. 
53 And in relation to infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU. The CJ has also unlimited jurisdiction 
to review the penalties imposed by the Commission on the basis of Regulations enacted by the Council, 
thereby including Regulation 1/2003. 
54 See Article 56 of the Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, OJ C 
83/210. 
55 Article 267 TFEU. Final Courts are instead under an obligation to refer the decision on the interpretation of 
the provision to the Court of Justice. See Craig, P. P. & De Búrca, G. (2011) EU law: text, cases, and 
materials / Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca. Oxford: Oxford University Press, c2011; 5th ed, Chap. 13. 
56 And therefore, National Competition Authorities may in principle not refer the question to the CJ. See Case 
C-53/03, Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) and Others v GlaxoSmithKline [2005] 
ECR I-4609, para. 29. A reference may be made only by a body established by law, which is independent, 
permanent and whose jurisdiction is compulsory. 
57 Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 5th ed. 
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3.2 The Modernisation 
In the context of a discussion on the application of competition law, it is important to 
mention the process of modernisation.58 Regulation 1/200359 has involved National 
authorities in the enforcement of EU competition law.60 National courts and 
competition authorities of Member States must now apply, alongside the provisions of 
national law, also EU competition law in cases regarding agreements (Article 101 
TFEU), or abuse of dominant position (Article 102 TFEU) that occur within their 
territory, and which may affect trades between Member States.61 National Authorities 
form with the Commission the European Competition Network (ECN).62 In the balance 
of competencies, a National Competition Authority should take action when the 
conduct in question has direct effects on its territory, or it originates within its territory, 
and provided that the NCA is able to gather the evidence required to prove the 
infringement, bring the infringement to an end and sanction it adequately.63 
Furthermore, when a National Authority is already investigating a specific conduct, the 
Commission should initiate its procedure only after having consulted the NCA.64 While 
                                                     
58 Regulation 1/2003 is the outcome of a process started in 1999 with the adoption by the Commission of the 
White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Article 101 and 102 of the Treaty [1999] OJ C132/1. 
The Commission aimed at promoting the decentralisation of enforcement through a network of national 
Courts and National Competition Authorities. 
59 The Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 replaced the previous Regulation 17 on 1 May 2004. 
60 Regulation 1/2003 in effect changed the procedural regime, enabling the Commission to focus on more 
serious infringement of competition law, rather than dealing with any conduct notified to it. See Whish, R. & 
Bailey, D. 2012, Competition law, 7th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 250. 
61 Article 5 Regulation No 1/2003. Moreover, Article 15 provides for a number of different types of 
cooperation arrangement between the Commission and the National Courts.  
62 It is for the Member States to designate the National Competition Authority (NCA hereinafter) responsible 
for the application and enforcement of competition law within their respective territory. Member State may 
decide to allocate different functions to their National administrative and judicial bodies. See Article 35, 
Regulation 1/2003. The Commission has also issued a Joint Statement to set out the main principles related to 
the allocation of cases within the Network. See Joint Statement of the Council and the European Commission 
on the Functioning of the Network of Competition Authorities, 10 December 2002, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/joint_statement_en.pdf. 
63 See Joint Statement, paras. 11 – 14. The Commission has also issued a Notice on Cooperation within the 
Network of Competition Authorities [2004] OJ C101/43, which deals with these matters at para. 8. 
64 See Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003. However, where possible, cases should be dealt with by a single 
authority. Nevertheless, several NCAs might act in parallel. See Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU 
competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 5th ed, p. 1052.  
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this thesis will be mainly focus on the public enforcement of EU competition law, the 
role of national courts is important in relation to private enforcement as well.65 
The Commission will still be best placed to investigate arrangements that have effects 
in more than two Member States, or anyway where the interests of the Union so 
require.66 Furthermore, the Commission retains a function of control over the action of 
national authorities:67 the latter, alongside national courts, cannot take decisions that 
are contrary to a Decision adopted by the Commission.68 This provision reflects the 
pivotal role that the Commission holds in relation to the enforcement of competition 
law and with regard to the formulation of enforcement norms.69 
 
4. The Application of the rules of Competition Law in the EU 
In general terms, it might be said that the law of the European Union is engaged 
whenever a conduct or an arrangement affects rights protected by the Treaties, 
provided that its effects are produced within the territory of the Union. The main norms 
that provide the discipline of competition law within the European Union are Articles 
101, 102, and 106 and 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.70 
The first two Articles deal with conduct and arrangements adopted by private 
undertakings, while the other two aim at regulating and controlling the influence of 
Member States on the market. 
                                                     
65 Any action for damages claims against undertakings that infringe EU competition law has to be brought 
before National courts. See Chalmers, D., Davies, G. & Monti, G. 2014, European Union law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, p.989. 
66 See Joint Statement on the Functioning of the Network of Competition Authorities, para. 19. In particular, 
only the Commission may adopt a decision finding that there is no infringement of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU. See Rizzuto, F. (2011) Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003: the limits to national procedural autonomy, in 
European Competition Law Review, 32 (11). pp. 564-572. 
67 This goes alongside with the power of the Commission to initiate an investigation. Where the Commission 
decides to do so, the NCA is relieved from its competence to apply Articles 101 and 102. See Article 6 of the 
Regulation 1/2003, and para. 51 of the Cooperation Notice [2004] OJ C101/43. 
68 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, Article 16. This can also be considered the expression of the 
general principle set by Article 4(3) TEU, whereby Member States are under the obligation of ensuring that 
the national bodies do not hinder the achievement of EU objectives.  
69 In relation to sport, the Commission has maintained that disputes related to sports governance and 
individual situations can be effectively handled by National Courts. See European Commission, Press Release 
IP/16/3201 - Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to International Skating Union on its 
eligibility rules. Brussels, 27 September 2016. 
70 This will be the numeration that will be used throughout the entire thesis, despite the fact that authorities 
may refer to the Articles under previous numeration.  
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These provisions will be applied any time a conduct put in place by an undertaking is 
capable of affecting the trade between Member States.71 They may be applied also to 
conduct put in place by sporting entities as long as they affect competition on the 
market. 
It is necessary to clarify a number of concepts before moving forward. The rules of 
competition law address behaviours put in place by undertakings that have as their 
effect or object the restriction of trade between Member States. It will be therefore 
mandatory to identify when a conduct is capable of producing effects on trade between 
Member States. Furthermore, it is necessary to provide a definition of the term 
undertaking, as to clarify which entities will be subject to those provisions and which 
others may escape from the application of these rules. This is particularly relevant in 
light of the complexities that will affect the subsequent analyses and in relation to the 
status and form that sporting bodies might be able to take. 
 
4.1 The notion of Undertaking 
The Court of Justice has given its definition of an undertaking in the Höfner case:72 for 
the purposes of EU law, the term undertaking encompasses any natural or legal person 
engaged in any kind of economic or commercial activity in the provision of goods and 
services, regardless of its status or the way it is financed.73 The focus should therefore 
be on the material activity carried out by this entity, consisting in offering goods or 
services on the market.74 In this perspective, it is not relevant whether the undertaking 
carries out its activity in pursuit of profit or otherwise, but simply that the latter is 
included in the broad category of economic activities.75 
                                                     
71 The test applied by the Court assesses a specific arrangement ‘on the basis of indirect, potential or actual 
effect on the flow of trade between Member States’. See Case 56/65, Societe Technique v Maschinbay Ulm, 
[1966], ECR 235, para. 7. 
72 Case C-41/90 - Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH.[1991] ECR I-1979.  
73 Idem, para. 21. 
74 See Case 118/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2599, para. 7. 
75 See Case 155/73, Italy v. Sacchi [1974] ECR 409, and more pertinent to this research, the Decision of the 
Commission 92/521/EEC Distribution of package tours during the 1990 World Cup, (1992) OJ L326/31. 
Obudu however points out that, in order to consider an entity an undertaking, the entity in question should be 
able to offer goods or services on the market, with the potential of making profits from its activity, and 
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Similarly, the form that such an entity takes is irrelevant in this scenario, as the 
economic nature of the activity carried out is the only element to be considered. An 
undertaking can therefore be constituted by an individual carrying out an economic 
activity on its own;76 the definition may comprise also a group of entities which 
effectively functions as a single economic unit.77 In this respect, parent and subsidiaries 
companies will form such a unit if the former effectively exercises decisive influence 
over the conduct of the latter. That is to say, if the controlled company is not able to 
decide independently its own market conduct but it rather represents an operative 
branch of the parent company.78 The relevant point to be addressed is whether two or 
more separated legal persons behave together as a single unit on the market:79 
agreements and concerted practices that concern merely the allocation of tasks amongst 
the members of the group will escape from the scrutiny of competition law.80 
Another distinction has to be made between a private undertaking and an entity 
performing tasks in the public interest:81 the function carried out in the particular 
circumstances will operate as the main factor to differentiate these entities. Even when 
the entity involved is a public body, its conduct will be relevant when the activity it 
performs is capable, at least in principle, to be carried on by private undertakings to 
make profit.82 
                                                                                                                                                                 
bearing the risks of the enterprise. See Odudu, O. (2006), The boundaries of EC competition law: the scope of 
Article 81, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
76 See for example the Case RAI/UNITEL [1978] OJ L157/39, but also the Meca Medina case, C-519/04 P 
David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991, where two professional swimmers 
were considered undertakings for the purpose of Article 101 TFEU. See infra, chap. 3. 
77 Case 170/83, Hydrotherm Gerätebau GmbH v Compact del Dott. Ing. Mario Andreoli & C. Sas. [1984] 
ECR 2999, para. 11. 
78 Case C-172/12 P, El du Pont de Nemours and Others v Commission [2013] n.y.p., and Case C-179/12 P, 
Dow Chemical v Commission, [2013] n.y.p. In this scenario parent companies might be held liable for the acts 
of the subsidiaries, see Case T-314/01, Cooperatieve Verkoop- en Productievereniging van Aardappelmeel en 
Derivaten Avebe BA v Commission, [2007] 4 CMLR1, para. 136. 
79 Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 5th ed., p. 138. 
80 Case 30/87 Bodson v. Pompes funebres [1998] ECR 2479, para.19. 
81 Public entities or undertaking providing services of general economic interest are generally not subject to 
the application of competition law. Article 106 TFEU clearly states that these entities will fall under the scope 
of the rules of competition law only to the extent that this will not obstruct the performance of such services. 
See infra § 7.1. 
82 See Case C-67/96 Albany International v Stichting [1999] ECR I-5751, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 311. 
Where a private undertaking would not be able to carry out that activity, there would be no reasons to apply 
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Since the main criterion to take into consideration for the identification of an 
undertaking is the nature of its activity, it is possible that an entity might be classified 
as an undertaking in relation to a number of the activities it carries out, while in other 
instances its conduct will not be relevant. Therefore, the fact that an undertaking is 
vested with public powers does not immediately exclude it from the scope of 
application of competition law, in respect of that set of activities that are economic in 
nature.83 
 
4.2 The effects on trade between Member States 
As stated by the Court of Justice, in the context of an analysis under the lens of 
competition law, an arrangement will be assessed on the basis of its effects, actual, 
indirect or potential on the flow of trade between Member States.84  
The arrangement must have an impact on the flow of goods and services, or other 
relevant economic activities that involve at least two Member States.85 In this 
perspective, however, the notion of trade is not exclusively referred to the exchange of 
goods and services, but it has to be construed as a wider concept, capable of including 
different sorts of cross border activities, and thus also the establishment in another 
Member State.86 
Furthermore, the cross border effects within the internal market have to be 
appreciable.87 It is often assumed that an agreement between entities situated in 
different Member States will certainly affect intra-member trade. The Courts of the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the rules of competition law to it. See also Case C- 264/01 AOK v. Bundesverband and Others [2004] ECR I-
02493, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para. 27. 
83 See Case C-49/07 MOTOE v. Elliniko Dimosio [2008] ECR I- 4863, para.25. 
84 See Case 56-65 Societè Technique Miniere v. Machinenbau [1966] ECR 235, at p. 249. 
85 Notice of the Commission on the concept of effect on trade between Member States [2004] OJ C101/81, 
para. 21. 
86 Idem, para. 19 
87 The provisions of competition law within the Treaty do not require expressly that the effect of the conduct 
on the trade between Member States has to be appreciable, but this might be inferred by the case law of the 
Court of Justice. See Case 22/71, Béguelin Import Co. v S.A.G.L. Import Export [1971] ECR 949, para. 16, 
and Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 5th ed., p. 180. 
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European Union, however, have interpreted this condition broadly,88 to the point that 
even agreements that are confined to activities that take place only in one Member 
State might be deemed to fulfil the requirement.89 An agreement which operates only in 
one Member State is thus still capable of producing effects on the trade between 
Member States. National cartels and dominating undertakings are able to divide the 
common market under national lines, and therefore hinder the ability of undertakings 
from other Member States of penetrating the market.90 On the other hand, an 
arrangement whose effects are limited to the territory of a single country will be subject 
only to the law of that particular Member State. However, the provisions of 
competition law of individual Members States often reproduce the rules enacted at EU 
level. 
An arrangement will be capable of affecting trade between Member States where it is 
possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability and on the basis of objective 
criteria that it can have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential on the pattern 
of trade between Member States in a way that could hinder the attainment of the 
objectives of the single market.91 This clearly indicates that agreements concluded 
between or conduct carried out by undertakings that hold a weak position on the market 
will not fall under the scope of the EU competition law provisions.92 Nevertheless, 
these arrangements are still likely to be assessed under the rules of national competition 
law of the Member State where they took place. 
The appreciability of the restriction has to be evaluated with reference to the position 
and the importance of the undertaking on the relevant market, thus depending on the 
                                                     
88 It is enough that the effect can be foreseen with a sufficient degree of probability. See Case 56-65 Societè 
Technique Miniere v. Machinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, p. 249. 
89 See Notice of the Commission on the concept of effect on trade between Member States [2004] OJ 
C101/81, para. 77 et seq, and Rompuy, B. V., (2012). Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern 
antitrust policy?: Non-efficiency considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International. 
90 See Case 8/72 Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v. Commission [1972] ECR 997, para. 29, and Jones, A. 
& Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 5th 
ed., p. 184. 
91 Case 5/69 Volk v Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295, p.302. 
92 See Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 
101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice) [2014], OJ C 291. 
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circumstances of the case.93 This assessment can either be made in absolute terms, in 
relation to the turnover of the undertaking, or in relative terms, identifying the market 
share in comparison with the competitors on the market.94 The Commission, however, 
has set some specific criteria that, where cumulatively satisfied, indicate that trade will 
not be appreciably affected. This is the case where the aggregate market share of the 
parties to an agreement does not exceed 5 per cent, and, in case of horizontal 
agreement, the aggregate annual turnover is not higher than 40 million Euro.95 
 
4.3 The Relevant Market 
The necessary basis for any analysis of conduct under the rules of competition law is 
the definition of the relevant market in which the conduct itself has to be considered. In 
order to be able to appreciate the effects and consequences of specific conduct, the 
relevant market has to be identified, as it is not possible to assess the legitimacy of an 
arrangement in abstract. Market definition is also considered as a tool to identify and 
set out the boundaries of competition between firms, and it provides the framework 
within which the EU Commission will apply competition policy.96  
A market is defined as consisting of a product, or a group of products, and a clearly 
identified geographic area in which these are produced, marketed or sold. In order to 
efficiently evaluate the economic power of the undertakings, the conditions of 
competition in this market have to be sufficiently homogeneous and companies have to 
be effectively competing amongst each other.97 The analysis will therefore have to 
individuate the main competitors in action and their respective market shares, and 
identify the related markets that might be affected by the conduct.  
The definition of the relevant market implies a thorough analysis of a given economic 
sector in a specific geographical region, considered at a given time. The aim of defining 
                                                     
93 This is an autonomous criterion that has to be assessed separately in each case. See para. 12 of the 
Commission Notice on the concept of effect on trade between Member States [2004] OJ C101/81. 
94 See idem, para. 46 - 47. 
95 See para 50-57 of the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, OJ 1997 C372/5. 
96 See Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition 
law, OJ 1997 C372/5, para. 2. 
97 Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, paras 11 and 44. 
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a relevant market is to identify products and services which the consumers consider as 
substitutable between each other, to the point that the existence of such a substitute 
represents a constraint for the supplier of the first product or service.98 The relevant 
market would therefore be constituted by products which are interchangeable with each 
other, but that cannot be substituted by products outside that market. Indeed, the 
analysis is limited to the participants of a relevant market, and cannot include all the 
other markets or sectors of the economy that may be affected.99  
Hence, in this context the main focus should be placed on the substitution factors, 
which identify whether a particular product might be replaced with a similar one, in the 
event of a small but significant increase of its price, and effectively satisfy the demands 
of consumers.100 These factors will comprise the substitutability of the product on the 
demand side,101 that measures whether consumers consider a number of products as 
substitutes, and the cross elasticity of demand, which is the tendency of consumers to 
switch to other products.102 The substitutability of the product might be considered in 
relation to other products, or to the same type of product manufactured and marketed 
elsewhere.103  
Other aspects should be considered as well: the behaviour of an undertaking on a 
market will also be influenced by the ability of potential competitors of entering into 
the said market. The supply substitution considers how easy it is for manufacturers to 
switch to the production of the relevant product, and thus entering its market.104 
                                                     
98 See Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 5th ed., p.63. 
99 Lianos, I (2013), Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law. CLES Working 
Paper Series 3/2013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2235875 Accessed on 21, Nov. 2014. 
100 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, 
OJ 1997 C372/5 pp.5-11. In practice the substitutability test assesses whether consumer will switch to another 
product in the event of a small increase of price of the product considered. 
101 Idem, paras. 15 et seq. 
102 Idem, para 39. 
103 See Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental v. Commission [1973] ECR 215, at para. 32. 
104 Potential competition will be considered only in the assessment of the conduct in object, and not in the 
preliminary stage of market definition. Furthermore, the Commission has indicated in its notice that it will 
mainly focus on demand substitutability. See Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the 
purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C372/5, para. 14 and Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU 
competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 5th ed., p. 76. 
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The identification of the relevant market is fundamental for the analysis under both 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU. In the perspective of an analysis of a conduct under Article 
101, this procedure is necessary to evaluate the impact on trade of agreements or 
concerted practices, and whether the latter are capable of having the effect or the object 
of restricting or in any way distorting the conditions of competition within the common 
market. Similarly, in the context of an analysis under Article 102, an abuse of dominant 
position can be ascertained only after the definition of the relevant market and the 
existence of such a position of dominance.105 
The definition of the market is therefore of fundamental importance in relation to its 
consequences: in a market narrowly defined iy is more probable that undertakings will 
hold dominant positions, or that a collusive arrangement will eliminate the competition 
on the market.106 
 
5. Restrictions under Article 101 TFEU. Rules and Derogations  
Once the framework of the relevant market has been established, it is possible to 
proceed with the analysis of the arrangement under the provisions of competition law.  
Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits any agreement between undertakings or other forms of 
arrangements made by associations of undertakings which have the object or the effect 
of preventing, restricting or distorting the competition within the European Union.107 
The provision aims therefore to sanction collusions or otherwise joint conduct between 
two or more undertakings, which are capable of restricting the competition to an 
appreciable extent and affecting trade between Member States.108 Article 101 makes 
reference only to conduct that is characterised by a concurrence of wills109 and in 
                                                     
105 See the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) in Case T-111/08, MasterCard and Others v 
Commission [2012], ECR II-000, para. 171. 
106 See Niels, G., Jenkins, H. & Kavanagh, J. (2011) Economics for competition lawyers, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, p. 347. 
107 See Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
108 Although, as mentioned before, the provision in itself does not mention the appreciability requirement. See 
supra, note 53. 
109 See Case T-41/96, Bayer AG. V. Commission [2000] ECR II-3383, para. 69. 
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general an element of coordination and collusion:110 these are, more in particular, 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices. The Article in object is drafted in a form 
that aims at catching the collusion regardless of the form it takes, and a precise 
characterisation of the cooperation at issue will not alter in any way the analysis.111 
The arrangement falling under Article 101 TFEU has as its object or effect the 
restriction or distortion of the competition within the market. The two conditions are 
not cumulative, and the arrangement will be caught if either the object, or its effect, is 
to restrict or distort the competition.112 In particular, when an agreement or a conduct 
has an anti-competitive object, it will not be necessary to demonstrate its 
anticompetitive effects.113 However, while the evaluation of the effects of a conduct 
might be quite easily carried out by the competent authorities, the identification of an 
arrangement which has as its object the restriction of the competition demands more 
attention. Indeed, only in relation to some hard-core forms of restriction, such as price 
fixing and other arrangements that clearly limit the output of a certain product, can the 
restrictive object be assumed as existing without the need to further investigate the 
matter.114 This is because arrangements of this kind are by their very nature harmful to 
the competition on the market, to the point that they should be automatically 
prohibited, regardless of their actual effects on the market,115 and, accordingly, they 
                                                     
110 While Article 102 TFEU regulates the individual conduct of undertakings operating within the EU, by 
prohibiting the abuse of dominant position that they might hold. 
111 See Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax, Servicios de Información sobre Solvencia y Crédito, SL v Asociación 
de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc) [2006] ECR I-11125, para. 32. See also para. 128 of the 
Decision of the Commission 94/601/EC (IV/C/33.833 - Cartonboard), where the Commission held that it was 
not necessary to distinguish between an agreement and a concerted practice in case of complex infringements. 
However, the form of the conduct object of assessment may affect the approach taken to collect the evidences 
and to impose the penalty. See Marco Colino, S. (2011) Competition Law of the EU and UK, Oxford 
University Press, p. 154. 
112 See Case C-209/07, Competition Authority v. Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers 
(Carrigmore) Meals Ltd (BIDS) [2008] ECR I-8637, para. 15. 
113 See Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1964] ECR 299, at p. 342, and 
Case C-49/92 P, Anic Partecipazioni, [1999] ECR I-4125, para. 99. 
114 The Guidelines of the Commission on the application of Article 101(3) give some non-exhaustive 
examples of conduct that are considered restrictive by object. See Communication from the Commission - 
Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004], para. 21. 
115 Nicolas, P., (2009) The Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) EC - A Critical Review, IEJE 
Working Paper No. 4/2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1428558, last accessed on 5th, Dec 
2014.  
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should not even be an object of exemption.116 In relation to other kinds of conduct, the 
Commission should undertake an analysis that considers the content of the agreement 
and the objective pursued, the economic and legal context in which it will be applied, 
and the conduct of the parties on the market.117 In this light the Court of Justice has 
intervened to prevent possible abuses of this decision making procedure.118 The Court 
held that a restriction by object occurs, and can be found, when the arrangement 
hinders the competition in light of its objectives and the context in which it has been 
concluded, to the point that it is intended to modify the structure of the market.119 
Therefore, it has to be demonstrated that the agreement produces, by its very nature, an 
actual and sufficient degree of harm to the competition, while an assumption is not 
enough, or the mere capability of causing a restriction on the market.120 Furthermore, in 
those cases in which the agreement affects a two-sided market, or two related markets, 
the ability of restricting competition by object has to be demonstrated in relation to all 
the markets involved.121 
If the agreement is not restrictive by object, it will have to be assessed whether it 
produces or it is likely to produce restrictive effects. To assess those, the competitive 
                                                     
116 However, this strict position does not find support in the case law of the CJEU. In GlaxosmithKline, the 
CFI held that any agreement that restricts the competition, whether by its effects or by its object, may in 
principle benefit from an exemption. See Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited vs. 
Commission, [2006] ECR II-02969, para. 233. 
117 Rompuy, B. V., (2012). Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust policy?: Non-efficiency 
considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International. 
118 See Case C-67/13P Cartes Bancaires v European Commission [2014] n.y.p.. At para. 25 of the Judgment, 
the Court held that agreements which, inherently, pursue an objective the very nature of which is so serious or 
harmful that in order to establish that a conduct is restrictive by object, its negative impact on the functioning 
of competition is clear beyond doubt, and there is no need to assess its potential effect. 
119 See O’Regan, M., (2014), Restrictions by object: duck and elephant hunting with the Court of Justice, 
Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 20th October 2014, available at 
http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2014/10/20/restrictions-by-object-duck-and-elephant-hunting-with-the-
court-of-justice/  
120 However, this requirement appears to contradict the previous case law of the CJEU. See para. 31 of 
the Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands [2009] ECR I-04529, where the Court held that the anti-competitive 
object of a concerted practice could be proved if the arrangement had the potential, or was simply capable of 
having a negative impact on competition. 
121 See Case C-67/13P Cartes Bancaires v European Commission [2014] n.y.p, para. 34. 
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situation that would exist in the absence of the agreement should be taken into account, 
as well as the impact on existing and potential competition.122 
However, even private arrangements that present prima facie restrictive characteristics 
may still be excused from the prohibition when they pursue an aim that is recognised to 
improve competition within the market or if they are necessary for the pursuit of public 
policy interests.123 In this context, the Court has held in Wouters124 that, where 
restrictions are inherent to the pursuit of legitimate objectives, the conduct may be 
deemed not to fall under Article 101(1) TFEU.125 
Furthermore, some types of vertical agreements are specifically excluded from the 
prohibition set out by Article 101(1) TFEU in light of their clear pro-competitive 
effects. Regulation 330/2010126 stipulated that some vertical arrangements will 
normally satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU, in light of the efficiencies they 
create, by facilitating coordination and reducing distribution costs. This block 
exemption regards vertical agreements or concerted practices between two or more 
undertakings operating at different levels of the production or distribution chain, 
provided that the suppliers and buyers part of the arrangement do not hold a market 
share exceeding 30 per cent on their respective markets. The exemption will not be 
effective where the conduct leads to vertical price fixing and territorial protection.127 
 
5.1 Article 101(3) TFEU 
                                                     
122 See para. 24 of the Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, and Cases C-7/95 P, John 
Deere Ltd v. Commission, [1998] ECR I-3111, para. 77, and C-234/89 Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bräu 
AG. [1991] ECR I-0935 paras 14 – 21. 
123 See Article 10 of the Regulation 1/2003, granting the Commission the power to issue Decisions declaring 
Article 101 not applicable to the arrangement in object. See also Heide Jørgensen, C., 2013, Private 
Distortions of Competition and SSGIs, in U., Neergard, E Szyszczak, J.W. Van De Gronden, M. Krajewski 
eds. Social Services of General Interest, The Hague, Netherlands, T.M.C. Asser Press, pp. 263 – 286. 
124 Case C-309/99, Wouters [2002], ECR I-01577. 
125 See idem, para. 97. This approach is particularly important as the Court has subsequently applied it in the 
Meca Medina Case. See infra, Chap. 3. 
126 Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [OJ L 
102, 23.4.2010]. 
127 Craig, P. P. & De Búrca, G. (2011) EU law: text, cases, and materials. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
c2011; 5th ed, pp.972 et seq. Block exemptions are adopted only for a specific period of time, and they are 
kept under review throughout that period. 
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When an arrangement falls under the scope of Article 101(1), the only possible 
exemption from its prohibition might come from the fulfilment of the conditions set by 
Article 101(3) TFEU.128 The Authority examining the conduct will therefore have to 
weigh up the restrictive effects produced, with the pro-competitive effects that the 
arrangement creates.129 
The first of these conditions requires that the restrictive agreement contributes to 
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress.130 Hence, this assessment should highlight the types of efficiency 
gains that the arrangement is capable of creating, and the economic importance of such 
benefits.131 
The second condition mandates that the arrangement imposes only those restrictions 
that are indispensable to the attainment of the efficiencies. The restraint will be 
indispensable if the efficiencies could not be achieved in its absence,132 and it should 
thus be established that there are no other less restrictive means to achieve those 
efficiencies. 
The third requirement to be fulfilled is that consumers receive a fair share of the 
efficiencies generated by the agreement. In particular, this assessment requires the 
weighing of the negative and positive impacts of the arrangement on the consumers.133 
                                                     
128 Article 101(2) TFEU establishes that the restrictive arrangements prohibited by Article 101(1) are 
immediately void.  
129 Cseres, K.J., (2007), The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard, The Competition Law Review, 
3, 2, p. 156. Moreover, under Regulation No. 2821/71, the Commission is however specifically empowered to 
create block exemptions for agreements that fulfil the criteria of Article 101(3) TFEU. See CEE Regulation 
No 2821/71 of the Council of 20 December 1971 on application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to categories 
of agreements, decisions and concerted practices, [OJ L 285]. 
130 Article 101(3) has to be construed as presenting four separated conditions, although its formulation does 
not clarify this aspect. See para. 5 of the Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [OJ C 101]. 
131 See idem, para. 50. 
132 See idem, para. 79. 
133 In this context it has been decided to follow the order used by the Commission in its guidelines. See idem, 
para. 39. Indeed, as the condition related to the benefit of consumers requires a balancing of the pro- and anti-
competitive effects, it is only logical that this exercise would not include those conduct that bring about 
restrictions that are not necessary to achieve the efficiencies. See Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU 
competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 5th ed., p. 258, citing Faull and 
Nikpay (eds.) The Ec Law of Competition, para. 3.436. 
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Finally, the agreement must not eliminate the competition in respect of a substantial 
part of the product. Preserving the competition on the market is thus more important 
than creating short-term efficiency gains.134 This factor, however, highly depends on 
the conditions of the competition existing on the market prior to the restrictive 
arrangement. Where the competition was already weak, restrictive agreements are more 
likely to eliminate the competition. Furthermore, if competition is eliminated in relation 
to price, innovation or other important factors, the agreement should be immediately 
regarded as illegal.135 
In order to clarify some of the doubts and concerns related to the application and the 
interpretation of this provision, the Commission has published a series of Guidelines, 
which should inform the analysis under Article 101(3) TFEU.136 The Guidelines clearly 
affirm that the conditions set out in Article 101(3) have to be cumulatively fulfilled in 
order to grant an exemption to a restrictive conduct.137 These conditions are also 
exhaustive, meaning that when they are fulfilled, the granting of the exemption cannot 
be subject to further conditions.138 
The Guidelines, however, do not completely fulfil their aim, as they leave some areas 
of uncertainty, particularly in relation to the definition of the type of efficiencies 
required and the passing on of the benefits to consumers. 
 
5.1.1 The benefit of Consumers 
The Guidelines firstly establish that the goal of Article 101 TFEU is to protect 
competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring 
an efficient allocation of resources.139 However, when it comes to the definition of 
                                                     
134 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [OJ C 101], para. 105. 
135 See Rompuy, B. V., (2012). Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust policy?: Non-
efficiency considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International. 
136 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [OJ C 
101 of 27.4.2004]. 
137 As established by the relevant case law. See Case T-185/00 and others, Métropole télévision SA (M6), 
[2002] ECR II-3805, paragraph 86. 
138 See Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [OJ C 101], para. 42. 
139 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [OJ C 
101 of 27.4.2004], para. 13. 
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consumers, as those who should receive a fair share of the benefits, the notion used by 
the Commission does not coincide with that of final consumer. 
Contrary to the area of Consumer Protection Law, where the term consumer is intended 
as comprising any natural person who is acting for purposes which are not related to his 
trade, business or profession,140 its interpretation in the area of antitrust law is much 
broader. Indeed, in this context the notion is by no means limited only to final 
consumers, but it rather comprises also all the intermediate customers, direct or indirect 
user of the products, including the producers that receive the product of the agreement 
as an input, wholesalers, retailers and lastly final consumers.141 
Thus, as set down in the Guidelines, consumers have to receive a fair share of the 
benefits created by the restrictive arrangement. It means that the passing on of the 
efficiencies produced should compensate ‘consumers’ for any negative effects that they 
suffer, or that the restriction will likely cause them.142 The group of consumers affected 
by the restriction should therefore be substantially the same that receives the 
subsequent benefits. The Commission has in fact argued that negative effects on 
consumers in one geographic or product market cannot be compensated through 
efficiencies created on another unrelated market.143 However, in cases where the two 
separated markets involved are nonetheless related and the consumers affected are the 
same, the efficiencies thereby created might be taken into account.144  
                                                     
140 See Article 2 of the Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council [OJ L 304]. 
141 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [OJ C 
101 of 27.4.2004], para. 84. 
142 See idem, para. 85 and Cseres, K.J., (2007), The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard, The 
Competition Law Review, 3, 2, p. 168. 
143 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [OJ C 
101 of 27.4.2004], para. 43. 
144 Lianos, I. (2012) Competition law in the European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, in The European 
Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, Ed. By Ashiagbor, D. Countouris, N., Lianos, I., Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 252 – 283. 
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For consumers, the net effect between the restriction and the efficiencies should be at 
least neutral.145 If the agreement leads to an increase of prices, the compensation should 
take a form that is equally valued by consumers, such as an improvement in terms of 
quality or in the range of products offered on the market.146 However, when an 
agreement improves the production, distribution or technical innovation, thus satisfying 
the first condition of Article 101(3) TFEU, the Commission usually assumes that 
consumers will consequently receive a fair share of this benefits.147 Instead, according 
to the Guidelines, the Commission should carry out an economic analysis of the various 
factors, therefore also examining which efficiencies were passed on to consumers and 
whether those could amount to a fair share of the benefit.148 
The Guidelines have also taken into account the possibility that the efficiencies might 
be produced only some time after the restriction occurred and the subsequent negative 
effects have taken place. In this case, the greater the time lag between the moments in 
which the effects are produced, the greater the benefit for consumers ought to be to 
compensate them for the loss suffered.149 
 
5.1.2 Economic efficiencies 
The efficiencies that an agreement might be capable of creating could take a number of 
forms: the arrangement might lead to economic efficiencies and non-economic 
                                                     
145 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [OJ C 
101 of 27.4.2004], para. 85, and Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/66, Consten and Grundig, [1966] ECR 429, at p. 
348. 
146 Lianos, I (2013), Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law. CLES Working 
Paper Series 3/2013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2235875 Accessed on 21, Nov. 2014. 
147 See Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
[OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004], para. 90 and for an example See infra the Decision of the Commission in the case 
COMP/C.2-37.398 Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League at paras. 152 and 
171. 
148 See Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
[OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004], para. 95 et seq. 
149 See idem, para. 87. However, there is a certain inconsistency in taking into account future consumers but 
not consumers affected in markets not related to the one analysed. See Rosenboom N.S.R., (2013), How does 
article 101(3) TFEU case law relate to EC guidelines and the welfare perspective?, Seo Economic Research 
Working Paper, Amsterdam, p.9. 
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benefits.150 Direct economic benefits may be defined as cost efficiencies, directly 
affecting the price of the product, and qualitative efficiencies, which are created 
through new or higher quality products, and greater product variety.151 In some cases, 
the efficiency will in fact be of a qualitative nature, rather than involving a cost 
reduction. On the other hand, non-economic efficiencies may include cultural or 
environmental benefits, or may be related to employment, or other aspects strictly non-
pecuniary.152 
In the context of the Guidelines, however, the Commission has clearly affirmed that the 
only efficiencies that it will take into account are quantifiable benefits of an economic 
nature, intended as including only cost and qualitative efficiencies. Accordingly, other 
goals that have to be pursued under other Treaty provisions might be taken into account 
only insofar as they can be subsumed under the four conditions set out in Article 
101(3).153 Under this approach, other factors, for example cultural or societal, should 
not be considered, unless they would be capable of being translated into quantifiable 
economic efficiencies.154 This theoretical stance should also be referred to objectives of 
public interest, which should be considered solely in the context of the analysis under 
Article 101(1) TFEU. If under Article 101(1) the restriction has been deemed to fall 
outside of the scope of the provision, in light of the public objectives that it pursues, it 
will not be necessary to analyse it under Article 101(3) TFEU. 155 
In some cases, however, the Commission itself has integrated public interest objectives 
into the assessment of the restriction under Article 101(3) TFEU. In CECED, for 
                                                     
150 See Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
[OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004], para. 59 et seq. 
151 Townley, C., (2011), Which Goals Count in Article 101 TFEU?: Public Policy and its Discontents, 
European Competition Law Review. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1894837 
152 For a discussion on the nature of the efficiencies that might be created and accepted in this context, See 
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OFT breakfast roundtable (London, Office of Fair Trading, May 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/events/roundtable-article101(3). 
153 See Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
[OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004], para. 44. 
154 See Rompuy, B. V., (2012). Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust policy?: Non-
efficiency considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International. 
155 Heide Jørgensen, C., (2013), Private Distortions of Competition and SSGIs, in U., Neergard, E Szyszczak, 
J.W. Van De Gronden, M. Krajewski eds. Social Services of General Interest, The Hague, Netherlands, 
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example, the Commission, rather than requiring individual consumers to benefit from 
the economic efficiencies created through the restriction, took into account collective 
benefits to the environment and balanced them against the restriction of the 
competition.156 The Commission regarded those environmental benefits as a factor 
contributing to the improvement of production or distribution, or the promotion of 
economic or technical progress.157 It therefore used a reference to a possible economic 
dimension of the environmental benefits to justify efficiencies that were not directly 
quantifiable in economic terms.158 
In relation to this, the position of the Court of Justice appears to be more flexible, since 
it took account of different forms of benefit stemming from the agreements analysed, 
and also in relation to effects created not only on the relevant market identified, but 
also in other markets.159 This latter approach might be seen as an expression of the 
obligation placed on the Member States and the EU institutions not to prejudice the 
achievement of the Treaty goals, where non-economic goals should be considered as 
well in the analysis under Article 101(3).160 
To further complicate the matter, though, a number of Treaty articles prescribe that 
some non-efficiency considerations have to be taken into account in the 
implementation and enforcement of all EU policies,161 thereby imposing such an 
obligation on the Commission and the Court of Justice as well. When these are the 
objectives that should inform the activity of the EU institutions, their relevance has to 
be taken into account in relation to competition law as well. 
                                                     
156 Commission Decision no. 2000/475/EC, CECED [1999] OJ L187/47, paras. 55–57.  
157 See Lianos, I. (2012) Competition law in the European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, in The European 
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6. Abuse of Dominant Position under Article 102 TFEU 
The second main provision of EU competition law is Article 102 TFEU. This norm 
prohibits an undertaking which holds a dominant position on a specific market from 
abusing of its power.162  
Dominance is established when an undertaking is in such a position of strength in the 
relevant market that it is able to prevent effective competition from rival undertakings 
and act to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors and consumers.163 In 
plain words, dominance exists when an undertaking is able to use its power to obtain 
advantages or behave on the market in a way that would not be possible in conditions 
of effective competition.164 Dominance does not require the constitution of a 
monopoly,165 but just the ability to restrict competition through unilateral actions.166 In 
this perspective, very large market shares are already considered solid evidence of the 
existence of a position of dominance.167 
A position of dominance can be held by a single undertaking, or it can be identified in a 
collective conduct of a group of undertakings.168 In this instance, the individual 
companies that exercise a collective dominance on the market have to be sufficiently 
                                                     
162 Sport Associations usually have practical monopolies over their sport, and therefore are likely to have a 
position of dominance over the organisation of sporting events in a specific territory. See Geeraert, A., (2013). 
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applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (OJ 2009/C 
45/02), para. 4. 
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connected amongst each other to adopt a conduct that restricts or eliminates 
competition on the market.169 
An undertaking in such a position is therefore prevented from abusing of its power: 
dominant undertakings have in fact a special responsibility, in light of their power, to 
protect the undistorted competition on the common market.170 European Union law 
does not prohibit the constitution of a position of dominance per se, but only its 
abuse.171 It is therefore necessary to understand what the concept of abuse is before 
moving forward. The Court of Justice clarified that an abuse of dominance is a type of 
behaviour which can influence the structure of a market where the level of competition 
is weakened and hinder the competition still existing.172 
Article 102 TFEU identifies some specific examples of conduct that amount to an 
abuse where put in place by a dominant undertaking. Thus, such an undertaking cannot 
impose unfair purchase prices, or selling prices or other conditions. It cannot limit the 
production, the commercialisation or the technical development of products to the 
prejudice of consumers. Furthermore, the application of dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions will amount to an abuse of power, as well as making the 
conclusion of contracts subjects to supplementary obligations not connected with the 
object of that contract.173 
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Objective Justifications in the Case of prima facie Dominance Abuses? in Journal of European Competition 
Law & Practice, p. 129. 
171 See Marco Colino, S. (2011) Competition Law of the EU and UK, Oxford University Press, p. 257. See 
also Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-527, para. 24 and Case T-
41/96, Bayer AG V Commission [2000], ECR II-03383, para. 176, where the Court held that the Commission 
was not entitled to prohibit unilateral conduct which did not amount to an abuse of dominant position, despite 
possible restrictive consequences could have arisen from it.  
172 See Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission, [1979] ECR 00461, para. 91 and Case 
6/72, Europemballage and Continental v. Commission [1973] ECR 215, where the Court held that the 
acquisition of shares in a competing undertaking which had the effect of increasing a position of dominance 
already held constituted an abuse. 
173 The list of conduct included in Article 102 TFEU is not exhaustive. See idem, at para. 26. 
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More in general, conduct that might constitute abuses are usually distinguished on the 
basis of the subject that suffers the harm caused by the restriction. An abuse will be 
named exploitative when it aims at harming the customers, by setting excessive prices 
for instance. Where the abuse is harming the competitors of the dominant undertaking 
or the competition in general, it is referred to as exclusionary.174 The notion of 
exclusionary abuse includes conduct that have as their objective the elimination of 
competitors or in general the preservation of the position of dominance held by the 
undertaking on the market.175 
As it was said also in relation to other restrictive conduct falling under Article 101 
TFEU, an abuse of dominant position is considered to be relevant only when it has an 
appreciable effect on trade between Member States, if it interferes with the pattern of 
trade or the structure of the competition within the internal market.176 The related 
assessment should take into consideration the volume of goods and services affected in 
comparison with the overall volume of the relevant market.177 
The objective of Article 102 TFEU is the protection of competition on the market as a 
means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of 
resources.178 Similarly to the Guidelines on Article 101, the Guidance on Article 102 
affirms that the goal of the provision is to prevent dominant undertakings from 
adversely affecting competition in a way leading to negative effects for consumer 
welfare.179 In this sense, it could be argued that this provision is aiming at protecting 
the freedom to compete and the general structure of the market, as opposed to the 
                                                     
174 Chalmers, D., Davies, G. & Monti, G. (2014), European Union law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom, p.1035. 
175 See Marco Colino, S. (2011) Competition Law of the EU and UK, Oxford University Press, p. 280. 
176 See Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 5th ed., p. 284. 
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178 See Akman, P., (2008), 'Consumer' Versus 'Customer': The Devil in the Detail. ESRC Centre for 
Competition Policy Working Paper No. 08-34, citing EC Commission ‘DG Competition Discussion Paper on 
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179 See the Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (OJ 2009/C 
45/02), para. 19. 
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economic efficiencies that are instead pursued under Article 101 TFEU.180 However, 
firms that are capable of dominating the market have also the kind of power that is 
likely to reduce the efficiency on the market itself. Indeed, under these circumstance 
the market lacks the competitive pressures that would be capable of preventing 
undertakings from raising prices and reducing output.181 Furthermore, Article 102 does 
not focus on the interest of consumers, since it does not require evidence of consumer 
harm.182 In particular, Article 102 TFEU does not require it to be demonstrated that the 
abuse had an actual or direct effect on consumers. Only the provision under Article 
102(b) takes into account the consumers, when they might suffer a prejudice by an 
arrangement which can limit the production, marketing and technical development in a 
market.183 The protection of the interests of consumers, in this perspective, should be 
assured by the prevention or prohibition of distortion of the market structure.184 
Conduct capable of infringing Article 102 TFEU might still be considered acceptable 
when they can be objectively justified:185 when arrangements are prima facie 
restrictive, they can be accepted186 if based on legitimate commercial behaviours,187 
efficiency considerations188 and public interest considerations.189 Nevertheless, the 
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applying Article 102 TFEU to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009], OJ C45, para. 
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189 See Van der Vijver, T. 2012, Article 102 TFEU: How to Claim the Application of Objective Justifications 
in the Case of prima facie Dominance Abuses? in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, p. 122. 
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exclusionary effect created by the arrangement must have a connection with the benefit 
created and not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objectives.190 
 
7. The role of the State on the Market 
While Article 101 and 102 TFEU provide a discipline for undertakings operating 
within the internal market, it might be said that Article 106 and 107 aim at regulating 
the intrusion of the State and its relationship with undertakings active on the national 
market. The intervention of the State might take place through public undertakings, 
controlled or owned by the State itself, or through the granting of unlawful advantages 
to private undertakings. The prohibitions set by Article 106 and 107 TFEU are 
therefore generally addressed to Member States, not to the undertakings. 
If a regulation, a conduct or an arrangement falls into the scope of these Articles, the 
only possible exceptions are those expressly prescribed by the Treaty itself. 
 
7.1 Article 106 TFEU 
Article 106 TFEU imposes the rules of competition law also on public undertakings 
and on those undertakings that provide a service of public interest, insofar as the 
application of such rules does not obstruct the completion of the tasks assigned. The 
provision consists of an exemption from the application of competition law for public 
undertakings in cases in which they are carrying out services of public interest. 
However, the development of trade must not be therein affected to an extent that would 
be contrary to the interest of the Union.191 
The concept of public undertaking includes entities over which the public authorities 
may exercise, directly or indirectly, a dominant influence, through ownership or 
                                                     
190 See Case C-95/04 P British Airways v Commission [2007] ECR I-2331, para. 86. Moreover, the restriction 
should not eliminate competition, as from Case C-209/10 Post Danmark v Konkurrencerådet [2012] 4 CMLR 
23, para. 42. 
191 This is expression of the duty of Member States to loyally cooperate for the objectives of the Union, as 
established by Article 4 TEU. See Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU competition law: text, cases, and 
materials, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 5th ed., p. 603. 
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control.192 This notion has to be broad enough to comprise the differences existing 
amongst Member States, and prevent them from adopting their own definition, which 
would deprive the provision of its effects. In relation to these undertakings, Article 106 
(1) TFEU prohibits Member States from enacting or maintaining in force any measure 
contrary to EU competition law, and which are therefore likely to distort competition 
on the market.193 
In relation to undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic 
interest,194 Member States must have specifically assigned them a certain task or 
function,195 or certain obligations must have been imposed on them by the State in the 
pursuit of the general economic interest.196 This notion includes the use of an 
undertaking as an instrument of economic, social and fiscal policy,197 which delivers 
outcomes in the overall public good that would not be supplied by the market without 
public intervention.198  
The entrustment of a public service task implies that the undertaking will supply a 
service that it would have not carried out if it was considering only its own commercial 
interest.199 
                                                     
192 The definition is taken from Article 2(b) of the Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 
on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings as well as on 
financial transparency within certain undertakings (OJ L 318/17). 
193 Again, this is a general provision that aims at comprising a number of different measures, without defining 
them strictly. For a list of examples of these types of measure, see Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU 
competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 5th ed., p. 628 et seq. 
194 Services of General Economic Interest are regulated also in Article 14 of the Treaty of the European 
Union, Protocol no. 26 on Services of General Interest, and a number of soft law provisions. It must be 
noticed, however, that there is no official definition of Services of General Economic Interest, and therefore 
the notion has to be construed through the use of the case law. See Ølykke, G.S. & Møllgaard, P. (2013), 
What is a service of general economic interest? European Journal of Law and Economics. 
195 See the Decision of the Commission 85/77/EEC of 10 December 1984 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/30.717 - Uniform Eurocheques), [1985], OJ L35/43. 
196 See Case C-203/96, Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV and Others v Minister van Volkshuisvesting, 
Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer.[1998] ECR I-4075, Opinion of Jacobs AG, para. 103. 
197 Case C-202/88, France v. Commission [1991] ECR I-1223, para. 12, and Case C-67/79, Albany 
International v Stichting [1999] ECR I-5751, paras. 103-105.  
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Undertakings providing services of public interest are usually subject to some form of 
regulation or control by the State, even if the latter does not hold direct ownership of 
the company. The services that these undertakings carry out will be characterised for 
being accessible to the public, for their continuity, quality and affordability, and for the 
protection of consumers.200 The reduction of the autonomy in setting regulations, prices 
and other conditions could therefore be seen as the price to be paid for a possible 
exemption from the rules of competition law. The State will in fact impose specific 
legal obligations on that company to perform a defined public service, under certain 
conditions. 
It is up to Member States to identify those companies that carry out an activity 
constituting a service of general economic interest. Article 106 TFEU provides only a 
proportionality requirement, which means that the Commission has only the power to 
test the determination when there has been a manifest error of assessment.201 The 
identification will be justified where the compensation for the provision of the service 
does not exceed the cost sustained, plus a reasonable profit,202 and whether in the event 
that such an undertaking would cease providing the service of general interest, the 
obligation would be transferred to the State.203 
The most common example of public undertakings for the analysis that will be carried 
out in the thesis could be provided by public broadcasting companies.204 However, 
other entities active in the sporting sector can take the form of public bodies too. The 
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question that might be relevant in this scenario is whether sport in general can be 
considered as a service of general economic interest.205  
 
7.2 State Aid 
As mentioned before, Member States can distort competition within the internal market 
by favouring one or more undertakings. Hence, the last provision that will be discussed 
in this chapter is Article 107 TFEU. This norm sanctions any aid granted by a Member 
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition. 
The objective of this legislation is to ensure that Member States, or public entities 
connected to Member States, do not distort competition and trade within the common 
market. The aim is to prevent private undertakings from being placed in a more 
favourable conditions than their competitors through State resources.206 The Treaty 
contains a general prohibition, but it nevertheless recognizes that public intervention 
might be necessary in certain circumstances for the well-functioning of the economy 
and the promotion of the welfare of the citizens of the Union.207 The aim is therefore to 
establish a balance between some legitimate forms of public intervention on the market 
and the protection required to ensure the conditions of fair competition.208 
A State aid might be generally defined as an advantage conferred on a selective basis to 
specific undertakings by national public authorities,209 which can be characterised as a 
transfer of resources from the State to a company, or a form of relief from charges 
                                                     
205 The Independent Sport Review argued that sport federations fulfil tasks of relevant general economic 
interest on the basis that in some EU Member States sport is identified as a Constitutional Right. See Arnaut J 
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which the company has to bear in normal circumstances, when the advantage is 
provided without adequate compensation.210 
From the general definition given above, it can be inferred that under the scope of the 
provision in question it is irrelevant the form that the aid takes. The concept of State aid 
is therefore a broad one and might include subsidies,211 tax reliefs,212 guarantees213 or 
provision of goods and services on preferential terms.214 There is no exhaustive list of 
measures falling under the State aid rule: the norm regulates any form of aid or subsidy 
granted by a Member State to private undertakings.215 Hence it is the effect of the 
measure, rather than its denomination, form, causes and objectives that has to be 
scrutinised.216 
The most important characteristic of the measures under the scope of this analysis is the 
fact that they are intended to favour certain specific undertakings in the production or 
distribution of goods. The selective advantage places the undertaking in a position that 
it would not have reached under normal market conditions. There cannot be selectivity 
if the measure is general and applicable to all the companies operating within the 
Member State,217 and the requirement will be satisfied only where the undertaking is 
chosen in light of properties that are specific to it, and differentiate it from other 
categories.218 
In order to appreciate this aspect, the selectivity has to be assessed by means of a three-
step test: firstly the system of reference has to be identified, then it will be determined 
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whether the measure constitutes a derogation from that system and if it differentiates 
between operators who are in a comparable situation; and finally it will be assessed if 
the measure is justified by the general nature of the system.219 The authority 
investigating the measure has thus to identify and examine the regime that is usually 
applicable to this type of undertaking in the Member State concerned, and consider 
whether the granting of such a measure is expression of a discretionary power.220  
The notion of State aid is referred only to those measures that are granted by the State 
or through State resources.221 The current approach of the European institutions in this 
regard is focused on the control exercised over the measure, rather than on the original 
source of the funding. Public Authorities have to be involved in the deployment of the 
funding: any fund will be considered a State resource if it it has passed under the 
control or at disposal of the State.222 However, this broad definition includes also the 
granting of advantages made by regional or local authorities and even private bodies, as 
long as they are established or specifically appointed by the State to administer the 
fund.223 
As it has been already said in relation to the other rules of competition law, a State aid 
is prohibited only if it is capable of affecting trade between Member States. In this 
regard, the Court has recognised that trade between Member States might be affected 
even when the undertaking involved does not trade across borders.224 Moreover, the 
actual effect does not need to be proven, the potential restrictive consequence on trade 
is sufficient.225 However, measures that provide only support for the construction of 
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local infrastructures are rarely capable of raising concerns as they do not carry inter-
state implications, and therefore they do not affect trade between Member States.226 
The role of the undertakings involved has to be carefully assessed from this angle as 
well. While the definition of an undertaking that has been given earlier in this 
chapter227 maintains its validity in this context, the specific function and role of the 
individual undertaking comes into play. Indeed, when the entity receiving the grant is 
performing a State function, the measure will fall outside the scope of the provision. In 
particular, where the aid is granted to finance an undertaking providing services of 
general economic interest, the measure will be covered by Article 106(2) TFEU.228 
Similarly, where the funding is aimed at a public project that is not meant to be 
commercially exploited, it will not be considered unlawful, as it will not grant any 
advantages to the undertakings involved.229 The measure will finally not be relevant 
where it is considered indispensable, and the market would not be able or willing to 
offer it.230 Provided that the aid does not benefit some individual undertakings in 
particular, the rules of competition law will not prohibit it. 
In the event that a measure will fall under the prohibition set by Article 107(1) TFEU, 
the only exemptions that are expressly mentioned within the Treaty are to be found in 
the second and third paragraphs of Article 107. Article 107(2) establishes that, in light 
of specific circumstances, some measures are deemed compatible with the rules of the 
internal market, leaving no discretion to the Commission to decide whether to exempt 
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them from the prohibition.231 These types of aid are required to have a social character, 
being granted to individual consumers and not discriminating in relation to the origin of 
the products concerned. Other types of aid considered in this provision are those 
measures enacted to provide support for areas or sectors hit by natural disasters or other 
exceptional circumstances. Finally, aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the 
former Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany are deemed 
legitimate.232 The Treaty thus leaves room for a number of public policy objectives that 
might be pursued through public resources, without falling under the prohibition set by 
Article 107 TFEU, provided that certain conditions are met.233 
Furthermore, Article 107(3) lists a number of measures that may be considered 
compatible with the provisions of the Treaty in light of the objectives they pursue:234 
they will be accepted only insofar as they contribute to the achievement of those 
common objectives set out by the Article itself.235 Therefore, contrary to the previous 
provision, these measures are not deemed compatible with EU Law a priori, and the 
Commission has some discretion in deciding whether to exempt them from the general 
prohibition.236  
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 51
The institution will carry out an assessment of the measure, weighing up the benefits it 
might create, against the restriction to free competition that it is likely to cause.237 
Finally, other categories of aid might be specifically exempted by a Decision of the 
Council on a proposal from the Commission. 
Measures that are likely to amount to forms of State aid must generally be notified to 
the Commission, which will assess their compliance with EU law, before being enacted 
by the Member State.238 While paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 107 provide for a strict set 
of exemptions, the Council has enabled the Commission to adopt a number of so-called 
Block Exempting Regulations for some types of State aid.239 Under these regulations, 
the Commission can declare specific categories of State aid to be compatible with the 
Treaty, provided that they fulfil certain criteria.240 The Commission has enacted a series 
of these regulations, the last at the time of writing being the GBER II.241 The inclusion 
of a particular kind of measure in the Block Regulation exempts the State from the 
requirement of prior notification of the measure and Commission approval.242 
 
7.2.1 Market Economy Operator Principle 
When the Commission has to analyse the compliance of a State aid measure with the 
provisions of the Treaty, one principle that will have to be taken into account is the 
Market Economy Operator Principle. Under this type of test, a public authority is fully 
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239 Council Regulation No 994/98 of 7 May 1998, amended by Council Regulation No 733/2013 of 22 July 
2013 
240 The Block Exemption Regulation includes measures enacted in the following sectors: SMEs, Research, 
Development and Innovation, environmental protection, employment and training, regional aid, and de 
minimis aid that excludes the application of the rules for measure below a certain threshold.  
241 See Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty [2014] OJ L 187/1. 
This is in particular important in the context of this study, as it provides an exemption also for the funding of 
sports and recreational infrastructures. See infra, Chap. on State Aid. 
242 A Block exemption regulation is possible only in relation to those areas where the Commission and the 
Member States have acquired a good level of experience through established practice and case law. See 
Commission Staff Working Document - Action Plan ‘Pierre de Coubertin’ - Accompanying document to the 
White Paper on Sport {COM (2007) 391 final} {SEC (2007)932} {SEC (2007)935} {SEC (2007)936} at 
p.28. 
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entitled to operate on the market under the same terms and conditions to which a 
private operator would agree.243 Where this is the case, the selected undertaking that 
gets funded or that is part of the arrangement does not get an advantage from the 
granting of the investments, as it could have received the same financing from the 
market.244 The same principle applies for the assessment of loans granted to 
undertakings or for waiver or restructuring of debts.245 Where this test is applicable, the 
Commission is under a duty to take the principle into account to establish the existence 
of a State aid.246 The Member State granting the measure under assessment has thus to 
demonstrate that the decision of the public authority is based upon economic 
evaluations that are comparable to those that a private investor would have carried out 
in order to determine the profitability of its investment.247 
The Commission has discussed the methodologies that may be employed when 
assessing a measure under the Market Operator Test.248 The first and most immediate 
method of comparison looks at the price paid for the sale and purchase of similar 
assets, goods and services. In this case the market price is the highest price that a 
private vendor is willing to pay for a public asset, or receive for the selling.249 
However, a private operator might accept an offer lower than the higher bid, where 
                                                     
243 See Case C-124/10 P, European Commission v Électricité de France (EDF), [2012] ECR I-0000, para. 78. 
244 Slocock, B, (2002), The Market Economy Investor Principle, Competition Policy Newsletter, reiterating 
that the presence of an advantage in a State aid measure is assessed by reference with what would have been 
the situation in the absence of the measure.  
245 And can therefore be expressed as Private Investor Principle (see e.g. C-303/88, Italy v Commission [1991] 
ECR I-1433, paragraph 20), or Private Creditor Principle (see e.g. Case C-342/6, Spain v. Commission 
(Tubacex) [1999] ECR I-2459). 
246 In EDF the Court of Justice annulled the decision of the Commission that had not applied the Test. 
However, the Test is not applicable to measures that are enacted by a public authority exercising its regulatory 
or fiscal power, rather than carrying out an economic activity. See Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU 
competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 5th ed., State aid chapter, p.52 - 
53. 
247 See Case C-124/10 P, European Commission v Électricité de France (EDF), [2012] ECR I-0000, para. 85. 
248 Draft Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU, 17 January 2014, 
para. 100 et seq. 
249 See Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 5th ed., State aid chapter, p. 59, and Case C-390/98, H.J. Banks & Co. Ltd v The Coal 
Authority and Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, [2001] ECR I-6117, paragraph 77. 
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justified by considerations other than price. Hence, if a private operator would take 
those factors into account, the same can be done by a public authority.250 
Where it is not possible to refer immediately to market data to establish whether a 
transaction is in line with market conditions, the assessment might use a benchmarking 
system or other methods. When the transaction is assessed through the benchmarking 
system, the conditions are compared with terms and conditions of a transaction that 
would have been carried out by comparable private operators in a comparable situation.  
In this scenario, it is necessary to pay particular attention to the type of operator 
involved in the transaction, the type of transaction and the characteristics of the market 
concerned. Alternatively, the transaction might be assessed on the basis of generally 
accepted standards,251 based on the available objective and data.  
Finally, although it is assumed that the conduct of a private investor on the market is 
guided by the aim of maximising profits without running excessive risks, and in light of 
an average return of the investment in relation to a particular commercial sector,252 the 
Commission has an obligation to take into account all the factors that influence a 
transaction. The Courts have therefore accepted that the private investor may not 
require only a short-term return of its investment, and a structural policy of long-term 




This chapter has tried to illustrate the main notions, principles and provisions of 
competition law that are applicable within the market of the European Union. 
This part of the project has intentionally avoided any reference to the sport system, 
with the aim of giving a clear general framework, which will be used to analyse the 
rules and conduct in sport and sports related matter. It is however possible to foresee 
                                                     
250 See Commission Decision 2008/719/EC on State aid C56/06 implemented by Austria for the privatisation 
of Bank Burgenland [2008] OJ L 239/32, paras 120–122. 
251 See Case T-366/00 Scott v Commission [2007] ECR II-797, para. 134. 
252 Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Commission [2003] ECR II-435, 
para. 255. 
253 See Case C-305/89, Italy v. Commission (Alfa Romeo No. 1) [1991] ECR I-1603, para.20. 
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that all the provisions mentioned in this chapter might be applied to specific rules and 
arrangements existing within a sport system. It is important to stress the objectives of 
the rules and the interpretation and standard chosen by the authorities in the context of 
their application. The main question in this regard is whether considerations other than 
economic-efficiency might find their way within the application of competition law, 
and which provisions entail the possibility of taking them into account. 
In the following sections, the thesis will therefore endeavour to establish whether and 
how these provisions have been applied to sport, and try to identify a systematic 
approach in this process, in order to understand how some areas of the sports system 
could be regulated in the future. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Sporting Value 
 
1. Introduction; 2. Sport and the Law; 3. Categorisation of Sporting Rules; 4. The 
European sport system; 5. Sport Specificity and Consequences; 5.1. The 
Characteristics of Sport; 5.2. Sporting practice v. economic activity; 5.3. The Sporting 
Labour Market; 5.4 The Sporting Product Market; 6. EU Sports Policy; 6.1. The White 




This chapter will analyse the values and characteristics that underlie the sport system, 
as opposed to the rules of the market discussed in the preceding chapter. The chapter 
assesses whether there is a need for a specific application of the rules of competition 
law to sports related matters. In doing so, it is necessary to understand the features and 
characteristics of sport.  
Sport is a phenomenon uniquely characterised by an interaction between socio-cultural 
and commercial aspects, which have to find a balance. In this context, the fact that the 
fundamental nature of sport is to provide entertainment distinguishes the game itself 
from productive activities.254 However, this nature has been profoundly impacted upon 
by the commercial aspirations and goals pursued by sports associations, leagues and 
clubs. It is therefore important to assess whether and to what extent these aspects are 
capable of affecting the nature of the sporting activity, and the matters related to it. 
The first part of the chapter will present an overview of the debate on the application of 
law to sport, taking into consideration the positions of Academics that have taken part 
in the discussion from its origin, including those who have taken a rigorous position in 
applying law to sport and those who seek to rely more on the autonomy and specificity 
of sport. In this context, it is also important to clearly highlight the classification of the 
                                                     
254 See the citation from Scalia J, dissenting, PGA Tour, Inc v Martin 532 US 661 (2001) 204 F 3d 994, 
affirmed, in Gardiner, S., Gardiner, S., O'Leary, J., Welch, R., Boyes, S. & Naidoo, U. (2012) Sports law / 
Simon Gardiner ... [et al.]. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2012; 4th ed, p.69. 
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sporting rules that will be adopted for the remaining part of the thesis. In order to 
present a coherent subdivision, this discussion will consider the nature of these rules 
and the objectives they pursue. This process, which will continue throughout the thesis, 
will allow us to understand whether rules and conduct are treated differently in relation 
to their purpose or justification, and therefore to what extent and depth the application 
of competition law has taken these elements into account. 
The second part of the chapter will seek to assess what the inherent characteristics of 
sport are. Starting from the nature of the activity, and moving to the economic aspects 
and the differences with other industries, the section will also endeavour to identify the 
consequences that may be derived from this assessment. In order to offer a 
comprehensive analysis of the topic, the research will be focused on the characteristics 
of the product that the industry offers on the market, and of the labour market within 
the sporting industry.  
The assessment of the features presented will answer one of the fundamental questions 
underlying the research and provide an original contribution to the body of knowledge. 
Finally, the chapter will provide an overview of the way European institutions have 
framed their policy towards sport throughout the years. In this regard, account will be 
taken of the soft law measures that have been adopted by the various institutions, with 
the objective of assessing also their relevance in the context of the development of 
European sports law.255 This will help identifying the relationship framework that has 
been established between EU institutions and Sports Governing Bodies, and it will 
allow the research to offer an analysis of its effectiveness under a legal point of view. 
 
2. Sport and the Law 
There is no general definition of sport commonly accepted and recognised.256 Much of 
the literature tends to identify sport as a vehicle towards some specific objectives, 
                                                     
255 See Parrish, R. (2012), Lex Sportiva and EU Sports Law, European Law Review, 37, Dec, pp. 716-733. 
256 See Soek, J., (2006) Sport in national sports acts and constitutions: definition, ratio legis and objectives. 
International Sports Law Journal 3–4:28–34. 
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either societal, commercial, or cultural.257 However, the European Sports Charter of the 
Council of Europe refers to sport as any form ‘of physical activity258 which, through 
casual or organised participation, aim at expressing or improving physical fitness and 
mental well-being, forming social relationships or obtaining results in competition at 
all levels.’259 
The phenomenon of sport is multifaceted and can be discussed in relation to its role as 
a physical and leisure activity, or its role in society, or the economic aspects that it 
involves. However, in order to proceed with the analysis and give account of the values 
and characteristics of sport, it is necessary to provide an overview of the discussion 
about the general application of law to sport and the notion of sports law, before 
moving to more specific considerations. 
When we first think about sport there are certain aspects that immediately confer it a 
degree of exemption from the application of ordinary law. The epitome of this concept 
is represented by contact disciplines, such as boxing, where hitting and causing injuries 
to another person is the main purpose of the sport itself, with only very limited 
intervention of criminal law.260 Similarly, labour law does not apply to athletes in the 
same way as it is applied to workers in other industries.261 Furthermore, the commercial 
exploitation of sports rights may highlight again another different application of the law 
to sports related matters.262 These kinds of considerations have led to a debate 
                                                     
257 Malloy DC (2003) Understanding the nature of ethics, and purposes of business health care and law. The 
sport we want: essays on current issues in community sport in Canada, Canadian centre for ethics in sport, pp 
59–79. 
258 The High Court has held that the physical nature of sport is its preeminent characteristic, and it 
consequently prevents activities such as bridge and chess from being included in the category. See The Queen 
(on the application of) English Bridge Union Limited v The English Sports Council v The Scottish Sports 
Council, The Sports Council for Wales, The Sports Council for Northern Ireland, The United Kingdom Sports 
Council, The Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, [2015] EWHC 2875, para. 41. 
259 See definition of Sport given by the Council of Europe in the European Sports Charter (2001) and also 
European Commission (1998) Commission staff working paper – the development and prospects for 
community action in the field of sport. 
260 See Anderson, J., (2010), Modern sports law: a textbook, Hart, Oxford, pp. 199 et seq. 
261 See Pijetlovic, K. (2015), EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International 
Sports Law Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, p.36. 
262 The collective selling of broadcasting rights, although restrictive of the competition, has been considered 
lawful in a number of occasions. See infra Broadcasting Right chapter, §. 3. 
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revolving around the general application of law to sport, resulting in a dichotomy 
between two opposite factions. 
On the one hand, there is a group of academics which take the lead from Grayson and 
his approach to the topic. They claim that a discipline called sports law cannot be 
identified as such, as it is only possible to study the relationship between the 
phenomenon ‘sport’ and the law.263 Disputes involving sport, at all levels, could not be 
labelled as sports law matters, but should be resolved by simply applying the law to the 
facts of the case, which would just so happen to involve sport.264 
On the other hand, a number of commentators contend that the term ‘sports law’ has, 
throughout the years, come to identify a specific area and discipline of law, constituting 
a vertically integrated field of study.265 This position is supported by a number of 
different elements: the enacting of legislative measures expressly aiming to regulate 
some sectors of sport, the existence of sport tribunals with relevant expertise in the 
field, the fact that Universities have started to include sports law within the modules 
delivered, and the existence of textbooks in the area.266 
In general, the term ‘sports law’ could be intended to include the application of 
traditional law disciplines to sport. However, this idea also includes the impact that 
statutory provisions might have on sport, such as issues of public and social policy and 
finally lex sportiva.267 This last notion refers to an autonomous legal order with its own 
set of rules and principles, created, adopted and enforced by national and international 
sports federations and tribunals.268 In this context, the main role is held by the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport,269 which represents the ‘Supreme Court of World Sport’,270 being 
                                                     
263 See Grayson, E. (1998), Sport and the Law, London: Butterworths. 
264 See Parrish, R. (2012), Lex Sportiva and EU Sports Law, European Law Review, 37, Dec, pp. 716-733. 
265 Beloff, MJ (2005), 'Is There a Lex Sportiva?', Sweet And Maxwells International Sports Law Review, 5, 3, 
pp. 49-60. 
266 See Opie, H, (1996) ‘Sports associations and their legal environment’, in McGregor-Lowndes, M, 
Fletcher, K and Sievers, S (eds), Legal Issues for Non-Profit Associations, Sidney: LBC, pp 74-94. 
267 See Anderson, J., (2010), Modern sports law: a textbook, Hart, Oxford, pp. 20 – 23. Anderson contends 
that the term lex sportiva was first used by the Secretary General of CAS Matthieu Reeb. 
268 See Foster, K., Lex sportiva and Lex Ludica: The Court of Arbitration for sport’s jurisprudence, in 
Blackshaw, I., Siekmann, R., Soek, J., (2006), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984 –– 2004, T.M.C. Asser 
Press, The Hague, The Netherlands; Berlin. 
269 The Court of Arbitration for Sport, hereafter also CAS, is an arbitration body created by the International 
Olympic Committee in 1983, and it is based in Lausanne, Switzerland. 
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the body called upon to resolve private disputes related to sport. The CAS hears 
disputes arising from arbitration clauses, or as the last instance tribunal for decisions 
related to anti-doping violations and other decisions made by tribunals of sports 
federations, when the statutes so provide.271 
The concept of lex sportiva may also comprise the notion of domestic sports law and 
global sports law:272 they refer to the area of influence of sporting bodies and of their 
rules, which can be framed either nationally or internationally.273 Foster, in particular, 
contends that the definition of lex sportiva should be replaced by the term global sports 
law, referring to a private contractual order established between international sporting 
federations and those subject to their jurisdiction.274 This term may thus have relevance 
only in relation to awards made by sporting tribunals.275 
This definition, however, is of great importance as it highlights one of the main 
characteristics of the sport system. Sports Governing Bodies are empowered to set rules 
and impose them on anyone subject to their jurisdictions. However, this authority has 
not been granted to them by the State or any other public entity, but it rather derives 
from a set of contractual relationships. As such, it is fundamentally based on the 
consensus of the subjects, who in theory have accepted the authority of a self-
regulating institution that has created its own private legal order, with private dispute 
settlement procedures. 
On the other side of the spectrum, the set of ordinary legal principles and statutory 
provisions applicable to sport may be defined as International sports law, European 
sports law and national sports law. These may be distinguished from the category 
previously mentioned, as they will be applied by national courts, whereas global sports 
                                                                                                                                                                 
270 See Swiss Federal Tribunal in its judgment of 27 May 2003, Lazutina & Danilova v. Comité International 
Olympique (IOC) & Fédération Internationale de Ski (FIS), at p. 267 et seq. 
271 See Reeb, M., The role and Functions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in Blackshaw, I., Siekmann,R., 
Soek, J., (2006), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984 –– 2004, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The 
Netherlands; Berlin. 
272 See Pijetlovic, K. (2015) EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International Sports 
Law Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. 
273 As opposed to national sports law and international sports law.  
274 See Foster, K, Is there a global sports law, in Siekmann, R.C.R. & Soek, J. (2012), ‘Lex sportiva: what is 
sports law?’, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands; Berlin. 
275 Parrish, R. (2012), Lex Sportiva and EU Sports Law, European Law Review, 37, Dec, pp. 716-733. 
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law implies a claim of immunity from national law, in the name of the autonomy of 
sport tribunals.276 International sports law comprises those principles of international 
law that are applicable to sport, including those that underpin the constitutional 
safeguards existing in most of the western countries.277 The term national sports law 
includes instead the national rules and legislation applied to sport,278 as well as the set 
of case law of national courts and tribunals in sports-related matters. Finally, European 
sports law279 refers to the sports-related activity of the EU institutions, including in 
particular the case law of the Court of Justice and the decision practice of the European 
Commission. 
 
3. Categorisation of the Sporting Rules 
Having discussed the general notion of sports law, and the different elements that may 
be comprised under it, it is now necessary to clarify which rules in particular will be 
considered in the context of this research, and how these have been divided into 
categories. 
Indeed, the rules of the sport system can be distinguished in relation to the objective 
they pursue and the way they are justified by the sporting bodies adopting them. 
However, the rules that will be presented are also capable of affecting different markets 
in the sporting industry. Three main markets can be identified in the sporting sector: the 
first is where the product of the industry is exploited. This is where the sporting 
associations or the individual clubs sell the commercial rights related to the contest 
they produce. Upstream to this market there is a second market, where the 
performances that will be exploited are produced. The third market is the supply 
market, where the clubs purchase or transfer the main production factor, which is the 
                                                     
276 See Foster, K, Is there a global sports law, in Siekmann, R.C.R. & Soek, J. (2012), Lex sportiva: what is 
sports law?, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands; Berlin. 
277 Such as the principle by which agreements are binding, and that parties to a dispute have to be treated 
fairly and proportionately, to name but a few. See James, M. (2013), Sports law, Second edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 19. 
278 In this regard Siekmann makes reference to the Sports Code enacted in a number of States, including 
France and Portugal. See Siekmann, R.C.R. (2013), ‘Social dialogue in professional sports: on some topics 
about European sports law: emphasis on ‘old and new’ EU member states’, Shaker Verlag, Aachen. 
279 See Weatherill, S., Is there such thing as EU Sports Law, in Siekmann, R.C.R. & Soek, J. (2012), Lex 
sportiva: what is sports law?, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands; Berlin. 
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labour. Players and athletes form the main supply source for individual clubs, that 
operate on this market.  
Borrowing from the seminal work of Foster,280 we may identify three main categories 
of sporting rules that have to be considered in this research. The first group can be 
subsumed under the notion of ethical principles of sport: they aim at protecting the 
integrity and fairness of the game, as it is the case for anti-doping rules281 and to some 
extent the UEFA282 Financial Fair Play Rules.283 This set of rules and regulations 
constitutes a legal order with its own characteristics that is specific to each sporting 
discipline. Albeit pursuing legitimate objectives related to the ethical aspects and the 
integrity of the system, these rules can nevertheless be challenged in courts whenever 
they encroach on the rights of natural and legal entities. These rules are likely to affect 
the market in which the sporting contest is produced. They are certainly capable of 
affecting a number of different interests of individuals and entities that are subject to 
them, and it is within their rights to seek protection in Court or through European 
institutions. An assessment of the legality of these types of rules will weigh the 
importance of the interests at stake and the severity of the restrictions imposed by the 
league or association. 
Another set of sporting rules aims instead at regulating the governance of the system: 
every sport federation or association will hence draft its own rules within the respective 
statute or regulation. Rather than defining the structure of the sport system, these rules 
range from providing a discipline for the use of regulatory powers by the sporting 
Associations,284 to rules related to home and away matches285 or ownership of the 
                                                     
280 See Foster, K, Is there a global sports law, in Siekmann, R.C.R. & Soek, J. (2012), Lex sportiva: what is 
sports law?, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands; Berlin, but also Parrish, R. (2012), Lex 
Sportiva and EU Sports Law, European Law Review, 37, Dec, pp. 716-733. 
281 The legality of this type of rule under EU law has been challenged before the CJEU in the Meca Medina 
case. See Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European 
Communities, [2006], ECR I-6991. 
282 Union of European Football Associations. 
283 See UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, available at  
http://www.uefa.org/MultimediaFiles/Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/02/26/28/41/2262841_DOWNLOAD.
pdf 
284 Examples of rules and conduct related to these aspects may be seen in cases such as MOTOE and FIA. See 
Case C-49/07, MOTOE v. Elliniko Dimosio (2008) ECR I- 4863, and the Press Release Commission closes its 
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clubs,286 and rules regulating the contractual relationship between athletes and coaches 
and their respective clubs.287 
A common objective underlying these first two categories of rules may be the need to 
preserve the uncertainty of the outcome of sporting events. However, by protecting the 
fairness of the contest and equal possibility for all the competitors, sporting bodies aim 
at preserving also a key commercial factor, related to how attractive and marketable 
their product is.288 In light of their expertise, they are best placed to pursue this 
objective effectively.289 
The impact that these rules can have on the competition and the players on the market 
is apparent even to the most casual observer. Indeed, they are likely to affect both the 
contest market, where the sporting contest is produced, and the supply market, where 
the production factor, the labour, is exchanged. They condition the conduct and the 
freedom of any entity or person economically active in the system, and may be 
challenged in Court for this reason.290 
The commercial aspects related to this last set of rules are evidently more prominent 
than in the context of the ethical rules mentioned before. The profit-oriented nature of 
the regulations becomes the core element for the last category that will be taken into 
consideration. These are commercial rules, which regulate or anyway affect the market 
for the exploitation of the sports product in its different forms, such as broadcasting 
                                                                                                                                                                 
investigation into Formula One and other four-wheel motor sports. European Commission - IP/01/1523, 
30/10/2001. 
285 This type of rule was considered in the Mouscron case. See the related press release ‘Limits to application 
of Treaty competition rules to sport: Commission gives clear signal’, European Commission, IP/99/965, 9 
December 1999. 
286 A case involving rules regulating the ownership of professional football clubs, ENIC, has been decided by 
the Commission in 2002. See Case COMP/37 806: ENIC/ UEFA. 
287 One of the main example in this regard may be taken from Bosman. See Case C-415/93, Union des 
Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) and others v Jean-Marc Bosman, [1995] ECR I-04921. 
288 In Meca Medina, the Court of First Instance recognised the economic value that Governing bodies place on 
the perception of the fairness of the competition. See Case T-313/02, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v 
Commission of the European Communities, [2004] ECR II-03291, para. 57. Moreover see Szyszcak, E. 
(2007), Competition and Sport, European Law Review, 32, p. 95. 
289 See Foster, K, Is there a global sports law, in Siekmann, R.C.R. & Soek, J. (2012), ‘Lex sportiva: what is 
sports law?’, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands; Berlin. 
290 See Weatherill, S. (2011), EU Sports Law: The Effect of the Lisbon Treaty, Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 3/2011, citing Walrave, see supra, as the first example in which the Court of Justice of the 
European Union has clarified that governance rule that are capable of causing restrictions may not escape the 
analysis under EU law. 
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rights,291 and ticket sales arrangements,292 to name but a few. In relation to this last type 
of rules, their objective is clearly and merely commercial, and hence their connection 
with the peculiar nature of sport and its features is weak and deserves less 
consideration. 
For the purposes of this research, the analysis has consciously excluded the rules of the 
game from this framework: each sport has its own technical rules and regulations, 
established by the international federations and applied throughout the whole sporting 
system. This set of rules is often referred to as lex ludica:293 although they are in theory 
capable of having economic consequences, they tend to be considered unchallengeable, 
because they are necessary and inherent to the sporting activity itself.294 
 
4.  The European Sport System 
As the focus of this research is expressly placed on the application of European Union 
law to sport, it seems logical to provide an overview of the European Sport system: its 
structure and characteristics will shape the framework into which the research will 
develop. 
The European Model of sport is often referred to as a pyramid,295 with the International 
Olympic Committee sitting at its top; progressively descending from it, the next levels 
are formed by the International Sporting Federations at global and continental level, the 
respective National Sporting Federations, the Associations, then the clubs, and finally 
                                                     
291 The theme of the commercialisation of sport broadcasting rights will be analysed in a separate chapter. See 
supra, chapter 5. 
292 An example of a Commission Decision involving the legality of ticket arrangements and distribution is 
Case 33384 and 33378, Distribution of package tours during the 1990 World Cup, OJ 1992 L 326/31. 
293 See Foster, K., Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: The Court of Arbitration for sport’s jurisprudence, in 
Blackshaw, I., Siekmann, R., Soek, J., (2006), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984 –– 2004, T.M.C. Asser 
Press, The Hague, The Netherlands; Berlin. 
294 See the Court of Arbitration for Sport, holding that judicial power to review the application of these rules 
has to be limited to that which is arbitrary or illegal, or in violation of social rules or the general principles of 
law. See Mendy v. IABA; OG. Atlanta 006, paras 11 – 13. 
295 The same definition has been used by the Commission in the Staff Working Document - Action Plan 
‘Pierre de Coubertin’ - Accompanying document to the White Paper on Sport {COM(2007) 391 final} 
{SEC(2007)932} {SEC(2007)935} {SEC(2007)936}, at para. 3.4. 
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the players. At the bottom of the structure there are amateur level clubs and players, 
and in general grassroots sport.296 
Within this general framework it is already possible to distinguish two main groups of 
entities, in light of their functions and objectives. The purpose of Amateur Clubs and 
Associations is intended to be limited to recreation and the development of young 
players, while Professional entities will have to operate also as commercial 
undertakings, having to balance the sporting objectives with the goal of maximising 
their profits.297 
As mentioned, the pinnacle of the European model of sport is constituted by the 
International Olympic Committee.298 The IOC operates as a quasi-state entity, with a 
sort of immunity status that makes it not triable in national courts by virtue of 
International Law.299 The IOC presents the main characteristic necessary to have its 
international legal personality recognised,300 such as the capacity of entering into legal 
agreements with States and other international organisations. 
Furthermore, as a feature intrinsically connected with the pyramid structure, European 
sport is organised with a single national sport association per sport and Member 
State,301 operating under the umbrella of a single European association and a single 
worldwide association.302 Therefore, as opposed to the North American system, where 
professional team sports leagues are independent organisations with entry barriers, the 
                                                     
296 Andreff, W., Dutoya, J., Montel, J. (2009) A European model of sports financing: under threat?, Revue 
Juridique et Economique du Sport 90: 75-85. Available at http://www.playthegame.org/news/news-
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297 See Pijetlovic, K. (2015) EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International Sports 
Law Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. 
298 The International Olympic Committee, hereafter also IOC, is the supreme authority of the Olympic 
Movement that comprises a number of parties, including the National Olympic Committees (NOCs), the 
International Sports Federations (IFs), the athletes, and the Organising Committees for the Olympic Games 
(OCOGs). 
299 See Foster, K, Is there a global sports law, in Siekmann, R.C.R. & Soek, J. (2012), ‘Lex sportiva: what is 
sports law?’, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands; Berlin. 
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http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/L.5 [last accessed on 3/10/2015]. 
301 Only one Association per country can be a member of the European or International Sporting Body. This 
structure has been accepted by the European Commission. See European Commission, The European Model 
of Sport, Consultation Document of DG X [September 2008]). 
302 See the Staff Working Document - Action Plan ‘Pierre de Coubertin’ - Accompanying document to the 
White Paper on Sport {COM(2007) 391 final} {SEC(2007)932} {SEC(2007)935} {SEC(2007)936}, at para. 
3.4. 
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vast majority of European leagues are integrated in a hierarchical structure, with some 
level of interdependence between amateur and professional sport.303 In particular, many 
European leagues are structured with a system of promotion and relegation of clubs 
between higher and lower leagues, and characterised by a certain degree of solidarity 
throughout the levels of the game.304  
The pyramidal structure might cause concerns from an EU law perspective in several 
ways. First, International Sport Federations have a monopoly or quasi-monopoly power 
over the organisation of their respective sporting disciplines within Europe; while in 
principle this does not infringe competition law,305 Federations may exercise their 
power over regulatory issues and in the exploitation of commercial rights. Moreover, 
the European Model of Sport divides the organisation and regulation of sport along 
national boundaries, an element that per se would be contrary to the objective of 
European integration, and to the notion of a EU single market.306 One of the reasons for 
the development of such a type of structure can be seen in the approach that European 
States have taken towards sports organisations, historically allowed to function as 
independent bodies, whose internal organisation is left to its autonomy.307 
Finally, the hierarchical governance system does not give proper account of the needs 
and rights of all the stakeholders of the industry. The commercialisation of the sector 
has increased the number of challenges that governments and stakeholders pose to the 
vertical authority exercised by Governing Bodies.308 It is therefore necessary to move 
                                                     
303 Andreff, W. (2011), 'Some comparative economics of the organization of sports: competition and 
regulation in north American vs. European professional team sports leagues.' The European Journal of 
Comparative Economics. (1) p. 3. 
304 Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2014), Sport: law and practice, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath, West 
Sussex. 
305 As seen before, infra Chap 2, § 6, EU law does not prohibit the constitution of a monopoly per se, but only 
the abuse of monopoly power. See Article 102 TFEU and Rompuy, B. V., (2012). Economic efficiency: the 
sole concern of modern antitrust policy? : Non-efficiency considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan 
den Rijn, Kluwer Law International. 
306 See Szyszcak, E. (2007), Competition and Sport, European Law Review, 32, p. 95. 
307 See Pijetlovic, K. (2015), EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International 
Sports Law Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands and Geeraert, A. (2015), The European 
sectoral social dialogue committee in professional football: power relations, legitimacy and control, Soccer 
& Society, 16, 1. 
308 Geeraert, A. (2015), The European sectoral social dialogue committee in professional football: power 
relations, legitimacy and control, Soccer & Society, 16, 1. 
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towards a horizontal model of governance, whereby all the stakeholders can contribute 
to the policy setting and the decision-making process.  
Although the monopolistic structure of the European sport system has been recognised 
in different circumstances by the Commission,309 this is neither the only possible 
structure, nor is it strictly necessary for the functioning of the system. In the United 
States the sport system is not structured in a similar fashion,310 and even in Europe 
some disciplines cannot be comprised under the Pyramid.311 Accordingly, some of the 
characteristics of the system are limited only to certain categories of sport, and cannot 
be assumed to be relevant for the totality of disciplines.312 Moreover, the emergence of 
European clubs and European leagues may in fact have diluted the validity of the 
notion of a European model strictly and exclusively divided along national lines.313  
 
5. Sport Specificity and Consequences 
In the context of the research on the application of competition law to sport, one of the 
most important elements to consider is the discussion of the specific characteristics of 
sport. In this regard it is important to identify which features of sport are so unique that 
may differentiate it from other industries, and how important these characteristics are 
when it comes to the application of competition law to sport. 
                                                     
309 See European Commission, White Paper on Sport, COM(2007) 391 Final, at para.4, and confirmed also in  
Kienapfel P, Stein A, (2007), The Application of Articles 81 and 82 EC in the sport sector, Competition 
Policy Newsletter 3: 6-14. 
310 Andreff, W. (2011), Some comparative economics of the organization of sports: competition and 
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313 See Gardiner, S., Characteristics of Sport Business, in, Gardiner, S., O'Leary, J., Welch, R., Boyes, S. & 
Naidoo, U. (2012) Sports law / Simon Gardiner ... [et al.]. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2012; 4th ed, 
p.223. Moreover, it is argued that after Bosman professional clubs and players have abandoned their marginal 
position at the bottom of the pyramid. See Garcia, B. and Meier, H. (2012) Limits of Interest Empowerment in 
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In general terms, one important aspect that has to be taken into consideration is the 
interdependence between the sporting activity, with its social and cultural 
importance,314 and the economic activity it generates.315 In this sense, the analysis is 
further complicated by the fact that sport exists both as a mere leisure activity, and as a 
commercial and profit pursuing enterprise.316 The issue arises when it has to be 
considered that any aspect related to sport may also be seen in an economic 
perspective.317 It is therefore difficult to sever the economic aspects from the sporting 
ones, as any rule is capable of exerting a certain economic impact.318 
The relationship between these facets is a delicate one: as the passion associated with 
team sport competitions is capable of overriding commercial needs and objectives, fans 
tend to weigh trophies and success on the pitch more highly than economic 
achievements. Sporting entities need to commercialise their products and brands 
without losing the nature of sport and the perception that fans must have of the integrity 
of the game.319 Where leagues and clubs fail to effectively pursue both aims, they will 
either be unable to survive commercially, or they will lose their fan base and main 
customers. 
                                                     
314 The social significance of sport, and in particular its role in forging the European identity and bringing 
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Polic1y Newsletter 3: 6-14. 
316 In this regard, some authors draw a comparison with other sectors that present this dual side as well, such 
as cultural services in general and theatre, art, music, health care and education. See Smith, A. C. T. & 
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318 See Case C-415/93, Bosman, [1995] ECR I-04921, para. 76, and Weatherill, S. (2011), EU Sports Law: 
The Effect of the Lisbon Treaty, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 3/2011. 
319 See Smith, A. C. T. & Stewart, B. (2010), The special features of sport: A critical revisit, Sport 
Management Review (Elsevier Science). 13 (1) pp. 1-13. This aspect has been also recognised by the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport in CAS 98/200 AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague / Union of European Football 
Associations (UEFA), award of 20 August 1999, at para. 25, and in the related Commission Decision Case 
COMP/37 806: ENIC/ UEFA, at para. 20. 
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The combination of the cultural and the commercial aspects of sport is reflected as well 
on the way it is financed. Sports financing may take the form of subsidies granted to 
sport federations and clubs, or funding for the building or renovation of sport 
infrastructures, or the creation of paid jobs in the sector. But the financing may also be 
distinguished in relation to the function of sport and the level of participation it attracts: 
from leisure and health sport practice, to amateur sport contests, to high level sport. 
Different sources of funding tend to be directed towards specific categories: therefore, 
enterprises and governments privilege high level sport, that guarantees high media 
exposure in return, while local communities will prefer to grant support to amateur 
sports, and finally household expenditures will be geared towards leisure and health 
practice.320 This differentiation, and its impact on the level of funding available to each 
category, is a further threat to the pyramidal model of the European sport system, while 
vertical solidarity should be used to address this concern. 
The societal importance of sport, and the need to preserve its educational, public health, 
social, cultural and recreational functions321 cannot be stressed enough, especially in 
light of the consideration that has to be granted to the public interest in the application 
of competition law.322 In this regard, social advantages may also be related to the 
process by which local communities and citizens identify themselves and feel 
represented by local teams, clubs or even individual athletes.323 Moreover, at grassroots 
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level sporting activities are mostly carried out by volunteers, thereby helping the 
development of the respective sport and the promotion of fair values.324 
 
5.1. The Characteristics of Sport 
There are a number of characteristics of the sport system which are immediately 
intuitive and may represent an important element of differentiation with industries 
operating in other commercial sectors. Participants in a sporting competition are 
usually divided in relation to their gender and sometimes their nationality. This is a 
clear and direct form of discrimination, but it is considered to be necessary for the 
functioning of the system.325 However, notwithstanding the relevance of this 
consideration, this analysis has to focus on the aspects that are more related to the 
framework of competition law. In this regard, one of the main characteristics of the 
sport system is the need for cooperation between competitors. There is no competition 
without two or more teams, or two or more athletes, and any sporting organisation 
cannot have meaningful existence without competitors.326 Moreover, the different 
actors on the market, whether clubs or athletes, have to agree on the practical 
organisation of the competition. Indeed, this requires the fixing of dates, locations and 
time to schedule the events: collusive conduct may therefore be considered as a natural 
consequence of mutual interdependence.327 
In any other economic sector a successful company strives to eradicate its competitors 
from the market, as this will increase the demand for its product, and ultimately allow it 
to acquire a monopoly power.328 In the sporting context, this type of conduct would 
                                                     
324 See Pijetlovic, K. (2015), EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International 
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imply the failure of the competition and even the dominating undertaking itself would 
not be able to operate on the market anymore, as there would be no market.329 This 
concept cannot be limited only to a situation of monopoly: even the position of 
dominance held by a club or a small number of clubs is capable of having adverse 
effects on the whole product.330  
Sporting clubs and associations, indeed, have as the main focus of their activity the 
production of the sporting event. The event constitutes in itself the product of the 
industry, and as such it has to be organised, and sold on the market. In this perspective, 
the product of a league is the game: this has to attract the interest of consumers, and it 
has to be integrated within the framework of a competition in order to achieve that 
objective.331 This represents a main difference with other industries: in sport there is a 
demand for the contest in its own right, and only subsequently a derived demand 
related to the specific outcome of the contest. Hence, the competition between 
companies is not a characteristic of the market, at least not in a first instance, but rather 
an inherent element of its product.332 This explains the value attached to the fairness of 
the competition, or better to the perception of fairness that consumers must have. 
Consumers value the competition and interaction between teams, with less attention 
given to one single player. The quality of the product will be determined by the quality 
of those involved in the event.333 From an economic perspective, winning the 
competition is important only to the extent that it guarantees more streams of revenue, 
and ultimately more success on the market for broadcasting rights, sponsoring rights 
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and merchandising.334 In turn, these represent areas of derived demand, where the 
content is distributed to broadcasters, and the sporting contest constitutes a vehicle for 
gambling activities, or for marketing purposes.335 
The competition is the main essence of sport, and its main feature is the uncertainty of 
the outcome. There cannot be competition where the result is already known.336 
Respecting and protecting the uncertainty of the outcome includes the need to preserve 
the integrity of the competition, against conduct running against the notion of fair 
play.337 But the objective may also refer to the need to ensure that there is a certain 
degree of equality between competitors: an event whose result is uncertain and 
balanced is likely to attract a higher number of consumers.338 The uncertainty may be 
related to the result of a single match, or to the final outcome of the championship. If 
we translate this concept into economic considerations, Kesenne has argued that only 
the uncertainty related to the final result of the championship is capable of affecting the 
interest of spectators.339 However, the real significance of the impact of the uncertainty 
element on fan demand may be questioned.340 
 
5.2 Sporting Practice v. Economic Activity 
                                                     
334 However, traditionally the European sport system adopts a win maximisation objective, as opposed to the 
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Sport exists as a leisure and recreational activity, but also as a profit-making 
enterprise,341 with the presence of an institutionalised competition as the key 
characteristic distinguishing the two.342 
Accordingly, the activities that sports associations carry out may be distinguished in the 
setting and subsequent implementation of sporting rules, and in the conduct of business 
activity. Genuine sporting rules would likely regulate the game, the schedule and 
structure of the competition and disciplinary matters, all aspects that are necessary to 
guarantee the functioning of sport. However, although being sporting rules, they may 
have been established with the aim of enhancing the attractiveness of the competition 
and the events, thereby increasing the number of fans and revenues, and ultimately 
pursuing an economic objective.343 
Hence, one of the characteristics of the sporting system is the manifold and intertwined 
nature of the activities that clubs, sporting bodies and athletes have to undertake. 
Indeed, they all have to carry out a number of activities with the aim of succeeding on 
the sporting pitch, but they also actively promote and sell their product on the market. 
Clubs in particular, as any other commercial enterprise, have to generate revenues by 
selling their own product to the fans, paying customers. In order to do that, they engage 
in a range of activities that may comprise advertising, marketing and promoting their 
brand, as well as investing in facilities and infrastructures that allow them to distribute 
their product efficiently.344 
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The sport system does not operate according to an efficient business model,345 but it is 
able to subsidise a number of losses with periods of financial rewards.346 The 
traditional economic approach towards sport argues that in Europe teams and sporting 
bodies pursue the objective of winning on the field, as opposed to maximise the profits 
on the market.347 This may represent an inner difference between the European and 
North American sport system, which could arguably be seen as a consequence of the 
structures adopted within the two systems, and the level of regulation imposed 
therein.348 Indeed, the closed league structure adopted by the North American system 
represents a cartel, capable of maximising the profits of the participants.349 Conversely, 
in Europe teams tend to adopt a winning maximisation objective, aiming at being 
promoted or winning the championship, or avoiding the threat of relegation, even at the 
cost of carrying out non-efficient conduct under an economic perspective. 
The choice of pursuing a win-maximisation objective rather than a profit-maximisation 
one has consequences on the sporting labour market as well. Under the win-
maximisation approach, teams will seek to recruit as much talent as possible within 
their budget constraint. The market for sport players in Europe has also been affected 
by the judgment in Bosman,350 where the Court of Justice held that the system of player 
registration, which was restricting the freedom of movement of workers within the EU, 
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was illegal. The ruling and its consequences351 have arguably freed the market for 
sporting players.352 This is in sharp contrast with the traditional description of the 
market for sports product, still nationally framed. This conclusion, however, is the 
outcome of a short-sighted vision, that does not take into account the increasing 
Europeanisation of sport,353 especially in relation to some disciplines and some 
products, that are now marketed on a European and global scale.354  
The next two sections will therefore give account of both the sport labour market and 
the product market, as their characteristics are important in the context of the 
specificity of sport. 
 
5.3 Sporting Labour Market 
As mentioned before, sport has an ephemeral nature. This characteristic is not only 
related to the product of the industry, but it also affects the labour side. In general, 
individual sportspersons tend to have short careers, in comparison with other industries. 
Furthermore, their career may be subject to a number of interruptions and abrupt 
termination due to injuries or other circumstances.355 
Although the discussion of the labour market is not the main aim of this research, the 
restrictions imposed on it may still be relevant under a competition law perspective.  
Indeed, the hierarchical structure of the sport system grants Sports Governing Bodies a 
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degree of control over the sporting labour market, which is likely to carry along 
restraints in wages and freedom of players and clubs. Ultimately, these restrictions can 
cause harm to consumers as well, when players are allocated to teams in a suboptimal 
way, thus lowering the overall quality of the product offered.356 Hence, in the context 
of this analysis it is important to give account of the features of the labour market in the 
sporting industry as well.357 
While it can be argued that in the U.S. the sport labour market is closed,358 with 
restrictions such as the reserve clause,359 salary caps and the draft system resulting from 
collective bargaining agreements between players and employers, the same cannot be 
said in relation to the European system. In a monopsony like the U.S. sport system 
labour market,360 the closed nature of the leagues allows them to maintain the wages of 
players at a level which is lower than what would have been possible in a competitive 
marketplace.361 On the other hand, the sport labour market in Europe is open:362 it faces 
a very high degree of international player mobility, as opposed to the product market 
which is still closed and nationally protected. This represents a further element of 
differentiation from the vast majority of industries in the context of the European 
Union, where the labour market is generally characterised by high development of 
international trade and mobility of capitals, while comparatively immobile in relation to 
workers’ mobility.363 As opposed to closed leagues, where the working conditions of 
players are set through collective bargaining between clubs owners and players’ union, 
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within Europe the role of collective bargaining is still fairly limited and less 
formalised.364 This aspect is particularly relevant, as collective labour agreements may 
escape the application of Article 101 TFEU, in light of the social policy objectives that 
they pursue.365 
This description of the European sport labour market is related to the so called post-
Bosman era: the seminal judgment has carried along an element of deregulation of the 
labour market for players, who were then allowed to respond to market incentives. The 
greater international mobility brought about as a consequence, coupled with a higher 
level of commercialisation of sport, has led to greater competitive dominance by a 
small pool of big-market teams.366 Furthermore, the judgment in this case has particular 
importance in relation to the recognition of another characteristic of the sport product 
market, such as the need to encourage the development of young athletes and the 
protection of minors.367 Indeed, in other industries it is given less importance and there 
is less protection for these needs.368 
The structure and conditions of the labour market have consequences on the quality of 
the competition as well. Teams from small countries have to compete with European 
dominant counterparts on a free labour market, while their ability to collect revenue is 
constrained by a product market that is nationally closed.369 
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Another feature that the literature has stressed in this regard is the ability of evaluating 
the performance of the employees: athletes are exposed to a level of scrutiny 
significantly higher than in other industries, and their contribution to the success of the 
group may be assessed in clear terms.370 While the typical employment relation is 
affected by an asymmetry of information, the abilities of players are well known to the 
market, and any employers, both present and possible future ones, can evaluate their 
productivity.371 
 
5.4 Sporting Product Market  
Sport is a heterogeneous and transient experience: its product, the event, is extremely 
perishable. Indeed, a sporting event is attractive on the market only before it has taken 
place and during the course of it. Once its result is known, the value sinks irremediably. 
This characteristic affects the exploitation of the products, as sport broadcasting must 
take place simultaneously to the event, and sport betting is a time-restricted activity.372 
In light of the weaknesses of the original product, organisers and players active on the 
market must compensate any eventual losses from direct revenues by seeking more 
stable sources of income, usually through the commercialisation of brands associated 
with clubs, players or events.373 
On one hand, the need to protect the value of sporting events might explain the 
attention that sporting bodies devote to preserve the uncertainty of the outcome of 
competitions and its perception by sport fans and consumers.374 This objective 
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underlies rules and regulations that aim to fight doping, match-fixing and other forms 
of unfair practices, but also rules on the ownership structure of clubs and players. 
On the other hand, sporting bodies strive to protect the uncertainty of the outcome of 
the competition by enhancing the competitive balance within the league, through forms 
of solidarity mechanisms and sharing of revenues aimed at levelling the playing 
field.375 This may be seen as a unique feature of sport, as in any other industry 
companies will refuse to share part of their profits with competitors, and with other 
players operating at lower level, unless as a form of voluntary activity related to social 
responsibility.376 
In relation to the product market, a distinctive characteristic of the sport system is the 
impossibility to increase the production over an established limit, as opposed to what 
other sectors may do.377 Only a certain number of games may be scheduled and offered 
on the market, due to the natural physical constraints to which players are subject, and 
in light of the seating capacity of the venues hosting the events. In turn, the fact that the 
number of events scheduled and marketed is limited at the source, immediately implies 
a first restriction imposed to the product market, and those active on it. The industry is 
indeed not capable of producing and supplying a number of sporting events within the 
same discipline over a certain limit, without undermining the efficiency of the 
system.378 It is not possible to store the sporting product in order to sell it on another 
day.379 Where the supply exceeds the demand, as unsold tickets could be considered in 
this case, the loss that the system will have to bear will not be recovered. However, this 
approach may be compared to the one adopted in relation to the luxury industry, where, 
by limiting the production and supply of the product, the brand will build or maintain 
its exclusive appearance and captivate the interest of consumers. 
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Another main characteristic of the sport product is that it attracts the irrational passions 
of fans, commanding an uncommon high level of loyalty and allowing them to boost 
the self-esteem through vicarious identification.380 The strong identification existing 
between the product and its consumers has as its consequence a low cross-elasticity of 
demand for the product itself.381 Hence, a specific sporting event cannot be easily 
replaced by another one; this may be true in an intra-market perspective, where a 
football fan is unlikely to turn to another sport as a substitute. But it is obviously 
applicable within the same sporting discipline as well: accordingly, an underperforming 
team may still retain its fans against a better performing one. However, this 
consideration is only applicable to hard-core fans of a team. In the array of sport 
consumers there are not only passionate and fanatical fans, and not all of them identify 
themselves with their favourite players and teams. Their loyalty can vary as their 
attendance, and the interest can be erratic, depending on the quality of the event, the 
competitive balance and the presence of anti-competitive behaviour.382 Similarly, the 
attachment mechanism described above may not be exclusive to sport fans. As sport 
consumers seek personal and emotional benefits through their favourite athletes and 
clubs, others may rely on discretionary leisure and luxury products to pursue the same 
aims.383 
Finally, the product market in the sporting industry may be defined as a natural 
monopoly, with a single seller, a unique product and barriers that restrict the entry into 
the market.384 The system may therefore need a regulatory structure that takes into 
account this aspect, and consider also the tendency of a private monopoly to ignore 
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issues of public interest.385 In this sense, one of the main questions is whether 
competition law represents an appropriate instrument to ensure the pursuit of objectives 
that cannot be limited to the mere economic interest of the natural monopoly, but have 
to take into account the societal role of sport as well. 
 
6. EU Sports Policy 
After having discussed the different categories of sporting rules and the main 
characteristics of the sport system, it is appropriate to mention also the way the 
institutions of the European Union have set their policy in this regard. In particular, this 
section aims at shedding some light on the approach that the institutions have adopted 
towards the theme of sports specificity: hence, it will provide an overview of the most 
important measures and try to highlight their impact. This discussion will therefore be 
extremely useful in the context of the analysis that will be carried out in the remaining 
sections of the thesis. 
The policy measures set the objectives and the line of activity that the institutions will 
follow. It is therefore important to notice which institutions have adopted a particular 
measure and its significance in the context of this research. In a chronological order, 
the first document that has to be mentioned is the Adonnino Report. In 1985 the 
Council issued a report prepared by an ad hoc Committee ‘On a people’s Europe’,386 in 
response to a perceived crisis of European integration.387 This report had the aim of 
encouraging the development of a European consciousness that would extend over 
national ones and increase participation of citizens in the political process of the Union. 
In this perspective, the report emphasised the societal role of sport, and its ability to 
represent a forum for communication among people and an instrument to foster the 
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image of the Union, through the promotion of events, teams and emblems representing 
the Community.388 
Nine years later, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on the Community and 
Sport389 inviting institutions, Member States and Governing Bodies to eliminate 
possible obstacles to the freedom of participation of Community citizens to sport, and 
to abolish any discrimination based on citizenship.390 On a similar note, the Resolution 
of the Parliament in 1997391 acknowledged the social importance of sport within the 
European Union392 and stressed the independence of the sport movement. Moreover, 
the Resolution highlighted how the economic activity offered by professional sports 
could not escape tout court from the application of the law.393 
The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 included a Declaration on Sport,394 reaffirming the 
social significance and importance of sport. It represented an attempt to discuss the 
special status of sport,395 as it called on the institutions of the Union to listen to sport 
associations in relation to important questions affecting sport, and to give consideration 
to the characteristics of amateur sport. The Declaration, however, lacked legal strength, 
as it did not establish any legal competence in relation to sport. Furthermore it did not 
result in an exemption from the application of EU law either.396 Regardless, its impact 
has been significant, both in political terms, as the Council has started to discuss sport 
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issues more frequently, and in relation to the Decision practice of the Commission397 
and the case law of the Courts.398 
Subsequently, the Commission has adopted a Consultation Document, entitled ‘The 
European Model of Sport’,399 where it described the structure and the organisation of 
the European Sport system, and it outlined the features of sport.400 In the second 
section, the document discussed the relationship between sport and television, 
maintaining that free access on television to major sporting events should be protected 
as falling under the right of information.401 The Document finally addressed the 
societal importance of sport, and its role in the field of education, health, environment 
and employment. 
Recalling the societal value of Sport as recognised by the Declaration annexed to the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the European Council invited the Commission to submit a report 
with a view to safeguard the structure of sport and its social and educational function. 
In 1999 the European Commission adopted the Helsinki Report,402 aiming to reconcile 
the economic dimension of sport with its social and education nature. The Commission 
stressed how the development of sport, in terms of popularity, economic dimension and 
internationalisation is capable of providing advantages, but may also cause concerns.403 
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Sport should be able to assimilate this new commercial framework, without losing its 
identity and autonomy.404 
The Report, while recognising that the Treaty did not contain any specific provision on 
sport, stated that the Community had to ensure that the initiatives taken by sporting 
organisations and State authorities comply with Community law.405 In this regard, 
particular attention should be given to competition law and the rules of the internal 
market: the Commission pointed out that sport, in terms of the economic activity that it 
generates, is subject to the rules of the Treaty, but account should be taken of the 
characteristics of the sector, and the interdependence between sporting and economic 
activity.406 Without clearly discussing either the nature of these characteristics, nor the 
extent to which they should be taken into account, the Commission tried to clarify the 
approach in this area, by distinguishing the possible conduct into three main 
categories.407 The first one comprises the set of rules that are inherent to sport, ‘rules of 
the game’ that are necessary to the existence of the system. The Commission argued 
that their aim is not to distort competition, and accordingly they could escape the 
application of the law. On the other side of the spectrum, the conduct that are likely to 
distort the competition were mentioned. Ranging from entry tickets discriminating 
between users, to sponsoring agreements foreclosing a market, to the transfer system 
based on arbitrarily calculated costs, these practices were held to be, in principle, 
prohibited by competition law. Finally, the last category included those conduct carried 
out in the context of economic activities generated by sport that have legitimate 
objectives, and are proportionate to the restriction caused. These conduct are likely to 
be exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU.408 
The Commission then stressed the importance of the relationship between professional 
and amateur sport, especially in respect to the need of solidarity of the system and the 
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role that national and international organisations should take in this context. It also 
emphasised how the basic freedoms protected by EU law are generally not impaired by 
the practices of sports organisations, in so far as the latter are objectively justified, non-
discriminatory, necessary and proportionate.409 
The Helsinki report was followed by a Council Declaration, adopted in 2000 in Nice.410 
This Document represents another soft law measure, signifying the lack of interest or 
will to commit to a more binding instrument as a Treaty Article would have been.411 
The Nice Declaration focused again on the specific characteristics of sport and its 
social and cultural function in Europe. While it recognised that the Community did not 
have any direct power in the area of sport, the Council stressed that the Community 
should take account of the social, educational and cultural value of sport in its action 
under other Treaty provisions.412 Institutions were therefore invited to take into account 
the specific characteristics of sport in a dialogue with sport governing bodies, whose 
autonomy is fully recognised, when designing and applying their policies.413 These 
include aspects related to the promotion of sport, the protection of the fairness of 
competitions and especially the principle of solidarity throughout the system.414 
As it was mentioned before in relation to the Amsterdam Declaration, the Nice 
Declaration represents an attempt to strike a balance between the commercialised 
nature of sport, and its importance to society as a whole. As soft law measures, rather 
than imposing a new regulatory framework, the two documents aimed at sketching out 
general objectives, which was the best result that the sport system was able to achieve 
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from the political process.415 However, as opposed to the former one, which merely 
consisted of a paragraph, the three-page Document signed in 2000 can be interpreted as 
a more serious commitment undertaken by Member States to set a more formalised EU 
sports policy.416 
These two Declarations confirmed the rejection of any possible claim for immunity 
advanced by sporting bodies.417 Despite the recognition of specific features that 
characterise sport, these measures did not call for a special treatment for sport under 
EU law. They rather maintained that, as other industries, the characteristics of the 
sporting sector should be duly taken into account when applying ordinary provisions.418 
As mentioned before, it is important to notice the role taken by each institution in the 
process of setting out an EU sports policy. Indeed, the Council has stressed on many 
occasions the specific nature of sport, asking for greater consideration to be given to 
the structure of the system and its autonomy.419 Almost opposed to this is the position 
of the Commission, which, as Guardian of the Treaty, has been urged to adopt a 
comprehensive approach for the application of competition law to sport.420 However, 
the role of the Commission clashes with the pressure that the Council may exert. 
 
6.1 The White Paper on Sport 
After years of political discussions, the Amsterdam and Nice Declarations finally 
granted EU sports policy a first solid background. The Commission then adopted the 
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White Paper on Sport.421 Hence, the White Paper422 cannot be considered as the birth of 
an EU sports policy, but it rather has to be seen as a measure consolidating a number of 
policy interventions on themes related to sport.423 The aim of the White Paper was not 
to constitute a legal basis for action, or to reduce the scope of application of EU law in 
the sector, but to clarify the policy position of the Commission, as it was developed 
throughout the years, and in the light of the case law of the Court of Justice.424 With the 
White Paper, the Commission for the first time addressed sports related issues in a 
comprehensive manner. The document is accompanied by and should be read in 
conjunction with a Staff Working Document,425 containing annexes dealing with 
different aspects, such as the application of EU competition law on sport and the 
relationship between sport and internal market freedoms. 
Resuming from where the Amsterdam and Nice Declarations have left, the White Paper 
stresses that the sport system is subject to the application of EU law, but it also 
highlights the societal importance of sport for the citizens of the EU. In particular, the 
document poses emphasis on the role of sport as a contributing tool to achieve the 
objective of job creation and economic growth within the European Union.426 It is then 
possible to infer that the institution has recognised that the impact sport has on the 
society cannot be limited anymore to the educational and wellbeing sphere, but it may 
also extend to pursue economic objectives of public interest.  
However, despite the social and cultural importance that it is likely to fulfil, it is clear 
that there are a range of activities in sport that are mainly of an economic nature, such 
                                                     
421 European Commission - White Paper on Sport {SEC(2007) 932} {SEC(2007) 934} {SEC(2007) 935} 
{SEC(2007) 936}, COM/2007/0391 final. 
422 A White Paper is usually a document containing proposals for action in a certain area. In some cases, it 
follows a Green Papers, published to launch a consultation process at European level. See http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/white_paper.html. 
423 Parrish, R. & Miettinen, S. (2009), The sporting exception in European Union law, T.C.M. Asser 
Instituut.  
424 See Siekmann, R. C. R. (2011) The Specificity of Sport: Sporting Exceptions in EU Law, International 
Sports Law Journal. (3) pp. 75-84. 
425 Commission Staff Working Document - Action Plan ‘Pierre de Coubertin’ - Accompanying document to 
the White Paper on Sport {COM(2007) 391 final} {SEC(2007)932} {SEC(2007)935} {SEC(2007)936}. 
426 See White Paper, p.10. These objectives are consistent with the subsequent ‘Lisbon Strategy’. See COM 
(2005) 024 Final of 2 February 2005: Communication to the Spring European Council - Working together for 
growth and jobs - A new start for the Lisbon Strategy. 
 87
as the sale of tickets and media rights, or advertising activities and transfer of 
players.427 Moreover, the Commission stresses how the commercialisation of sport has 
attracted new stakeholders and may pose questions related to governance democracy 
and representation of interests.428 
Within the White Paper, the Commission makes a distinction between three domains: 
the societal and cultural role of sport, the economic importance of sport, and its 
organisation. The White Paper then recognises the specific characteristics of sport, in 
particular in relation to two dimensions: these are related to the specificity of the rules 
that regulate sporting activity, and the specificity of the sport structure and its 
autonomy.429 While the first category of rules includes the rules of the game, and the 
measures aimed at guaranteeing the fairness of competition, the second group 
comprises the organisation of sport on a national basis, solidarity mechanisms and the 
principle of a single federation per sport. In this sense, the Commission states that most 
of the areas can be efficiently regulated by the governing bodies through self-
regulation, provided that EU law is respected.430  
It is important to stress again the significance of these first few statements. The 
Commission recognises the need to allow the stakeholders of the industry greater 
representation at governance level. Furthermore, it approves a self-regulatory approach, 
as long as EU law is upheld. The Commission finally stresses the importance of Social 
Dialogue and other instruments to enhance the dialogue and the participation of 
stakeholders within the rule setting and decision-making procedure.431 In relation to 
this, the Commission has also proposed to strengthen the cooperation with Member 
States. Indeed, full support of Member States is necessary to give effect to the switch 
from a vertical form of regulation and governance, to a horizontal system that grants 
greater representation to relevant stakeholders. 
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The Staff Working Document dwells more extensively on the specificity of sport, 
providing also a list of the features that the Commission considers as characterising 
sport, such as its competitive nature, the required uncertainty of the outcome, and its 
monopolistic organisational structure.432 These characteristics, however, are both 
significantly relevant in connection with the nature of sport as a leisure activity, and in 
light of the economic and commercial objectives that the sport system pursues as a 
business activity.433 
While the Commission recognises that certain values and specific characteristics of 
sport have to be taken into account and protected, it also confirms that this cannot 
justify an exemption from EU law. However, rules designed to protect those features 
may be considered legitimate, even when they impose restrictions on individuals and 
undertakings. Indeed, rules related to the organisation of sport may escape the strict 
application of competition law, when their anti-competitive effects are proportionate 
and inherent to the pursuit of those legitimate objectives.434 When affirming this 
principle, the Commission refers to the case law of the Court of Justice, and it stresses 
the need for a case-by-case analysis that will take account of all these aspects when 
assessing a specific rule, thereby excluding also the possibility of issuing any 
guidelines on the application of competition law in the sport sector.435 
After the White Paper on Sport, the European institutions have enacted other soft law 
measures. In 2011 the Commission adopted a Communication on the European 
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Dimension in Sport.436 The Document recognises the importance of the White Paper on 
Sport, maintaining it as a sufficient basis to deal with aspects not addressed therein. 
The Communication discusses, again, about the social importance of sport and its 
economic dimension, and it recognises how the exploitation of media rights is one of 
the main sources of revenue for sports governing bodies and clubs. However, it also 
warns that this exploitation must respect the laws of the internal market of the 
European Union, as well as the right of the public to receive information.437 Finally, it 
has to be noted how the Commission reiterates the Meca-Medina approach,438 which 
aims to assess the proportionality of a restrictive measure in light of the legitimate 
objectives pursued. Moreover, the Communication lists some objectives that may be 
considered legitimate in this perspective, such as the fairness of competitions, the 
protection of athletes’ health, the uncertainty of results and even the financial stability 
of clubs.439 
Through the series of soft law measures discussed above, the Commission has 
indicated that its main policy tool in the area of sport is dialogue. The response to the 
request from Sports Governing Bodies to provide protection to sport through stricter 
provisions could have not been met in this way. This reflects the lack of competence, or 
the limited competence granted to the Union in the area of sport.  
Although the Parliament has generally supported the approach taken by the 
Commission,440 it has also maintained that the case-by-case approach may be 
detrimental for the system. In its Resolution on the White Paper on Sport,441 the 
Parliament has indeed invited the Commission to have due regard of the specificities of 
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sport by moving away from a case-by-case approach, and creating more legal certainty 
through guidelines on the application of EU law to sport.442 This position is in sharp 
contrast with the view expressed in the White Paper on Sport443 and what was held in 
the study on The Lisbon Treaty and the European Union Sports Policy,444 whereby it 
was maintained that there was no need to move away from the established approach. 
The Parliament has listed a number of characteristics and needs of the sport system, 
such as the implementation of a financial licensing system for clubs, that may be 
legitimately pursued. However, these rules have still to comply with the rules of the 
internal market, and may have toy be the outcome of negotiations with all the interested 
stakeholders.445 
 
6.2 The Lisbon Treaty 
The combined effect of the Amsterdam and Nice Declarations, along with the White 
Paper on Sport and the other soft law measures mentioned before, reflects the increased 
importance that has been attributed to sport throughout the years. This set of measures 
can be seen as the necessary preliminary step before the adoption of Article 6 and 165 
TFEU with the Lisbon Treaty. The soft law measures have effectively been replaced by 
the Treaty provisions. Indeed, they mention the specific nature of sport, that the EU 
institutions have to take into account when contributing to the development of the 
European dimension of sport.446 
The impact of the reform enacted through the Lisbon Treaty will be assessed later on in 
the thesis, but it is worth mentioning it and briefly discussing it in this section as well. 
Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the institutions of the European 
Union did not have any power specifically provided in relation to sport.447 Indeed, 
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notwithstanding the policy and soft law measures enacted in the past, there was no 
legal basis in the Treaty to act in the field of sport. Article 6 TFEU introduces sport for 
the first time as one of the competencies of the Union, alongside education, vocational 
training and youth. However, the provision points out that the Union has competence in 
this field only to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of Member States. Sport 
is therefore included within the policy fields where the Union has a subsidiary 
competence, the weakest amongst the possible ones, and where the sovereignty rests on 
the Member States.448 In this regard, the EU institutions can only contribute to the 
promotion of sporting issues, with no possible harmonisation within the sector. The 
first and immediate consequence of the inclusion of sport within the Treaty provisions, 
therefore, is only the creation of an EU budget stream solely devoted to sports 
projects.449  
Article 165 TFEU, introduced with the Lisbon Treaty as well, includes the concept of 
specificity of sport in a legislative measure. The provision does not constitute a 
horizontal clause, which would oblige the institutions to take the sports’ specificities 
into account when applying any other EU provisions or exercising powers in other 
areas.450 However, it is binding, meaning that the institutions will still consider it to 
some extent when applying competition law or free movement provisions to sport. 
The Article mandates the Union to contribute to the promotion of European sporting 
issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, and its structures based on 
voluntary activity and its social and educational function. In the second paragraph it 
then specifies that the action of the Union should aim at developing the European 
dimension of sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and 
cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and 
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moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen. A topic of discussion in this regard may 
be related to the interpretation of the notion of fairness and openness. These terms may 
be referred to values that must be respected for the benefit of participants and fans, 
such as the right to access to the competition, or they may be used by sporting bodies to 
justify restrictions in place to protect some characteristics inherent to the sport 
system.451 Article 165 TFEU finally clarifies that the Union may pursue these 
objectives only through incentive measures, with the express exclusion of any 
harmonisation of laws and regulations. Albeit prohibiting harmonising measures, the 
Article may still have an important effect on the system and on the institutions applying 
EU law to sports related matters.452 
The analysis of the provisions will be carried out in a subsequent section of the thesis, 
where the impact of Article 165 TFEU will be further assessed. However, some 
conclusions may be already drawn here. It is clear, for instance, that the official 
recognition of the specific features of sport cannot remain only on paper: the societal 
role of sport and its importance are now fully accepted and may not be overlooked 
anymore. Moreover, sporting bodies may refer to the protection of the specificities, 
instead of their private economic interests, to justify restrictive conduct.453 
The provisions, moreover, include the concept of specificity of sport within the Treaty. 
However, the Article does not provide a definition of this concept. The authors of the 
Study on the Lisbon Treaty and EU sports policy have therefore suggested that the 
sports movement should take a leading role in defining the concept, in order to better 
substantiate its claim for autonomy. This definition should be included into the relevant 
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sports regulations, be the product of the discussion between governing bodies and 
affected stakeholders, and be supported with thorough reasoning and robust data.454 
Other soft law measures have been enacted after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. In 
this regard, the European Parliament has adopted a Resolution,455 urging the 
Commission to look more systematically into restrictive and abusive practices put in 
place by international sport federations. This measure takes the cue from an 
investigation opened by the Commission on the practice of the International Skating 
Federation of prohibiting its members from taking part in events not sanctioned by the 
Federation itself, with the threat of a life ban on athletes, officials and coaches.456 
Similar to this, in 2014 the Commission has issued a Decision457 formalising an 
agreement with UEFA under article 17 TEU.458 In this instance, the Commission has 
formally expressed its intention to cooperate with UEFA on matters of shared interest. 
The document presents a series of considerations on important issues in sport, and on 
the way to address concerns in light of the specific characteristics of the system. The 
text of the arrangement stresses the cultural and societal importance of sport, but also 
its ability to contribute to the economic growth of the Union.  
The arrangement does not establish concrete commitments of the parties, but clarifies 
the position of the Commission in respect of some important issues. However, as a 
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Decision, this measure is binding in its entirety and may create rights459 and especially 
give rise to legitimate expectations of third parties.460 This aspect is particularly 
relevant in relation to the themes of financial solidarity and long-term viability of 
competitions. In this regard, the Arrangement provides support for measures imposing 
redistribution mechanisms of audio-visual media services and training compensation 
fees.461 Furthermore, it considers positively the Financial Fair Play rules, as measures 
contributing to the sustainable development and healthy growth of sport in Europe.462 
Finally, the Arrangement recognises the Arbitration tool as the most appropriate system 
of dispute resolution in sport.463 
Although the legal value of this Decision may be unclear, it has a political significance 
that cannot be ignored.464 Indeed, it maintains that some of the objectives of the system 
can and should be legally pursued through self-regulation, provided that they comply 
with EU competition law. This is a confirmation of the role of the institutions, whereby 
a mere autonomy of Sports Governing Bodies cannot be granted, and the shift towards 
a co-regulatory approach has become necessary.465 
 
7. EU Sports Law 
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Having discussed the basics of EU sports policy, it is appropriate to provide an 
overview of the development of EU sports law as well. This will also better clarify the 
categorisation of sporting rules that has been previously proposed. As mentioned 
before, sporting bodies have always tried to put forward a claim for their autonomy, 
somewhat supported by the lack of interest shown by national legal systems toward the 
regulation of the sector.466 
The first chance for examining the legality of sporting rules under EU law presented 
itself in Walrave.467 In this case, two Dutch professional pacemakers argued that the 
rule of the Union Cycliste International requiring pacemakers to be of the same 
nationality of the cyclist in medium distance races468 was restricting the freedom of 
movement of workers and services.469 The Court had to establish whether EU law 
could be applied to sport, in lack of an express competence, and whether acts of private 
bodies were subject to Treaty provisions on the freedom of movement of workers and 
freedom to provide services. 
In relation to the first point, the Court held that sport was subject to EU law insofar as it 
constituted an economic activity,470 within the meaning of Article 3 TEU.471 In 
particular, when such an activity had the character of gainful employment or 
remunerated service, the law will be applied to it in the orthodox manner. However, 
this meant that sporting bodies were able to advance the claim that sport was not an 
economic activity, and that rules of purely sporting nature fell off the scope of 
application of EU law.472  
The Court subsequently addressed the question related to acts adopted by private 
bodies, and their relationship with EU law. In practical terms, the issue in this regard 
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was whether Treaty article carried horizontal direct effect,473 thereby capable of being 
invoked by a private party as an athlete, against another private party as a Federation. 
The Court held that the rules on free movement were applicable to the conduct of any 
entity aiming at collectively regulating gainful employment and services.474 This 
definition would exclude individual sport clubs, but it would cover governing bodies 
that, as private regulators, are able to control the activities of individual employees.475 
The Court finally had to deal with the jurisdictional question, whether Treaty articles 
could affect and invalidate provisions of international associations covering countries 
that were sitting outside the jurisdictional reach of EU law. In this regard, the Court 
held that the rule on non-discrimination applies to all legal relationships that can be 
located within the territory of the Union, by reason of the place where they were 
entered into, or where they took effect.476 
The Court concluded its analysis by holding that this type of rule, and the 
discrimination that it carried along, had to be considered as falling out of the scope of 
the Treaty. In this regard, the existence of an economic element was not in discussion: 
it was not important whether the rule had an economic effect, but whether the 
discrimination was justified by economic reasons.477 
The Court confirmed its approach in Donà v Mantero,478 where it stated that the notion 
of economic activity had to be intended as including the conduct of professional and 
semi-professional sport players.479 The Court held that rules adopted by a sporting 
organisation limiting the right of professional or semi-professional football players to 
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take part in matches solely on nationality grounds were incompatible with EU law.480 
Such rules could not be considered of sporting interest only, but they would still be 
exempted if justified by reasons that were not economic in nature.481 
The matter was discussed again only in Bosman,482 almost twenty years later. In this 
instance, the International Football Federation claimed that the economic activity of 
sport clubs had to be considered negligible, and was therefore falling outside the scope 
of EU law, whilst only major sport leagues could be regarded as undertakings. The 
Court dismissed this reasoning,483 and held that the player registration system adopted 
by the International Football Federation,484 permitting clubs to retain players’ 
registrations even after the expiration of the contract, was restricting the freedom of 
movement of workers.485 
As opposed to a mere deference to the ‘sporting nature’ of rules, the Court recognised 
the difficulty of severing the economic aspects from the sporting ones:486 the vast 
majority of sporting rules exert economic effects, and hence the economic activity that 
sport generates irremediably falls under the scope of application of EU law.487 
Therefore, the rule was considered to constitute an obstacle to the freedom of 
movement of players, that, as such, had to be assessed in the search of a justification. In 
this regard, the Court took into account non-economic reasons concerning sport as 
such, thereby including them into the assessment of the restriction. The rule was 
considered to pursue legitimate objectives, such as maintaining the financial and 
                                                     
480 See Donà v Mantero, para.19, and Anderson, J., (2013), Leading cases in sports law, Asser Press, The 
Hague, p. 51. 
481 See Donà v Mantero, para. 18 and Geeraert, A. (2013). The role of the EU in better governance in 
International sports organisations. In: Alm J. (Eds.), Action for Good Governance in International Sports 
Organisations. Copenhagen: Play the Game/ Danish Institute for Sports Studies, 25-37. 
482 See Case C-415/93, Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) and others v Jean-Marc 
Bosman, [1995] ECR I-04921 
483 See Bosman, paras. 70 – 72. 
484 FIFA hereinafter. 
485 One of the questions asked to the Court was also related to the compatibility of such a rule with EU 
competition law. However, having held that the rule was infringing freedom of movement provisions, the 
Court stated that it was not necessary to assess its compliance with competition law as well. See Bosman, 
para. 138. 
486 See Bosman, para. 76. 
487 See Weatherill, S. (2011), EU Sports Law: The Effect of the Lisbon Treaty, Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 3/2011. 
 98
competitive balance between clubs, and support training efforts of the clubs.488 
However, the Court held that the restriction the rule caused was disproportionate to 
these objectives, going beyond what was necessary to achieve them.489 
The scenario was drastically changed from Walrave and Donà, and sport was definitely 
falling under the scope of EU law. The Court confirmed and perfected this approach in 
Deliege:490 in yet another case involving discrimination based on national grounds, it 
was held that selection rules for competing at international championships have to be 
considered inherent and necessary to the organisation of sport, notwithstanding their 
ability to restrict the number of participants in the competition.491 Participating in 
competitions at international level had to be regarded as a form of provision of 
services, regardless of the economic value attached to the performance of the individual 
athletes, their professional or non-professional status and even their direct 
remuneration.492 Restrictions to these rights were consented only if proportionate to 
legitimate objectives, regardless of a detrimental effect that athletes may suffer.493 The 
Court recognised an area of autonomy of governing bodies, as their expertise makes 
them the best placed entities to regulate their own sectors.494 
This inherent approach was furthermore adopted in cases assessing the legality of 
sporting rules under competition law. In Meca-Medina, an integrity rule sanctioning the 
use of doping was considered as inherent to the organisation of sport, thereby not 
falling under article 101(1) TFEU.495 The Court considered in this instance the 
existence of a legitimate aim, as the protection of health and of the fairness of the 
competition, and whether the rule was necessary and proportionate to achieve that 
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objective.496 The Commission applied the inherency test again in ENIC,497 whereby 
rules prohibiting multiple ownership of clubs were deemed proportionate to pursue a 
legitimate aim, and therefore not to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU. 
The Court departed from this approach in Lehtonen:498 in this instance, the Court of 
Justice held that the setting of a transfer deadline for players, albeit restricting the 
freedom of movement of workers and their chances of employment,499 could meet the 
objective of ensuring the regularity of competition.500 The Court therefore relied on 
non-economic grounds and referred to considerations related to sport as such, and 
hence to the characteristics and specific needs of the system to justify the rule. 
However, the restriction was still considered to be disproportionate in relation to the 
objectives pursued.501 
Similarly, the Court in Bernard502 relied on objective justifications in order to assess 
the conduct of sporting bodies, and more specifically the legality of the rule imposing 
training compensation for young players, and the proportionality of such a measure in 
relation to its objectives. This case is also relevant as in this instance the Court cited for 
the first time Article 165 TFEU, stating that within the analysis of sporting rules the 
specific characteristics of sport and of their social and educational function must be 
taken into account.503 In a subsequent case, dealing with the exploitation of 
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broadcasting rights,504 the Court made reference to article 165 TFEU, again to 
corroborate the previous case law. The Court in Murphy, questioned on the application 
of article 101 TFEU on licensing agreements, decided to follow an orthodox approach, 
whereby the connection with sport merely constituted a characteristic of the product to 
be broadcasted. Indeed, the Court held that the specific characteristics of sport 
mentioned in article 165 TFEU cannot justify a special status to sport broadcasting 
rights under EU law.505 
It is appropriate to conclude this brief overview with the cases that have dealt with the 
use of regulatory power in sport and its abuse. In FIA506 and MOTOE,507 the 
Commission, first, and the Court subsequently assessed the legality of the system in 
place, where Federations were granted both regulatory and commercial rights over the 
participants to the competition and over their own competitors. MOTOE is of particular 
interest for the inclusion of sports federations which may be, to some extent, vested 
with public powers under the definition of undertaking. They will still be classified as 
undertakings for the remainder of their economic activities, and regardless of their 
possible non-profit status.508 As undertakings, though, Federations that are endowed 
with regulatory powers are also in a position of dominance, and they have to be 
prevented from abusing it under article 102 TFEU.509 In light of objective justifications, 
conduct that are proportionate to their goals could be deemed not to fall under Article 
102 TFEU. Further, they could be exempted if they would create efficiency 
outweighing the distortion. However, when the undertakings are pursuing private 
                                                     
504 See Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08. Football Association Premier League and Others v QC Leisure and 
Others Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] ECR I-09083. See infra the chapter on 
Broadcasting Rights for a more detailed discussion of the case. 
505 See Parrish, R. (2012), Lex Sportiva and EU Sports Law, European Law Review, 37, Dec, pp. 716-733. 
506 European Commission, Press Release IP/01/1523. Commission closes its investigation into Formula One 
and other four-wheel motor sports, 30/10/2001. 
507 See Case C-49/07, Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio, [2008], ECR 
I-04863. 
508 See MOTOE, at para. 25. 
509 See Miettinen, S. (2008). Policing the boundaries between regulation and commercial exploitation: 
Lessons from the MOTOE case, International Sports Law Journal, 3(4). 
 101
interests, rather than acting solely in the public interest, the proportionality test will be 
stricter.510  
The main consequence that can be drawn from this overview is that in the field of 
freedom of movement, objective sporting reasons can justify restrictions, as long as 
they are proportionate to achieve the aims. Sport as such cannot be excluded from the 
scope of EU law, but it is within the context of the application of an orthodox approach, 
that the Court will consider the reasons and needs of the sporting system. One of the 
questions that will be discussed later on is whether the same orthodox approach can be 
seen in the area of competition law, and therefore whether there can be convergence 
between the two areas. 
As it can be understood from the overview provided, all the cases examined by the 
Court in this context were dealing with possible restriction of freedom of movement. 
Breaches of competition law have been assessed only later on by the institutions,511 and 
will be discussed hereinafter. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This chapter has tried to answer one of the fundamental questions underlying this 
research by discussing the features that uniquely characterise sport. In order to include 
the analysis into the most appropriate framework, sporting rules were divided into 
macro-categories and the general features of the European Sport system were 
presented. 
The discussion on the characteristics of sport has been placed immediately after the 
chapter analysing the rules of EU competition law, with the intent of clarifying the 
relationship between them. In particular, the sport system has characteristics and a set 
of rules that are likely to conflict with EU law. Each industry has its own features, and 
to the extent that sport is considered an economic industry, it does not differ from the 
others. This section discussed what these characteristics are; the goal, however, was not 
                                                     
510 See Pijetlovic, K. (2015), EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International 
Sports Law Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. 
511 Albeit discussed in Bosman, and by the Advocate General in Deliege, and Lehtonen para. 107.  
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to provide a sterile list. The aim was instead to assess their importance, in light of the 
review of the literature undertaken, but also through the discussion of the soft law 
measures adopted in this regard by the institutions of the European Union. The 
specificity of sport has been mentioned in multiple occasions by the European 
institutions, but with no definitive clarification as to what should this notion 
encompass, and to what effect. 
As opposed to a mere acceptance of the specificity of sport, the chapter has provided an 
original contribution by discussing which of the characteristics presented can be 
considered exclusively in relation to sport. In particular, the purpose was to identify the 
features that are inherent to the system, and without which there can be no sport. Aside 
from the cultural and social value of sport, which is clearly very relevant in the context 
of this research, the key feature could be considered the need to have a competition, 
necessary for the existence of the system itself. Without competition there would be no 
clubs, athletes and associations; the competition represents the product that fans and 
media companies will buy. This may justify the need to have an overarching 
framework and structure in which to include the competition, and the consequent need 
for a system exercising a great deal of control over it. The institutions, and the 
Commission in particular, have recognised the specific nature of sport and its ability to 
rely on self-regulation and autonomy. However, the chapter has highlighted the 
pressure that industry stakeholders, institutions and Member States have progressively 
exercised to move towards a form of co-regulation and horizontal system of 
governance. 
On the other hand, however, the characteristics of the sport product, as an ephemeral 
and transient experience, albeit important, are only the features of the product of this 
specific industry. When other characteristics are discussed to a greater extent, it is 
possible to appreciate how they may not be exclusively related to sport,512 or that they 
                                                     
512 The level of attachment of sport fans to their respective teams may be compared with the customers of 
luxury products; another example is the nature of sport, which ranges from leisure activity to a profit-making 
enterprise. The same can be said for theatre and arts. 
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may not be necessary for the existence of the system itself.513 Furthermore, the fact that 
the sport system has unique characteristics does not immediately imply that they 
require a unique application of competition law. Taking them into account does not 
mean that restrictive conduct put in place by sporting bodies may be exempted under an 
inherent rule approach514 or that they should get treated in a way that differs from the 
orthodoxy. 
When conduct, rules and regulations pursue legitimate objectives, they may be 
exempted from the application of EU law under Article 101(3) TFEU, as long as they 
are also necessary and proportionate to achieve those objectives. The next sections of 
the thesis will discuss how the institutions of the European Union have applied the 
notion of sport specificity and to what extent it has been recognised and protected, by 
examining the case law of the Court and the decision practice of the Commission. 
                                                     
513 The competitive balance could be seen as a preference of the supplier and of fans, rather than a 
requirement for the system. 
514 See Case C-309/99, Wouters [2002], ECR I-01577. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Integrity Rules and Regulatory Rules 
 
1. Introduction; 2. Integrity Rules; 2.1 Meca-Medina; 2.2 ENIC/UEFA; 2.3 
Mouscron; 3. Regulatory Rules; 3.1 MOTOE; 3.2 FIA; 3.3 Piau; 4. Integrity and 
Regulatory objectives, public policy objectives and efficiency; 5. Conclusion 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will focus on two of the categories of sporting rules that have been 
identified in the previous chapter. The categorisation presented above, based the work 
of Foster515 and reflected in the White Paper on Sport published by the Commission,516 
will be used here to discuss the application of EU competition law to regulatory rules 
and the integrity rules. The area of broadcasting rights and their exploitation, as one 
main example of commercial rules in sport, and the rules related to the labour 
relationships within the sport system will be analysed in the subsequent chapters. 
As from the brief overview presented in the previous chapter, one of the main 
conclusions that can be drawn is that, at least in the field of freedom of movement, 
objective sporting reasons can justify a restriction, as long as it is proportionate to 
achieve legitimate aims. Sport as such cannot be excluded from the scope of EU law, 
but it is within the context of the application of an orthodox approach that the Court 
will consider the reasons and needs of the sporting system. One of the questions that 
will be discussed in this chapter is whether the same orthodox approach can be seen 
applied in the area of competition law. The objective of this section, and to some extent 
of the ones that follow, is to provide an analytical overview of the cases dealt with by 
the European Commission and the Court of Justice in relation to the application of 
competition law to sport. The chapter will therefore endeavour to draw some 
conclusions and highlight the approach taken by the EU institutions in relation to the 
                                                     
515 See Foster, K, Is there a global sports law, in Siekmann, R.C.R. & Soek, J. (2012), Lex sportiva: what is 
sports law?, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands; Berlin, and chapter 2, § 2. 
516 See European Commission, White Paper on Sport, COM(2007) 391 Final, and the Staff Working 
Document - Action Plan ‘Pierre de Coubertin’ - Accompanying document to the White Paper on Sport 
{COM(2007) 391 final} {SEC(2007)932} {SEC(2007)935} {SEC(2007)936}. 
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application of competition law to regulatory rules, such as the regulation of clubs’ 
ownership, and integrity rules, such as anti-doping. Furthermore, the chapter aims at 
highlighting the relationship that EU institutions have established with Sports 
Governing Bodies in the sector, in light of the objectives pursued by the latter. It will 
be submitted that there is a need for a more cooperative relationship between the EU 
institutions and Governing Bodies. This may be achieved through a greater use of tools 
already available as the Social Dialogue, or through the issuing of Guidelines to clarify 
the application of competition law in the area. 
The first part of the chapter will therefore focus on the cases dealing with integrity 
rules: they aim at protecting the fairness of the game, and the ethical principles that 
underlie sport. The second section deals with the rules that discipline the use of 
regulatory power in sport, and the governance of the system. In a general perspective, 
both categories are likely to pursue legitimate objectives. However, they also exert an 
economic effect on individuals and entities subject to them, whose interests and 
freedoms may therefore be impaired. They may also pursue private economic interests 
of the Governing Bodies. In this context, it will be important to assess whether and to 
what extent the economic interests that may underlie these rules are taken into 
consideration in assessing their lawfulness under competition law. 
 
2. Integrity Rules 
This part of the research will be focused on the first two categories of sporting rules. In 
particular, the first subchapter will discuss the rules that aim to protect the integrity and 
fairness of sport. Indeed, the competitive nature of sport requires some form of 
protection, so that clubs, athletes or any other bodies involved in the game will not be 
able to deceive their competitors and gain victories in an unfair manner. This need for 
integrity is of utmost importance in light of the value that sport has in society, 
especially in relation to its educational and cultural role.517 If sportspeople have the 
                                                     
517 See the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts - Declarations adopted by the Conference - Declaration on 
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ability of becoming role models, then their conduct should be ethically sound and, 
ideally, flawless.  
However, there is a significant economic interest underlying this need. Governing 
bodies need to protect the fans’ perception of the integrity of the competition; 
ultimately they are the final customers of the sports product. A lack of perception of 
integrity of the competition would likely cause a disaffection of fans, which would then 
lose interest in the game. It is therefore possible to see a private economic interest that 
goes alongside with the protection of the original nature of sport and its ethical 
principles. The objective of the following section is to assess whether and to what 
extent these economic interests have been considered by the EU institutions when 
analysing these rules under the lens of competition law. The outcome of this discussion 
will shine a clearer light on the approach of the institutions towards the notion of 
specificity of sport.518 
This part of the chapter will therefore provide an analytical overview of case law and 
decision practice of the EU institutions in relation to integrity rules in sport. The 
subdivision in itself has only a limited relevance, as some of the rules may pursue a 




The first case that will be discussed in this instance is Meca-Medina:519 for the first 
time the European Courts dealt with the application of Article 101 and 102 TFEU to a 
sporting rule, adopted by a sporting association and related to a sporting activity.520 
                                                                                                                                                                 
sport, OJ C 340, 10/11/1997, and European Commission, White Paper on Sport, COM(2007) 391 Final, at 
para 2 et seq. 
518 See Parrish, R. & Miettinen, S. (2009), The sporting exception in European Union law, T.C.M. Asser 
Instituut.  
519 Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities. 
[2006] ECR I-6991. 
520 See the Staff Working Document - Action Plan ‘Pierre de Coubertin’ - Accompanying document to the 
White Paper on Sport {COM(2007) 391 final} {SEC(2007)932} {SEC(2007)935} {SEC(2007)936}, para. 
3.4. 
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One of the most important aspects related to the integrity and the fairness of sport is the 
fight against doping. The use of performance enhancing substances has been 
considered a plague for the system, that had to be eliminated or at least severely 
limited.521 Rules prohibiting doping have the objective of protecting the fairness of the 
game, in light of its educational role. However, their application is likely to cause 
restraints on the freedoms and the activity of athletes. A ban or suspension of an athlete 
from carrying out the sporting activity is clearly restrictive of his economic activity as 
well. Hence, the question that has to be considered is the justification given to such a 
restriction, and its proportionality in relation to its objective.522 
In 2006 the Court of Justice finally examined a doping case, Meca-Medina.523 The case 
involved two swimmers, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen, who failed an anti-
doping test in 1999 in Brazil, and were subsequently suspended by the International 
Swimming Federation524 for four years. The two athletes appealed the decision of the 
FINA Doping Panel before the CAS, which confirmed the suspension. After the 
coming to light of new scientific evidence, the athletes, with the agreement of FINA, 
filed a new appeal before the CAS, which reduced the suspension to two years.525 
Significantly, the applicant did not appeal against this decision before the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal, the ordinary route to challenge a CAS award. Instead, the swimmers 
filed a complaint with the European Commission, arguing that the anti-doping rules 
adopted by the International Olympic Committee, to which FINA had to abide, were 
restrictive under Article 101 TFEU. Moreover, they claimed that the fixation of a low 
limit of nandrolone, the prohibited substance, had to be construed as a concerted 
practice between the IOC, FINA and the accredited network of laboratories carrying 
                                                     
521 See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the regions - Community support plan to combat doping in sport 
COM(1999) 643 final. 
522 See Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2014), Sport: law and practice, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath, 
West Sussex. 
523 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina [2006] ECR I-6991. 
524 Federation Internationale de Natation, FINA hereinafter. 
525 See Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina [2006] ECR I-6991, paras. 8 – 13. 
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out the analysis.526 The athletes contended that the limit was arbitrary and not 
scientifically based, and capable of excluding innocent or even negligent swimmers 
from the sporting activity.527 The complainant finally maintained that the dispute 
settlement procedure set by the IOC was restrictive and abusive under Article 102 
TFEU, calling into question the independency of the CAS.  
The Commission rejected the complaint in its entirety,528 holding that the rules in 
question were necessary for the organisation of the sporting competition. Furthermore, 
they were not having as their object the restriction of the competition on the market.529 
Moreover, the Commission argued that the anti-doping rules did not fall under the 
scope of the IOC and FINA’s economic activity, which was instead related to the 
exploitation of the events.530 The restrictive effect of the rules was therefore considered 
acceptable, as inherent to the organisation of the competition and necessary to the 
pursuit of the objectives of protecting the fairness of the competition, the health of the 
athletes, and the ethical values of sport.531 The Commission applied the criteria set out 
in Wouters,532 holding that a restriction that is inherent to the pursuit of legitimate 
objectives does not fall under Article 101(1) TFEU, so long as it is proportionate to 
them. The institution therefore made use of a principle that had been established in a 
case involving the application of Article 101 to a regulation adopted by the Bar of the 
Netherlands, prohibiting partnerships between Members of the Bar and members of 
other professions. 
The swimmers then brought an action for annulment of the Commission’s Decision 
before the General Court, maintaining that the institution was wrong in applying 
Wouters and in not considering the IOC as an undertaking under the scope of 
                                                     
526 Colomo, P. (2006), The Application of EC Treaty Rules to Sport: the Approach of the European Court of 
First Instance in the Meca Medina and Piau cases, Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, volume 3, number 
2. 
527 See Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina [2006] ECR I-6991, para. 16. 
528 Case COMP/38158 - Meca-Medina and Majcen/IOC. 
529 Case COMP/38158 - Meca-Medina and Majcen/IOC, para. 41. 
530 Case COMP/38158 - Meca-Medina and Majcen/IOC, para. 38 and Colomo, P. (2006), The Application of 
EC Treaty Rules to Sport: the Approach of the European Court of First Instance in the Meca 
Medina and Piau cases, Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, volume 3, number 2. 
531 Case COMP/38158 - Meca-Medina and Majcen/IOC, Paras. 42 – 45. 
532 See Case C-309/99, Wouters and others [2002], ECR I-01577, and infra, chapter 2, § 5. 
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competition law. The General Court, after having reaffirmed the Walrave principle,533 
whereby sport falls under EU law in so far as it constitutes an economic activity,534 
recognised as well that sporting activity is capable of taking the form of paid 
employment or provision of remunerated services.535 However, in the subsequent 
paragraphs of its judgment, the Court held that the Treaty applies only to those rules 
that concern the economic aspects that sporting rules can present.536 Accordingly, 
‘purely sporting rules’ are considered exempted from EU law:537 the Court therefore 
reiterated the Walrave approach, without taking into consideration the evolution of the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.538 The General Court did not assess the 
proportionality of the restriction caused by the rule, but simply held that its sporting 
nature was capable of overcoming any other consideration.539 The Court subsequently 
held that the sporting rule exception, originally established in relation to freedom of 
movement of workers, was equally applicable in the area of competition law. Indeed, 
the fact that sporting rules have nothing to do with economic activity in respect of the 
freedom of movement means that they do not have anything to do with economic 
activity in relation to competition law either.540 
After having depicted this framework, the Court then assessed the nature of the anti-
doping rules in question. It argued that anti-doping rules pursue non-economic 
                                                     
533 See Case 36/74, Walrave & Koch v. Association Union cycliste internationale [1974] ECR 1405, and 
infra, chapter 3, § 7. 
534 See Case T-313/02, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities 
[2004], ECRII-03291, at Para. 37. 
535 See Case T-313/02, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities 
[2004], ECRII-03291, at Para. 39. 
536 See Case T-313/02, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities 
[2004], ECRII-03291, at Para 40. 
537 See Case T-313/02, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities 
[2004], ECRII-03291, at Para 41. 
538 See for a more detailed analysis of this aspect Colomo, P. (2006), The Application of EC Treaty Rules to 
Sport: the Approach of the European Court of First Instance in the Meca 
Medina and Piau cases, Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, volume 3, number 2. 
539 The existence of purely sporting rules does not find support in the previous case law of the European 
Courts. The Court of Justice has only affirmed the existence of purely sporting interests, or made reference to 
the nature of sporting events. See Rincón, A. (2007). EC competition and internal market law: On the 
existence of a sporting exemption and its withdrawal. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 3(3), 224-
237. 
540 See Case T-313/02, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities 
[2004], ECRII-03291, at Para 42. 
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objectives, and they concern exclusively a non-economic aspect of sport, even when 
applied to professional sportspersons.541 However, the Court recognised that there is an 
inherent economic value in protecting clean sporting contest, and hence that the reason 
behind the anti-doping rules may be the preservation of IOC and Olympics economic 
potential. However, it held that the sporting nature of the rules should not be affected 
by this consideration.542 The General Court then referred to the Helsinki Report on 
Sport,543 according to which rules inherent to the organisation of sport escape the 
application of competition law. It finally held that the prohibition of doping is based on 
purely sporting considerations, that have nothing to do with economic consideration.544 
Although the Court highlighted the inapplicability of the Wouters test to the case at 
hand, it nevertheless held that this did not affect its judgment, thereby affirming the 
decision of the Commission.545 
The two swimmers appealed the judgment of the General Court before the Court of 
Justice. They argued that the General Court misinterpreted the case law of the Court of 
Justice, holding that purely sporting rules have never been excluded from the scope of 
application of EU competition law. Moreover, the applicants held that the distinction 
drawn by the General Court between the economic and non-economic aspects of 
sporting activity was artificial and should have been dismissed.546 On the contrary, the 
Commission submitted that the General Court was right in holding that purely sporting 
rules did not fall within the scope of the free movement provisions. Accordingly, this 
                                                     
541 See Case T-313/02, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities 
[2004], ECRII-03291, at Paras. 44 – 45. 
542 See Case T-313/02, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities 
[2004], ECRII-03291, at Para. 56. See Szyszczak, E. (2007). Competition and sport. European Law 
Review. 32, 1, 95-110. 
543 See COM/99/0644, Report from the Commission to the European Council with a view to safeguarding 
current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework - The 
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544 See Case T-313/02, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities 
[2004], ECRII-03291, at Para. 47. 
545 See Case T-313/02, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities 
[2004], ECRII-03291, at Para. 65 – 66 and Colomo, P. (2006), The Application of EC Treaty Rules to Sport: 
the Approach of the European Court of First Instance in the Meca Medina and Piau cases, Entertainment and 
Sports Law Journal, volume 3, number 2. 
546 See Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities. 
[2006] ECR I-6991, paras. 18-19. 
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had to be construed as a general exception for purely sporting rules, in an attempt to 
apply a convergence between freedom of movement and competition law.547 
The Court began by reiterating that sport is subject to European Union law as long as it 
constitutes an economic activity.548 It then repeated the formula that subjects sporting 
activities to the freedom of movement when they take the form of gainful employment 
or provision of services for remuneration. On the basis of these considerations, the 
Court held that the mere fact that a rule is sporting in nature does not have the effect of 
removing the person engaging in the sporting activity from the scope of application of 
EU law.549 The Court hence appreciated that a rule or a conduct may be of a sporting 
nature, and still exert economic effects that have to be analysed under EU law.550 This 
amounts to a rejection of the division between economic and sporting aspects of the 
activity and a final recognition that the two spheres necessarily overlap.551  
In this regard, it must be noticed that the Court based this conclusion on a number of 
findings related to freedom of movement and provision of services, stretching this 
principle to cover also competition law provisions.552 Moreover, the Court recalled how 
the provision on freedom of movement may be restricted by conduct and rules justified 
on non-economic grounds, so long as they are proportionate to achieve their legitimate 
aim.553 However, it subsequently clarified that the two sets of provisions have to be 
considered separately: the fact that a specific rule does not constitute a restriction of 
freedom of movement does not immediately mean that it does not infringe competition 
                                                     
547 This position was in contrast with the finding of the Commission when it first examined the case. See 
Vermeersch, A. (2007). All’s Fair in Sport and Competition? The Application of EC Competition Rules to 
Sport, Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 238-254. 
548 See Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities. 
[2006] ECR I-6991, para. 22, citing the case law of Walrave, Donà, Bosman, Deliege and Lehtonen. 
549 See Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities. 
[2006] ECR I-6991, para. 27. 
550 Anderson, J., (2013), Leading cases in sports law, Asser Press, The Hague. p. 141. 
551 Anderson, J., (2013), Leading cases in sports law, Asser Press, The Hague. p. 146. 
552 See Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities. 
[2006] ECR I-6991, paras 28-30. 
553 See Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities. 
[2006] ECR I-6991, para. 23. 
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law either, or that it satisfies the requirements of Article 101 or 102 TFEU.554 However, 
this consideration may be seen merely as a way to draw attention to the weakness of the 
analysis of the General Court, which did not take into consideration the possible 
differences between the norms. Hence, the consideration would not be interpreted as a 
rejection of the convergence thesis.555 Instead, as the General Court held that, in light 
of their purely sporting nature, the rules in question were not subject to either freedom 
of movement or competition law provisions, the Court of Justice decided to set aside 
the judgment and proceeded to analyse the claim for the annulment of the Commission 
decision.556 
The Court pointed out that it is not possible to assess an agreement in abstract and that 
not every agreement that restricts the freedom of action of the parties necessarily 
breaches Article 101(1) TFEU. Hence, when assessing a conduct, account must be 
taken of the overall context in which the conduct itself has taken place, its objective, 
whether or not the rule and its restrictive effects are inherent in the pursuit of it, and 
whether they are proportionate.557 However, the Court failed to carry out a preliminary 
test, that should have considered whether the IOC and FINA acted as an undertaking in 
regard to the setting of anti-doping rules.558 
In regard to the overall context, the EU institution considered that the anti-doping 
system aimed at safeguarding the health of athletes, but also the ethical and competitive 
nature of sport. The Court maintained that these rules were proportionate to achieve the 
said objective.559 Hence, a conduct that would normally restrict competition and 
infringe Article 101(1) TFEU, can be justified if it is necessary to achieve a legitimate 
                                                     
554 See Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities. 
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objective and it is proportionate to it. The approach taken by the Court, however, 
excludes the possibility of drafting a list of conduct that can be immediately considered 
as complying with EU competition law, or that, conversely, represent a breach. This 
represents a total rejection of a possible exemption of purely sporting rules.560 In any 
event, it is likely that those rules that were defined as ‘purely sporting’ in the pre-Meca-
Medina era would still escape the application of competition law.561 
The appraisal of the inherency and necessity of the rule can only be made in the context 
and in relation to the objective pursued. The analysis requires a balancing of conflicting 
values: on one side the rules of the market would impose to strike out restrictive 
conduct, while on the other non-competition objectives may justify them. The Court 
has therefore accepted that the analysis under Article 101(1) TFEU may take into 
account considerations which are not merely related to the efficiency of the market.562 
This assessment, however, is possible only if the specific characteristics and needs of 
the sport system are taken into account.563 
At the same time, the ability of the EU institutions to assess the necessity of a rule and 
the inherency of its effects represents a statement confirming the conditional autonomy 
of sporting bodies.564 Sporting bodies, much like other self-regulating collective actors 
such as the Dutch Bar Council, have been enabled to pursue objectives of general 
interests.565 Therefore, although there is no possible blank exemption for their conduct, 
sporting bodies can use their expertise and enjoy their autonomy insofar as they respect 
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the rules of EU law. In particular, sporting bodies will be able to secure sports specific 
objectives so long as their conduct complies with the principle of proportionality.566 
The approach adopted in Wouters and Meca-Medina is therefore strikingly similar to 
the justification of restrictions on freedom of movement, legitimate if they are 
necessary to satisfy mandatory requirements in the general interest.567 
To sum up, the Court held that even anti-doping regulations have to be assessed under 
the lens of competition law, in light of their ability to affect the conditions under which 
athletes may engage in their activity. However, the objective of ensuring the fairness, 
integrity and ethical values of sport has been considered legitimate. As long as they are 
proportionate and necessary to achieve this goal, rules and conduct of this type may be 
justified, and hence escape the application of Article 101 TFEU. When these rules 
relate also to private economic interests, the analysis will have to consider the 
relevance of the latter. In Meca-Medina the General Court held that private economic 
interests of the International Olympic Committee that may be underlying the anti-
doping regulation were not sufficient to alter the discussion.568 Conversely, where rules 
of associations have been adopted with the mere intent to protect private commercial 
interests, the analysis will have to consider the pro-efficiency impact of the conduct 
under Article 101(3) and 102 TFEU.569 
 
2.2 ENIC/UEFA 
The goal of protecting the integrity of sport can also be seen to underlie rules and 
regulations other than anti-doping. Indeed, the same rationale can be seen in other 
conduct that aim at preserving the uncertainty of the outcome of sporting events. In 
1998, UEFA introduced the ‘Integrity of the UEFA Club Competitions: Independence 
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of Clubs’.570 According to this regulation, an individual or a company cannot exercise 
direct or indirect control on more than one club participating in a competition organised 
by UEFA. If one entity controls or exerts influence on more than one club, only one of 
them is eligible to be entered into the UEFA Competition. It is then up to the national 
Association members of UEFA to lay down implementing provisions. 
At the time when the regulation was adopted, the English National Investment 
Company (ENIC) was holding stakes in six football clubs in different European 
countries.571 As two of them, respectively AEK Athens and Slavia Prague, qualified for 
the UEFA Cup in the 1997-1998 season, the rule took effect excluding AEK from 
taking part in the EUFA Cup in the 1998-1999 season.572 The two clubs promoted an 
action before the CAS, appealing against the sanction and the regulation.573 At the 
hearing in Lausanne, the Court examined the UEFA rule under a series of provisions, 
including EU competition law. In relation to this, the CAS found that the objective of 
the rule was not to restrict competition, but to maintain the integrity of sport, and the 
fans’ perception of the integrity of the competition. This integrity rule, albeit posing 
restraints on the freedom of clubs’ owners, was therefore considered essential to 
preserve the public confidence in the authenticity of results.574 Moreover, being 
responsive to the concerns of spectators was also important in order to render the event 
attractive for sponsors, media and investors in general.575 Finally, the CAS rejected the 
complaint, holding that the rule could not fall under any type of sporting exemption to 
                                                     
570 The rule is now written in Article 7bis (5) of the UEFA Statutes, accessible at 
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competition law, in light of its economic effects and nature, but had to be consented as 
proportionate to the legitimate objective that it pursued.576 
Having lost its case before the CAS, ENIC subsequently lodged a complaint against the 
rule with the European Commission.577 In relation to the autonomy of the sports 
system, it is significant to notice that the rule was firstly challenged within the sport 
system itself and through its judicial bodies. Only after it lost the case in Lausanne, 
ENIC decided to challenge the system of lex sportiva, and its autonomy, by leaving the 
sport jurisdiction.578  
In its complaint, ENIC argued that the regulation was capable of distorting the 
competition and restricting the market for investments in European football. In this 
regard, the rule affected the ability of clubs of finding investors on one side, and the 
conduct of investors on the other. Moreover, ancillary markets, such as the market for 
football players and the market for media rights, could have been affected as well.579 
ENIC held that the regulation infringed Article 101 TFEU, as a decision of an 
Association of undertaking, and represented an abuse of dominant position under 
Article 102 TFEU.580 Although it recognised that the rule could have pursued a 
legitimate aim, ENIC held that the restriction caused was disproportionate, and that the 
absolute prohibition for commonly owned teams to take part to the same competition 
was not the least restrictive means to protect the perception of the public.581 
On the contrary, UEFA argued that the rule was justified under non-economic grounds 
as necessary for the organisation of sport. The Association therefore tried to draw a 
comparison between the case law on competition law and free movement of services.582 
However, UEFA held a strict position in relation to the assessment of the 
proportionality of the rule which is hardly understandable: it argued that an association 
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cannot be obliged to divine the least restrictive measures to achieve an objective 
inherent to the system, and that the Commission cannot substitute its assessment to the 
expertise of the Association. 
Within the Commission’s assessment, it pointed out that football clubs have to be 
considered as undertakings, in light of the economic activities they carry out through 
advertisement, sponsorship, sale of tickets and media rights. Hence, UEFA represents 
an association of undertakings, whose decision may be relevant under Article 101 
TFEU.583 Subsequently, the institution confirmed that the object of the rule was not to 
restrict competition on the market for investors in European football, but to protect the 
integrity and uncertainty of the results, and to guarantee the perception of consumers. 
The Commission then moved to consider the effects of the conduct, and referred in this 
instance to the Wouters test. It therefore asked whether the restrictive effects were 
inherent in the pursuit of the very existence of Pan-European football competitions. 
The limitation on the freedom to act was considered a necessary and proportionate 
effect to maintain the competition possible in the long term.584 Indeed, the uncertainty 
of the outcome requires protective measures, as the confidence of the public and the 
perception of the integrity of the competition could be undermined if two entities with a 
similar ownership structure would meet on the pitch.585 The Commission therefore 
applied a proportionality test and assessed the necessity of the rule, as to create a sport 
integrity justification under EU competition law.586 Indeed, as the measure was 
considered not to go beyond what was necessary to achieve its objectives, the 
Commission rejected the complaint. 
In relation to this, it must be noticed how, as opposed to Meca-Medina, the private 
economic interest of UEFA was in this case considered of primary importance in the 
context of the assessment under the Wouters test. In particular, the pursuit of a private 
                                                     
583 See Decision in Case COMP/37 806: ENIC/ UEFA, paras. 25 and 26. The Commission in fact argued that 
UEFA had to be considered an association of the national associations. 
584 See Decision in Case COMP/37 806: ENIC/ UEFA, para. 38. See Weatherill, S. (2012) EU Sports Law: 
The Effect of the Lisbon Treaty. Oxford University Press.  
585 See Decision in Case COMP/37 806: ENIC/ UEFA, para. 32 and See Parrish, R. (2012), Lex Sportiva and 
EU Sports Law, European Law Review, 37, Dec, pp. 716-733. 
586 See Szyszczak, E. (2007). Competition and sport, European Law Review. 32, 1, 95-110. 
 118
economic interest was considered legitimate despite the restriction caused, and 
regardless of the private source of the power held by UEFA. The integrity of sport, and 
more correctly the public perception of this integrity are considered as inherent 
characteristics of the sport system, and necessary in order to extract value from the 
ancillary activities of the clubs.587 Hence, although the regulation pursued an economic 
objective, it was not examined under Article 101(3) TFEU, but the analysis remained 
limited to the nature of the restriction and the application of competition law. 
 
2.3 Mouscron 
The last case that will be discussed in relation to integrity rules concerns a complaint 
lodged with the Commission by the Communautè Urbaine de Lille against UEFA.588 
As the local stadium was not complying with UEFA criteria, the Belgian football club 
Excelsior Mouscron wanted to move to the nearest stadium in order to play the 
1997/1998 UEFA Cup matches. Hence it tried to relocate to the city of Lille, just over 
the border in France, for the match against another French team, F.C. Metz. According 
to the ‘home and away from home’ rule for UEFA competitions, in two-legged ties 
clubs must play first in one club’s country and then in the other club’s country.589 
Therefore UEFA did not allow the match to be staged in Lille. This measure had the 
effect of preventing the Communautè Urbaine de Lille to hire out its stadium to the 
Belgian club, thereby restricting the market for the rental of football facilities within 
the territory of the European Union. The city of Lille lodged a complaint arguing that 
the regulation was infringing Article 102 TFEU, as an abuse of dominant position by 
UEFA. 
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The Commission rejected the complaint, holding that the ‘home and away from home’ 
rule had to be considered a sport rule that did not fall under the scope of EU 
competition law. In particular, it held that the rule was indispensable for the 
organisation of national and international competitions and in order to ensure equality 
between clubs taking part in the competitions themselves.590 The organisation of sport 
under national lines, rather than arbitrarily partitioning the market, may be then 
considered as one of the inherent elements of the system.591 In this regard, the 
Commission argued that the rule is a legitimate expression of the right of self-
regulation of a sporting organisation.592 Unfortunately, the Commission did not fully 
examine the case, as it underlined the lack of Community interest on the matter. 
Indeed, this was the first case involving a dispute of this kind, and the Commission 
maintained that the investigatory measures needed would have been disproportionate in 
respect to the probability of establishing that an infringement had taken place. Finally, 
the Commission confirmed that the organisation of sport on a territorial basis was held 
to fall outside the scope of the Treaty rules on competition.593 
In the cases discussed so far, the integrity exception under Article 101(1) TFEU was 
applied to restrictive conduct imposed by collective private bodies, which regulate the 
sector in the pursuit of private and public interests. The institutions have not negated 
the restrictive effect of the conduct, and in some instances they even have explicitly 
recognised the economic motives that underlie them. Therefore, Governing Bodies may 
legitimately pursue objectives of both public and private interests. The institutions have 
shown that they are willing to accept the autonomy of private regulators in relation to 
integrity rules, as long as they can demonstrate that their conduct is necessary and 
proportionate to achieve their own legitimate aims. 
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3. Regulatory Rules 
In this section the case law and the decision practice of the institutions concerning 
regulatory rules will be discussed, and conclusions will be drawn as to their approach 
to conduct that may restrict competition under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
The second category of sporting rules that will be assessed in this chapter comprises 
those regulations and conduct that are related to the organisation of the sport system. 
In relation to this, the rules express the authority that governing bodies can exercise 
over their specific discipline. They range from safety rules, to rules concerning the 
practical organisation of the competition and the events, to rules related to the 
contractual relationships between sportspersons and clubs and disciplinary matters. 
Similar to the integrity rules discussed above, the regulatory rules may aim at 
guaranteeing the uncertainty of the result of competitions. However, they are clearly 
capable of restricting the ability and freedom of those engaged in the sporting activity. 
Furthermore, these rules are set by governing bodies which are also likely to pursue 
their own commercial interests. There is thus the need to prevent and control any 
possible conflict of interests, where a regulatory rule may in effect hide an abusive 
conduct aiming at impairing the activities of competitors. Alternatively, if the 
autonomy and the expertise of the governing bodies is recognised, then they are 
legitimately entitled to regulate as they see necessary the various aspects of the system, 
even when this may encroach the ability of undertakings and competitors, provided that 
they do so in a proportionate manner. 
 
3.1 MOTOE 
One of the most important cases in this regard concerned the conduct of the Greek 
Automobile Federation, and the conflict between the use of its regulatory power and its 
commercial role.594 The case arrived to the Court of Justice as a preliminary ruling on 
the application of Article 102 and 106 TFEU. The national proceeding was seeing 
MOTOE, a non-profit organisation that had as objective the organisation of 
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motorcycling events in Greece, confronted with the Greek State and the Greek 
Automobile Touring Club, ELPA, a non-profit organisation itself representing the 
International Motorcycling Federation595 in Greece. ELPA, as representative of the 
FIM, was granted the power from the State to authorise and sanction motorcycling 
events in Greece. 
MOTOE therefore had to make an application to ELPA for the organisation of the 
Panhellenic Cup. When this was refused, MOTOE brought an action before the Athens 
Administrative Court of First Instance, and once this was rejected, to the Court of 
Appeal. ELPA was the only entity entitled to authorise the organisation of 
motorcycling events, and it could exercise this power without being subject to any 
external control. Moreover, ELPA was also organising motor sport events on its own, 
and it was engaged in related economic activities, such as concluding sponsoring 
agreements, advertising and other forms of exploitation of the events.596 MOTOE 
argued that ELPA was abusing its dominant position under Article 102 TFEU by 
combining the regulatory power with the role of organiser of motor sport events. 
In its assessment, the Court of Justice pointed out that the definition of undertaking, as 
from Höfner,597 does not depend on the legal status of the entity, or whether it makes 
profit, or finally whether its activity is related to sport. Indeed, when there is an 
economic activity, which is merely constituted by the offering of goods or services on 
the market,598 even when the entity under assessment does not make profit its 
competitors would still seek to make profit in order to survive on the market. 
The main question to be resolved at this point was related to the public powers that 
ELPA was exercising, while carrying out its private interests. The Court held that even 
when an entity is vested with public powers, it will still be classified as an undertaking 
in relation to the economic activities it carries out.599 Hence, a sport federation may be 
considered as not falling under the definition of undertaking in relation to some of its 
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activities. However, when it enters into agreements with broadcasters, sponsors, 
advertisers and other entities, the federation carries out an economic activity, and as 
such it will be subject to competition law.600 
Once it had established that ELPA could be considered an undertaking, the Court had 
to assess whether ELPA was holding a position of dominance on the relevant market, 
defined as consisting of the organisation of motorcycling events and their commercial 
exploitation.601 In relation to this, the Court considered that such a position of strength 
can be achieved when the undertaking has received rights to the effect that it is able to 
determine whether and under which conditions its competitors can gain access to the 
market.602 As this was the case, ELPA was placed in a clear condition of advantage 
over its competitors. Moreover, such a rule could give ELPA the power to distort 
competition by favouring the events that it organised and commercially exploited. 
The Court therefore concluded that Article 102 TFEU prohibits a national rule which 
confers on a legal person, which organises motorcycling events and in that relation 
enters into commercial agreements, the power to authorise the organisation of other 
competitions, without that power being made subject to any control.603 According to 
this reasoning, undertakings endowed with public powers of this sort are immediately 
placed in a position of dominance that has to be subject to restrictions and reviews, 
regardless of whether there is an abuse.604 However, while undertakings holding a 
dominant position have a special responsibility not to alter the condition of the 
competition on the market by abusing of their power,605 this cannot be extended to 
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impose regulations even when there is no abuse. Therefore, the State may have to 
withdraw special rights that have been granted to the sporting bodies to guarantee that 
they do not abuse their power. Furthermore, there is also the question of whether 
sporting federations, when they are entrusted with the organisation of competitions, 
should separate themselves from the commercial exploitation of the product.606  
While the governance and regulatory structure seen in MOTOE is immediately 
concerning under an antitrust perspective, the exercise of public powers may be 
legitimate in some circumstances. Indeed, it can be necessary to protect the safety of 
drivers, athletes in general and spectators. Furthermore, the regulatory power can be 
legitimately exercised to ensure the uniformity of the competition, and its inclusion in 
one overarching framework, ultimately in the interest of the public.607 In any event, it 
needs to be ensured that these justifications and the restrictions they carry along are 
proportionate and do not hide preferences given to the events organised or marketed by 
the federation itself.608 
In this sense, more detailed guidelines could help the governing bodies to shape their 
regulatory power and structure in compliance with EU law, by setting standard to be 
respected and hence avoid a necessary stricter ex post control.  
 
3.2 FIA 
Another case involving the use, or misuse, of regulatory powers by sporting bodies is 
again related to the world of motor sports. In particular, this second case concerned the 
system of exploitation of rights adopted by the International Automobile Federation,609 
in relation to the competition it organised.610 
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In 1999, the European Commission opened an investigation after a number of private 
complaints over the conduct of FIA, holding that the system that the federation put in 
place for the exploitation of rights arising from the competition was breaching Article 
101 and 102 TFEU. In essence, the main problem in this case, much like what has been 
seen in MOTOE, was the conflict of interest existing between the regulatory and the 
commercial function of the Federation, which allowed it to block the organisation of 
competing events and foreclose the access to the market to other players.611 
As the only regulator body of international motor racing in Europe, FIA had the power 
to grant licenses to anyone who wished to participate in international motor racing 
competitions. Drivers, track owners, vehicle manufacturers and events organisers that 
were licensed by FIA were only allowed to take part in the events sanctioned by the 
federation itself, and prohibited from taking part in any other event. The use of this 
power was particularly concerning in consideration of the commercial role that FIA 
itself held, as organiser of motor racing events. Moreover, FIA claimed the 
broadcasting rights related to all the events it authorised, which were then transferred to 
a controlled company. Teams participating to the Formula One Championship and 
promoters of the events were forced to transfer their broadcasting rights to Formula 
One Administration,612 created and controlled by FIA. Through this organisation, the 
Federation entered into contracts with track owners and media partners.  
These agreements included provisions which posed significant restrictions to the 
freedom of the parties. Indeed, thanks to the popularity of its brand, FIA was able to 
impose a strict loyalty condition on those involved in the system.613 Hence, 
broadcasters were not allowed to transmit the images of competitions organized by 
FIA’s competitors, track owners could not use their circuits for races which could 
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compete with Formula One, and teams could not take part in events in competition with 
Formula One.614  
The Federation was therefore exercising the role of sporting regulator, by deciding 
rules and the competitors allowed to take part to the events it organized, and at the 
same time, through the controlled company FOA, it managed the related commercial 
rights. This set of arrangements was considered as a possible infringement of Article 
101(1) and 102 TFEU, as it gave FIA the power to control, exploit and block the 
organisation of events in competition with those promoted or organised by the 
Federation itself. 
After the statement of objections, the Commission initiated a series of negotiations with 
FIA, aiming at discussing and amending the arrangement. FIA finally agreed to amend 
its rules in order to comply with EU competition law, by restricting its role only to 
regulator of the sector.615 
In its press release confirming the Decision to close the investigation,616 the 
Commission recognised the need for governing bodies to exercise regulatory powers on 
their respective sectors. However, the Federation was prohibited from using its powers 
to prevent the organisation or exploitation of other events, unless this could have been 
justified for safety reason, or to protect the fair and orderly conduct in motor sport.  
Under the new arrangement, the Federation had to fulfil a number of conditions: FIA 
retained its rights over the competitions it organised, but had to remove from the rules 
any claim over the events it authorises, and any obstacles to the activity of other 
organisations. FOA as well had to remove provisions penalising broadcasters that 
wanted to transmit other events in competition with Formula One. FIA had therefore to 
appoint a commercial right holder, and guarantee access to motor sport to any 
organization interested, as well as the possibility for teams and circuits owners to 
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participate in events other than those organised by FIA itself.617 Finally, FIA had to 
remove the provisions that were creating and allowing a conflict of interest. It withdrew 
from commercial activities in order to safeguard its independence and impartiality as a 
regulatory body.618 
The approach taken by the Commission in this case demonstrates the willingness to 
establish a dialogue with Sports Governing Bodies, which would allow the institution 
to steer their conduct towards principles of good governance.619 Rather than imposing 
amendments, the Commission has therefore instituted a cooperation to resolve the 
antitrust concerns. However, it is not clear whether the intervention of the institution 
has fully resolved the question and dispelled these concerns. Indeed, FIA transferred 
the right to FOA for a period of 100 years, in exchange for a one-off fee. The two 
companies were closely related, as the FIA Vice-President was also the President of 
FOA at the time.620 Although the structure received the approval of the Commission 
after a monitoring period,621 the new commercial rights holder was allowed to continue 
with its previous policies, through low revenue participations to teams and other 
stakeholders.622 
In FIA, as in MOTOE, the analysis of the institutions did not have particular regard to 
the connection with the world of sport. It was recognised in both cases the need for 
governing bodies to exercise a regulatory power to guarantee certain conditions, such 
as safety of participants and spectators, and the fairness of the competition. However, 
the cases are clearly more related to aspects of management and government of a 
                                                     
617 See Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2014), Sport: law and practice, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath, 
West Sussex. 
618 See European Commission, XXXIst Report on Competition Policy 2001, para. 221 et seq. 
619 See Geeraert, A. and Drieskens, E. (2015) The EU controls FIFA and UEFA: a principal–agent 
perspective, Journal of European Public Policy, 22, 10. 
620 See Budzinski, O. (2012), The institutional framework for doing sports business: principles of EU 
competition policy in sports markets, International Journal of Sport Management & Marketing. 11 (1) pp. 44-
72. 
621 See European Commission IP/03/1491, Commission Ends Monitoring of FIA/Formula One Compliance 
with 2001 Settlement, Brussels. As the Commission did not take any further action, it is not possible to study 
the analysis carried out and the elements considered therein. 
622 Cygan, A. (2007), Are All Sports Special? Legal Issues in the Regulation of Formula One Motor Racing, 
European Business Law Review, Vol. 18 (6), pp. 1327-1352. 
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specific sector, rather than to the nature of the sporting activity regulated.623 Indeed, 
these restrictive arrangements could not be justified under the cultural or societal role 
of sport, which could hardly be considered relevant in the context of motor sport. In 
this regard, it is clear how the Federations in MOTOE and FIA were protecting their 
own private interests, and their position of dominance on the market. The restriction 
they were imposing, however, could not be justified as proportionate to achieve some 
legitimate objectives, which were overridden by the economic interests. 
 
3.3 Piau 
The last case that will be discussed in this section saw the Court of Justice assessing the 
compliance of regulatory rules set by FIFA in relation to the activity of football 
players’ agents. The case arose from a complaint to the European Commission lodged 
by Mr Piau, claiming that the FIFA regulations on players’ agents were breaching 
Article 101 TFEU,624 by restricting the access to the occupation and the market through 
the setting of requirements and sanctions, against which there was no possible remedy. 
These regulations established that players’ agents needed to hold a specific licence 
issued by FIFA, and authorised the Executive Committee of the Federation to set 
binding rules for agents. The procedure to obtain the licence included an interview to 
assess the knowledge of the candidate, a check on possible incompatibilities and moral 
conditions, and the requirement of a bank deposit guarantee of 200,000 Swiss Francs. 
In the event of a breach of the regulations, a sanction mechanism was provided against 
players, clubs and agents responsible for the breach, ranging from fines to withdrawal 
of the licence. Finally, a Players’ Status Committee was designated as supervisory and 
decision-making body.625 
                                                     
623 See Pijetlovic, K. (2015), EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International 
Sports Law Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. 
624 See Colomo, P. (2006), The Application of EC Treaty Rules to Sport: the Approach of the European Court 
of First Instance in the Meca Medina and Piau cases, Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, volume 3, 
number 2. In the course of the proceeding, the complainant will also argue that the regulations were in breach 
of Article 102 TFEU. 
625 See Case T-193/02, Piau v. European Commission supported by FIFA, [2005] ECR II-209, paras. 4-7. 
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The Commission initiated a proceeding and sent FIFA a statement of objections in 
which it was held that the regulations constituted a decision by an association of 
undertakings under Article 101 TFEU. The regulations were considered to restrict and 
prevent the access to the market by requiring the agents to demonstrate skills and 
knowledge, and to pay a large monetary deposit. Furthermore, as these regulations 
bound all members of FIFA, which included national associations from a high number 
of EU Member States, and concerned the activity of intermediaries operating within the 
European Union, they were clearly capable of affecting trade between Member 
States.626 FIFA justified the regulations and the restrictions caused under the need of 
raising ethical standards and the level of professional qualification for players’ agents. 
It then put forward that the regulations should have been subject of exemption under 
Article 101(3) TFEU. 
On 10 December 2000 FIFA adopted a new Players’ Agents Regulation,627 in response 
to the concerns expressed by the Commission. The new Regulation maintained the 
obligation to hold a licence issued by a national association. Furthermore, the candidate 
needs to have an impeccable reputation and take a written test to verify his knowledge 
of law and sport, and take out a liability insurance policy. Finally, the contract 
regulating the relationship between the agent and the players must stipulate the agent’s 
remuneration, calculated on the basis of the players’ gross salary, or otherwise set at 
5% of the salary. Finally, the amended Regulations maintained a number of sanctions 
for non-compliance with the rules, ranging from a fine to a suspension and withdrawal 
of the licence. 
Following the adoption of the amended Regulations, the Commission rejected the 
complaint, holding that FIFA had eliminated the main restrictive elements, and hence 
                                                     
626 See Antonov, G. (2015) Is FIFA fixing the prices of intermediaries? An EU competition law analysis, 
Asser International Sports Law Blog, 13 May 2015, available at 
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there was no Community interest in continuing the procedure.628 In particular, the 
Commission stressed how the new Regulations aimed at raising professional standards 
and protecting its members from unqualified or unscrupulous agents, and how these 
objectives had to prevail over competition considerations.629 Hence, although the 
requirements set in the Regulations could be deemed to fall under Article 101 TFEU,630 
in light of their restrictive effects, they were held to satisfy the criteria to be exempted 
under Article 101(3) TFEU.631 In this regard, the Commission took account of some 
specific characteristics of the sports industry, such as the brevity of the career of 
football players, the client receiving the services, and the absence of an organisation 
overlooking the activity of agents. Their need to be represented by a reliable agent can 
be fulfilled through the imposition of qualitative restrictions to the access to the 
profession.632 However, the reliance of the Commission on Article 101(3) TFEU poses 
some questions: indeed, the institutions mentioned the legitimacy of the objective 
pursued through the Regulations, and how the restrictions are necessary and 
proportionate to it. A correct application of Article 101(3) TFEU, instead, should have 
given full account of the pro-competitive benefits that the arrangement was likely to 
create in order to outweigh the restriction.633 The Commission also held that Article 
102 TFEU was not infringed as FIFA was not active on the market for the provision of 
players’ agents’ services.634 
                                                     
628 See European Commission, Decision in Case COMP/37.124. 
629 See Press Release IP/02/585, Commission closes investigations into FIFA rules on players' agents, 
Brussels, 18 April 2002. 
630 In particular, the mandatory nature of the licence could constitute an entry barrier for the market of 
players’ agents. See European Commission, Decision in Case COMP/37.124, para. 27. 
631 The Commission reaches this conclusion in light of the objective pursued through the regulations, and 
following the line of reasoning of the Court in Lehtonen, and the opinion of the A.G. in Bosman, thereby 
applying a convergence between free movement provisions and competition law. See European Commission, 
Decision in Case COMP/37.124, para. 29. 
632 See European Commission, Decision in Case COMP/37.124, para. 28. 
633 Moreover, there is a difference between the two provisions in term of the burden of proof. Under Article 
101(3) TFEU it is up to the defendant to prove that the arrangement enhances the efficiency on the market. 
See Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 5th ed, p. 241, and Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited vs. Commission, [2006] ECR 
II-02969, para. 235. 
634 Colomo, P. (2006), The Application of EC Treaty Rules to Sport: the Approach of the European Court of 
First Instance in the Meca Medina and Piau cases, Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, volume 3, number 
2. 
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Subsequently, Mr Piau brought an action before the General Court for annulment of the 
decision of the Commission. Mr Piau argued that the Regulations were neither 
necessary nor proportionate, and that they highlighted the intention of FIFA of taking 
complete control over the players’ agent occupation.635 In its submission, the 
Commission justified its decision on the basis that the Regulations were able to satisfy 
a general interest, and the sanctions provided for therein were inherent in the existence 
of the rules.636 
The General Court first confirmed that football clubs have to be considered 
undertakings under Article 101 TFEU, as they carry out economic activities related to 
the practice of football. Hence, FIFA is an association of undertakings, as its members 
are national associations grouping those clubs.637 The aim of the activity of players’ 
agents is to introduce a player for a fee to a club, or clubs to each other, with a view to 
employment. The Court therefore identified the occupation of players’ agents as an 
economic activity involving the provision of services, which does not fall within the 
scope of the specific nature of sport.638 
According to the General Court, the Players’ Agents Regulation adopted by FIFA 
could not be related to any rule-making powers that may have been conferred on the 
Federation by public authorities in the pursuit of general interest concerning sporting 
activity, and could not be comprised under the freedom of internal organisation enjoyed 
by sports associations either.639 The General Court assessed the Regulations and upheld 
the findings of the Commission. The licence system was considered not to eliminate 
competition on the market, as it resulted in a qualitative selection, appropriate to 
                                                     
635 See Case T-193/02 Piau v. European Commission supported by FIFA, [2005] ECR II-209, para. 56. 
636 See Case T-193/02 Piau v. European Commission supported by FIFA, [2005] ECR II-209, para. 61. 
637 See Case T-193/02 Piau v. European Commission supported by FIFA, [2005] ECR II-209, paras. 68 - 72. 
However, the Court has not discussed the nature of undertaking in relation to the activity carried out. 
638 See Case T-193/02 Piau v. European Commission supported by FIFA, [2005] ECR II-209, para. 73, and 
the Staff Working Document - Action Plan ‘Pierre de Coubertin’ - Accompanying document to the White 
Paper on Sport {COM(2007) 391 final} {SEC(2007)932} {SEC(2007)935} {SEC(2007)936}, p. 76, and 
Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2014), Sport: law and practice, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath, West 
Sussex. 
639 See Case T-193/02 Piau v. European Commission supported by FIFA, [2005] ECR II-209, para 74 and see 
Anderson, J., (2013), Leading cases in sports law, Asser Press, The Hague. p.52. 
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achieving the objective of raising professional standards.640 The restrictions stemming 
from the Regulations were therefore held to be justified under Article 101(3) TFEU. 
However, the Court merely held that the restriction had to be justified, without carrying 
out a full assessment under Article 101(3) TFEU.641 
Subsequently, the General Court came to discuss the applicability of Article 102 TFEU. 
The Court held that FIFA had to be regarded as holding a collective position of 
dominance on the market for the services of players’ agents. If clubs were 
implementing a decision such as the Regulations, they would present themselves on the 
market as a collective entity vis-à-vis their competitors, their trading partners and 
consumers.642 Through the Regulations, they lay down conditions under which the 
services could be provided. Moreover, FIFA had to be considered active on this market 
as the emanation of the national association and clubs, which are the actual purchasers 
of the services.643 
However, the Court held that the Regulations did not amount to an abuse of dominance 
either: it merely relied on the fact that the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU were 
satisfied as a sufficient ground to hold that an abuse could not be demonstrated.644 The 
General Court therefore rejected the complaint, as the rules were considered 
                                                     
640 See Case T-193/02 Piau v. European Commission supported by FIFA, [2005] ECR II-209, paras. 100 – 
106, and Colomo, P. (2006), The Application of EC Treaty Rules to Sport: the Approach of the European 
Court of First Instance in the Meca Medina and Piau cases, Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, volume 3, 
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116. The Court, however, did not give a detailed account of the conditions of the market in order to establish 
whether a position of dominance existed. See Colomo, P. (2006), The Application of EC Treaty Rules to 
Sport: the Approach of the European Court of First Instance in the Meca 
Medina and Piau cases, Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, volume 3, number 2. 
644 See Case T-193/02 Piau v. European Commission supported by FIFA, [2005] ECR II-209, paras. 117 – 
119 and See Pijetlovic, K. (2015), EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International 
Sports Law Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. 
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proportionate and essential to achieve the object.645 Subsequently, the Court of Justice 
confirmed the judgment, declaring the appeal inadmissible.646 
The Piau case is particularly relevant in the context of the analysis undertaken in this 
chapter for a number of reasons. First, it clarified that rules adopted by national or 
international sports associations are likely to constitute agreements or decisions by 
association of relevance of public policy also in the context of Article 101(3) TFEU.647 
Although a private body is not supposed to regulate an economic activity,648 the Court 
recognised the legitimacy of the objective, and the proportionality of the restriction 
caused, in relation to the benefits that could be granted to sport.649 The institutions 
demonstrated an appreciation of the needs of Sports Governing Bodies to regulate the 
sector and those who work in it. However, both the Commission and the General Court 
failed to assess the Regulations properly, and to give comprehensive account of the 
efficiencies and restrictions created.650 
From April 2015, FIFA has de-regulated the licensing system for football agents, 
through the adoption of the Regulations on Working with Intermediaries.651 According 
to these Regulations, it is up to National Associations to register intermediaries 
involved in transactions, and to check that they have an ‘impeccable reputation’.652 
National Association are also responsible for imposing sanctions on those that are 
                                                     
645 See Case T-193/02 Piau v. European Commission supported by FIFA, [2005] ECR II-209, paras. 83 - 99. 
646 Case C-171/05 P Laurent Piau v Commission [2006] ECR I-37. 
647 See Townley, C., (2011), Which Goals Count in Article 101 TFEU?: Public Policy and its Discontents, 
European Competition Law Review. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1894837 
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Appeal of Paris held that sports governing bodies are best placed to regulate their sector and FIFA has the 
authority to set rules and monitor ethical matters.  
651 FIFA Regulation on Working with Intermediaries, available at 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/Document/AFFederation/Administration/02/36/77/63/RegulationsonWorkingwithIn
termediariesII_Neutral.pdf [last accessed on 05/05/2016]. 
652 See Article 4 of the Regulations. In order to satisfy this requirement, the Intermediary must sign a form 
certifying that he has no criminal record for ‘financial or violent crime’, he has no conflict of interest and he 
shall abide to the Regulations. See Annexes 1 and 2 of the Regulations. 
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subject to their jurisdictions: they are required to implement and enforce the 
Regulations, but they are entitled to go beyond the minimum standard set therein. 
Furthermore, the Regulations recommend a cap on intermediaries’ remuneration, not to 
exceed 3% of the player’s basic gross income.653 
This last provision, in particular, has raised criticism and concern, as it could be 
considered as a form of price fixing,654 as such strictly prohibited under Article 101(1) 
TFEU.655  Indeed, the proposed cap may be considered as a Decision of an Association 
of undertakings, as the National Associations have been held to be in Piau.656 For this 
reason, the Association of Football Agents have lodged a complaint with the 
Commission, holding that that the Regulations would breach EU competition law.657 It 
appears that the Regulations contravene the original objective and justification put 
forward in Piau, which was to raise the professional and ethical standards of the agents, 
in order to protect players. Indeed, the de-regulation and the requirement of 
‘impeccable reputation’ may not guarantee the achievement of the said aims.658 
Furthermore, the Regulations impose a quantitative rather than a qualitative criterion, 
which is unlikely to constitute an efficient benchmark for the protection of players. 
The Commission will therefore have to weigh the regulatory autonomy of governing 
bodies, which include also the possibility of de-regulating an area, with the objectives 
of the systems and the rules of the market. This will represent another very important 
                                                     
653 See Article 7(3) of the Regulations. 
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658 See De Marco, N. (2014) The End of the Licensed Football Agent, Sports Law Bulletin, 21 October 2014, 
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step in the context of the discussion of the values that are protected, and the objectives 
that have to be pursued. 
 
4. Integrity and Regulatory objectives, public policy objectives and efficiency 
The role of Governing Bodies has a fundamental relevance in relation to the legality of 
both integrity and regulatory rules that they enact. Although this aspect was only 
touched upon by the General Court in Piau,659 a private body may not be legally 
entitled to regulate the economic activity of other private individuals or entities. Even 
when a delegation of public power may be identified, when the regulator is also 
carrying out an economic activity the exercise of such a power has to be subject to 
control.660  
Hence, one of the key aspects to be discussed is the origin of the power exerted by the 
Governing Bodies. In Wouters and Meca-Medina, the Court had to assess the legality 
of restrictive rules laid down by private bodies, respectively deriving their powers from 
national law and public international law.661 These bodies were pursuing in fact a 
public interest: the restrictions were imposed by collective private parties that were 
designated or implicitly delegated to regulate a specific sector.662 However, the 
majority of Sport Governing Bodies do not derive their power from public laws, but 
from a set of contractual relationships. Nevertheless, their role is to protect the public 
interest in areas where there is no responsible public authority, or where there is a 
legislative vacuum.663  
As primary legislation is unlikely to establish a framework where public interest values 
are specifically identified and supported,664 it may be the role of the regulator itself to 
identify, interpret and possible achieve the desirable objectives. In any event, a correct 
                                                     
659 See Case T-193/02 Piau v. European Commission supported by FIFA, [2005] ECR II-209, paras. 77-78. 
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identification of the public interest must follow a hierarchy of values that goes beyond 
mere economic considerations. Indeed, the pursuit of public interest and the protection 
of public interest values are ill-fated when the regulation arises from a market-oriented 
starting point and it focuses on the interest of competitors and consumers, rather than 
citizens. Therefore, it can be maintained that competition law is not the most efficient 
tool to regulate the conduct of bodies that pursue public interests. This consideration 
would explain the approach of the CJEU, seeking to exempt these conduct under 
Article 101(1) TFEU, rather than by carrying out an assessment of the efficiency 
created under Article 101(3) TFEU.665 In this regard, it must be noticed that even where 
the institutions considered that the public policy exception could have not been applied 
to the conduct of sporting bodies, they have circumvented the strict application of the 
law, by adopting an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.666 
The approach taken by the Commission in its Decision practice regarding conduct 
assessed under Article 102 TFEU follows a similar path. Although the article in 
question does not have an exempting provision, conduct may be considered lawful if 
they can be objectively justified.667 The notion of objective justification may refer to 
non-economic goals, thereby amounting to a public policy justification similar to the 
one provided under Article 101(1) TFEU.668 This common approach and the 
                                                     
665 See Rompuy, B. V., (2012). Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust policy?: Non-
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convergence between the two articles was confirmed by the Commission in its White 
Paper on Sport, where it held that the Meca-Medina test was apt to use in order to 
assess the compatibility of sporting rules with both Article 101 and 102 TFEU.669 
Further strength to this position is given by the efficiency-type justification under 
Article 102 TFEU, which mirrors the assessment under Article 101(3) TFEU.670 
The expertise of Governing Bodies can be channelled into pursuing legitimate public 
objectives. In order to ensure that there are no conflicting or competing interests, it is 
submitted that a greater degree of cooperation between the private regulators, i.e. 
Governing Bodies, and the authorities, i.e. EU institutions, may increase the possibility 
of effectively pursuing public objectives.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an analytical overview of the case law and Decision practice 
of the institutions of the European Union in relation to regulatory and integrity rules 
adopted by sports governing bodies. Several elements have been underlined in the 
course of the chapter: the legitimacy of integrity and regulatory rules and the ability of 
Governing Bodies of framing the rules in a way capable of satisfying public policy will 
be subject of a more detailed analysis in chapter 7. 
The overview of the cases where integrity and regulatory rules have been examined 
demonstrates how generous the EU institutions have been in recognising the specificity 
of sport. The need to protect the integrity of the game has been upheld in many 
occasions, and this objective has been considered legitimate both under the ethical 
perspective and in light of its economic value. In relation to this, the regulatory 
autonomy of Sports Governing Bodies have been considered mostly under Article 
101(1) TFEU, and therefore exempted as inherent and necessary to the pursuit of a 
legitimate objective.  
                                                     
669 See the Staff Working Document - Action Plan ‘Pierre de Coubertin’ - Accompanying document to the 
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It is therefore possible to infer that Sports Governing Bodies are free to set and pursue 
integrity objectives, subject only to a soft proportionality test, with only a minimum 
level of control exercised over this autonomy. Similarly, Governing Bodies are entitled 
to set and impose regulatory rules. In order to meet the requirements, and be considered 
inherent and proportionate to achieve legitimate objectives, Governing Bodies have to 
present themselves as free from conflicts of interests that could impair the pursuit of 
their aim.  
The institutions have recognised the expertise of the Governing Bodies to set the 
objective for the benefit of sport. However, in this regard, their autonomy is necessarily 
conditional to respecting the notion of good governance. This constitutes another form 
of cooperation between the EU institutions and Governing Bodies, mainly put in place 
through the Decisions of the Commission and commitments of the undertakings 
involved. In this regard, the issuing of guidelines from the authorities would certainly 
improve the transparency, and simplify the activity of SGBs themselves, which would 
have a clearer idea of the boundaries into which they can exercise their autonomy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: EU Competition Law and the Sports Labour Market 
 
1.  Introduction; 2. The Labour Market; 3. Social Dialogue; 4. The Transfer 
System in Football; 4.1 Transfer Windows; 4.2 Contractual Stability; 5. Third Party 
Ownership; 6. Players Mandatory Release; 7. Home-grown Players Rule; 8. 




This chapter will discuss the rules regulating the labour market within the sporting 
industry. The labour market and its peculiarities represent one of the main 
characteristics of the sport system. Therefore, the set of features that characterise the 
sports labour market and the way it is regulated, or not regulated, by Sports Governing 
Bodies are important elements to be considered in the context of this thesis. As it was 
briefly mentioned above,671 the sports labour market presents a number of features 
capable of distinguishing it from other sectors and industries. Athletes and players are 
the main protagonists of sporting events, the reason that fans, customers and advertisers 
are attracted to them. However, they are also the main factors of production of the 
industry. It is submitted that a greater engagement of these stakeholders through Social 
Dialogue would reduce the antitrust concerns and enhance the legitimacy of rules 
regulating the labour market. 
In light of their importance, the level of control that Governing Bodies tend to exercise 
on the athletes has to be considered with particular care. Many regulatory measures that 
affect the sport labour market are likely to engage competition law. The restrictions that 
this form of control are capable of causing may affect clubs, by limiting their ability to 
buy players on the market, and obviously athletes, as they may condition their freedom 
to carry out their economic activity. Finally, the regulations of the sports labour market 
                                                     
671 See Sporting Values chapter, para. 5.3. 
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may have a significant impact on customers as well, for instance if they were to receive 
a product of a low quality due to a sub-optimal allocation of the resources.672 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the case law and the decision practice of the 
European institutions when they have been called upon to assess the legitimacy of the 
regulations of the labour market in European sports. In this regard, however, not only 
the characteristics of the sports labour market itself, but the features of the sports 
system more in general have to be taken into consideration. Governing Bodies have 
stressed on many occasions the need to maintain restrictions on the freedom of athletes 
and workers, as necessary to guarantee the viability of the system. The discussion of 
the legitimacy of the restrictions and the objectives therein pursued is fundamentally 
connected with the debate around the claim for self-regulation of the sport system.673 
Two aspects are particularly relevant in the context of the analysis that will be 
undertaken in this chapter. On the one side, the dominant position that Governing 
Bodies are likely to exercise may also affect the ability of clubs, players and athletes, as 
undertakings, to carry out their economic activities, through restrictions of different 
sorts. This question has with time gained increasing importance, especially where 
Federations were prohibiting individual athletes from taking part in certain 
competitions organised by other entities and not officially sanctioned.674 This is an 
expression of the regulatory autonomy that governing bodies can exercise over the 
various stakeholders, as long as it complies with the provisions of law. 
On the other hand, the very small diffusion of collective bargaining agreements in the 
sporting industry favours the conclusion of restrictive arrangements that tend to pursue 
the interests of Governing Bodies for the most part. In turn, this creates more 
favourable conditions for the issuing of complaints by those that are subject to the 
power of Governing Bodies. One element that can now be taken into account is related 
                                                     
672 See Ross, S. F. (2003). Competition Law as a constraint on Monopolistic Exploitation by Sport Leagues 
and Clubs, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19(4), 569–584. 
673 See Gardiner, S. and Welch, R., (2007), The Contractual Dynamics of Team Stability Versus Player 
Mobility: Who Rules 'The Beautiful Game'?, Entertainment and Sports Law Journal. 
674 One of the most actual example is the Complaint lodged with the European Commission against the 
International Skating Federation. See European Commission, Press Release IP/16/3201 - Antitrust: 
Commission sends Statement of Objections to International Skating Union on its eligibility rules. Brussels, 27 
September 2016. 
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to the application of Article 165 TFEU. Although most of the cases discussed in the 
chapter predate the adoption of the provision, it is important to consider whether its 
application would have affected the matter in any way. In relation to this, Social 
Dialogue should represent a useful tool to provide employers and employees with a 
forum to facilitate the conclusion of legal agreements that could also be considered to 
pursue the openness and fairness of the system. These agreements may then be falling 
out of the scope of EU competition law, in light of the social objective that they are 
considered to pursue.675 
In this chapter, the emphasis will be placed on the most relevant arrangements that are 
capable of affecting the sports labour market within the EU sports system. The aim is to 
discuss these aspects and draw some conclusions as to the application of EU 
competition law to the sports labour market. In particular, an original contribution to 
the body of knowledge will be provided by focussing the discussion on the objectives 
that are protected in the sports labour market. Indeed, the chapter will highlight the 
relationship between the regulatory autonomy of sports Governing Bodies, the EU 
institutions and the market principles in relation to the sports labour market. 
 
2.  The Labour Market 
The sports labour market is characterised by a high mobility of players and workers in 
general.676 For this reason, the sports market has been considered as the main example 
of European integration,677 in light of a high degree of cross-border mobility and a truly 
European dimension. Moreover, the market is very fluid and dynamic, in light of the 
ephemeral nature of sporting activity: sportspersons tend to have short careers, and 
sudden injuries can shorten even more their period of activity. 
                                                     
675 See Joined Cases C-115/97, C-116/97 and C-117/97, Brentjens Handelsorderneming BV v Stichting 
Bedreifjspensioenfonds voor de Handel in Bouwmaterialen [1999] ECR I-6025. 
676 See Kesenne, S. (2007), The Peculiar International Economics of Professional Football in 
Europe, Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 54 (3) pp. 388-399. This consideration is especially true for 
team sports. 
677 See KEA/CDES, ‘Study on the Economic and Legal Aspects of Transfers of Players’ (European 
Commission, 2013), at p.6, and see also Kuper, S., & Szymanski, S. (2012). Soccernomics: Why England 
loses, why Germany and Brazil win, and why the U.S., Japan, Australia, Turkey and even Iraq are destined to 
become the kings of the world's most popular sport. New York: Nation Books. 
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The sports labour market can be identified as the supply market for the sport industry. 
Athletes and players constitute the main supply source for clubs that operate on the 
market and purchase their services.678 This market can then be divided into three sub-
markets. In a primary market, there are those players that are considered superstars. 
Here we can find a small number of athletes, which, in light of their value, have a 
significant bargaining power against clubs, which is reflected in high transfer fees and 
high wages. Therefore, only a restricted pool of rich clubs can get access to this market. 
On a second level, a limited number of players will offer their services to a high 
number of clubs: the bargaining power of the players will be reduced and they will not 
be able to negotiate wages comparable to those offered on the primary market. Finally, 
there is a third-level market, where a large number of players compete to be signed by a 
limited number of clubs. In this latter market, clubs have significant bargaining power 
in determining the players’ wages.679 
As it can be understood from this brief introduction, one of the main elements 
characterising the sports labour market is the regulation of the transfer of players 
between clubs. Within team sports in Europe, the transfer of players from a team to 
another is regulated by a set of rules, standardised at international level by the 
International Federations. These rules are an expression of the free will of the relevant 
associations, and they are the epitome of the self-regulatory power held by international 
and national sports organisations.680 Regardless of their content and the subject to 
whom they are addressed, they are not the result of negotiations between management 
and labour, and they do not aim at improving the working conditions of the employees. 
They hence cannot enjoy a general exemption from competition law.681 
                                                     
678 See Egger, A. and Stix-Hackl, C. (2002), Sports and Competition Law: A Never-Ending Story?, European 
Competition Law Review, 23/2, pp. 81 – 91. 
679 KEA/CDES, ‘Study on the Economic and Legal Aspects of Transfers of Players’ (European Commission, 
2013), pp. 4-5. It is argued that, due to the number of clubs active on each market, the first market has a 
monopoly structure, the second an oligopoly structure and the third represents an oligopsony. 
680 See KEA/CDES, ‘Study on the Economic and Legal Aspects of Transfers of Players’ (European 
Commission, 2013), p. 33. 
681 See Egger, A. and Stix-Hackl, C. (2002) ‘Sports and Competition Law: A Never-Ending Story?’ European 
Competition Law Review, 23/2, pp. 81 – 91. 
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In any other industry, employees are free to change their employers, breach the contract 
and pay a sum due as compensation for the breach.682 Conversely, the transfer rules in 
sport impose forms of contractual stability between clubs and players, and hence 
between employers and employees, that cannot be observed elsewhere. They limit the 
mobility of athletes by requiring the payment of transfer fees between clubs,683 in order 
to prevent a total ban on players’ mobility. Most of the associations prevent clubs from 
registering new players after a certain point of the season. Indeed, the transfer system 
that many leagues and associations have in place allows players to move from one club 
to another only during a limited time, usually less than four months every given year, 
and only with the consent of the current employer.684 Furthermore, contracts can be 
terminated by either party, without incurring sanctions, only in the presence of a ‘just 
cause’.685 The consequence of the combination of these aspects is that transfer fees 
have significantly and progressively increased since 1995.686 Therefore, the system 
may also reduce the ability of clubs to compete in the market for the best players, as 
only elite clubs will be able to afford high transfer fees. This means that the access of 
clubs to their only source of supply is restricted, but it ultimately produces effects on 
the exploitation market as well. Indeed, the system is capable of preventing 
economically weaker clubs from enhancing the quality of their sporting performance, 
and hence make their product more attractive to consumers.687 
                                                     
682 See Gardiner, S. and Welch, R., (2007), The Contractual Dynamics of Team Stability Versus Player 
Mobility: Who Rules 'The Beautiful Game'?, Entertainment and Sports Law Journal. 
683 In order to play in a competition, an athlete has to be registered with a club. The transfer fee is therefore 
related to the payment that a club requires to release the player’s registration to the club that wishes to employ 
him. See Pearson, G. (2015). Sporting justifications under EU free movement and competition law: The case 
of the football ‘Transfer system’. European Law Journal, 21(2), 220-238.  
684 See Pearson, G. (2015). Sporting justifications under EU free movement and competition law: The case of 
the football ‘Transfer system’. European Law Journal, 21(2), 220-238. 
685 KEA/CDES, ‘Study on the Economic and Legal Aspects of Transfers of Players’ (European Commission, 
2013), at p. 20. Other conditions may apply as well. In football, the existence of a ‘just cause’ and related 
disputes have to be decided by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber. This is an arbitration panel to which 
players are obliged to refer disputes, as opposed to access to ordinary courts of law. See FIFA Statutes, 
Articles 64(2) – (3). 
686 In particular, starting from the Bosman judgment. See KEA/CDES, ‘Study on the Economic and Legal 
Aspects of Transfers of Players’ (European Commission, 2013), at p.10. 
687 See Egger, A. and Stix-Hackl, C. (2002), Sports and Competition Law: A Never-Ending Story?, European 
Competition Law Review, 23/2, pp. 81 – 91. 
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The transfer system in team sports has been assessed on a number of occasions.688 It is 
indeed apparent how limiting the ability of a worker to quit his job and seek other 
employment opportunities within the same industry represents a restriction of his 
freedom of movement and freedom to provide services. Therefore, the legality of 
transfer windows has already been examined under the provision protecting the 
freedom of movement of workers.689 The Court has held that transfer windows are 
likely to constitute a restriction. However, provided that the restriction is proportionate, 
it can be justified under non-economic grounds, such as the need of ensuring the 
regularity of the competition, and the proper functioning of the championship as a 
whole.690  
While the same regulations could pose restrictions also under EU competition law, the 
Court has been more reluctant to express its position in this regard.691 Indeed, 
regulatory arrangements affecting the labour market are also likely to have an impact 
on the undertakings active on the sports market. It can be the case of clubs, whose 
ability to recruit players is restricted by rules such as transfer windows and salary caps. 
Obviously, these regulations may also affect individual athletes, who can also be 
defined as undertakings, in light of the ancillary activities related to sport that they 
carry out.692 
On the other hand, a number of justifications have been put forward by Sports 
Governing Bodies to defend the restrictions that the arrangements impose on the labour 
market. Governing Bodies tend to rely on the need to protect the solidarity within sport, 
                                                     
688 See the judgments of the Court of Justices in the cases Bosman, in relation to nationality requirements and 
contractual stability; Lehtonen on the legality of transfer windows; and Bernard on training compensation. 
689 See, amongst others, Cases C-176/96, Lehtonen et al v. FRBSB [2000], ECR I-02681, and C-415/93, 
Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) and others v Jean-Marc Bosman, [1995] ECR I-
04921. 
690 See Lehtonen, paras. 52 – 54. 
691 It has to be reminded how the Court of Justice in Bosman refused to assess the compatibility of the football 
transfer window with EU competition law, as it had already held that the system was infringing freedom of 
movement of workers and freedom to provide services. As such, there was no need to examine also its 
compatibility with EU competition law. See Bosman, para. 138.  Similarly, in Lehtonen the Court did not 
consider the question, holding that it did not receive enough information from the national court to decide on 
the issue. See Lehtonen, para 107. 
692 See Case C-51/96, Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue 
belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo, [2000], ECR I-02549, at para. 13. 
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the redistribution of resources amongst clubs to enhance competitive balance, and the 
development of young athletes.693 Indeed, rules imposing contract stability in team 
sports can address the need for stabilising relations between clubs and athletes: this 
would protect the stability of the competition, by ensuring that teams will not sign 
decisive players at a critical point of the season.694 
These objectives may be pursued through rules that - at the moment of the transfer - 
sets compensations for the costs borne by the club for the training of the athletes. This 
can both compensate the small clubs for their loss, and constitute an incentive for the 
investments in youth development.695 Similarly, the setting of transfer fees may be 
based on a positive interest, aiming at putting the party that has suffered the breach of 
contract in the position it would have been if the contract would have been performed 
properly.696  
The need to provide incentive to the funding of youth development is related to another 
characteristic of the sports labour market, which has to nurture its talents within the 
system itself. Indeed, as opposed to the College system that is the rule in North 
America, in Europe teams have to develop players through their own academies. 
Hence, clubs will have to invest in order to produce talent, which may then be used in 
the squad, or sold on the market. Therefore, youth development is an objective of clubs 
and sports associations in general and it is important to assess the value recognised to 
this training process, and how it can be protected. This aim has been recognised as 
legitimate on multiple occasions,697 as it can also be considered fundamentally related 
                                                     
693 See Bosman, para. 106, and Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle 
UFC [2010], ECR I-02177, at para. 39. See also KEA/CDES, ‘Study on the Economic and Legal Aspects of 
Transfers of Players’ (European Commission, 2013), at p 7. 
694 See Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2014), Sport: law and practice, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath, 
West Sussex, p. 578. 
695 See Parrish, R, (2015), Article 17 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: 
Compatibility with EU Law, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 22(2) 256-282. Training 
compensation and youth development have been recognised by the Court of Justice as legitimate objectives. 
See Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC [2010], ECR I-02177, 
para. 45. 
696 This is a principle that has been applied by the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Matuzalem, see CAS 
2008/A/159. See also Wild, A (2012), CAS and Football: Landmark Cases, ASSER International Sports Law 
Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, p.101. 
697 See the Judgment of the Court of Justice in Bosman, at para. 106 and Bernard, at para. 39.   
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to the cultural and educational value of sport. However, the need of training employees 
is common to any industry and to all the employers, certainly if they want to enhance 
the benefits received from them whilst in the company or in the sector.698 
In this regard, therefore, it is important to assess whether, and to what extent, these 
justifications have been accepted by the Competition authorities. The upholding of 
these characteristics, which may be legitimately considered as one of the fundamental 
elements of the specificity of sport, represents a clear example of the regulatory 
autonomy of Sports Governing Bodies against the strict application of competition law. 
 
3. Social Dialogue 
Collective bargaining agreements are a powerful tool through which restrictive 
arrangements can find a safe harbour from EU competition law. This is the case in the 
North American sports system, where strong labour market regulation is made up of 
arrangements such as salary caps, draft system, free agency and restrictions on players’ 
mobility.699 These instruments aim at allocating talent efficiently amongst the 
competitors, in order to avoid dominance by a few clubs, and prevent them from 
monopolising the market for players. However, all these arrangements have to be 
agreed between employers and employees through a collective bargaining agreement 
process.700  
On the other hand, it must be noticed that in Europe, despite a history of unionised 
working classes, collective bargaining agreements are still not common in sport. This is 
particularly relevant since collective bargaining agreements would fall out of the scope 
of application of EU competition law, in light of the social policy objectives that 
                                                     
698 See Weatherill, S. (2000), Resisting the Pressure of Americanization: The Influence of European 
Community Law on the European Sports Model, Williamette Journal of International Law & Dispute 
Resolution, 8, 37. 
699 The draft system limits the competition between clubs to sign players that come into the league, by 
granting to the last classified team at the end of one season the possibility of selecting the best player. Salary 
caps limit the wage payable by clubs. Free agency defines a situation in which a player is out of contract and 
free to sign with any team. See KEA/CDES, ‘Study on the Economic and Legal Aspects of Transfers of 
Players’ (European Commission, 2013), p. 81 et seq. 
700 See Halgreen, L. (2004), European Sports Law – A Comparative analysis of the European and American 
models of Sport, Folarget Thomson Publishing, Copenhagen. 
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underpin them.701 In this regard, one of the innovations brought about by the European 
Union is the Social Dialogue, a forum where social parties and stakeholders can discuss 
employment related matters.702  
Social Dialogue is regulated by Articles 153 – 155 TFEU.703 According to these 
provisions, the Commission is responsible for promoting and supporting Social 
Dialogue, which consists of a forum where both sides of the industry can discuss 
employment related issues, that ideally result in collective agreements.704 When the 
social partners have successfully reached an agreement, this may be implemented in 
two ways. The parties may decide to have the Council ratify the agreement through the 
adoption of a Directive. In this scenario, the agreement becomes part of EU law as soon 
as it is implemented by Member States, which are bound to achieve the result set 
through national legislation or national collective agreements. This outcome would 
represent the best example of co-regulation, whereby the institutions set up the 
framework and ratify the content of a legislative measure drafted by social partners and 
industry stakeholders. Alternatively, the agreement may be implemented under the 
voluntary route, through customary national procedures.705 This latter type of 
agreement would bind only its signatories and their affiliates, and it would require a 
                                                     
701 Indeed, when these agreements are reached between employers and employees and aim at improving the 
working conditions, the social policy objectives they pursue would be undermined if they would be subject to 
the application of competition law. See Case C-67/79, Albany International v Stichting [1999] ECR I-5751, at 
para. 59, and Case C-115/97, Brentjens' Handelsonderneming BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de 
Handel in Bouwmaterialen [1999] ECR I-06025, at para. 56. 
702 The objective is therefore to enhance dialogue between stakeholders, reduce recourse to litigation, and 
ensure that EU law rights and freedoms penetrate within private regulatory arrangements without public 
enforcement proceedings. See Parrish, R. (2011), Social Dialogue in European Professional Football. 
European Law Journal, 17: 213–229. 
703 Article 153 TFEU establishes the possibility of action taken at Community level to improve employment 
conditions. Article 154 grants the representatives of employees and employers the right of consultation and 
review on proposals of the Commission in the field of social policy, and even affect the subject of the 
Commission legislative proposal if they have been able to reach a Community-wide agreement. Moreover, 
according to Article 155, the social partners can initiate their own process aiming at an agreement, 
independently from a proposal of the Commission. 
704 See Pijetlovic, K. (2015), EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International 
Sports Law Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. 
705 See Article 155(2) TFEU and Parrish, A. (2016) ‘The European Social Dialogue: A New Mode of 
Governance for European Football’, in Duval, A. and Van Rompuy, B. (eds.) The Legacy of Bosman, 
Revisiting the Relationship between EU law and Sport, T.M.C. Asser Press, p. 193. 
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stronger commitment on behalf of the participants and the governing bodies overseeing 
the arrangement. 
Only certain types of organisations can take part in social dialogue: they have to be 
organised at European level and have the capacity to negotiate agreements. 
Furthermore, they need to have adequate structures to ensure effective participation. 
Finally, all the social partner organisations have to apply jointly to the European 
Commission for the creation of the instruments in that particular sector.706 The 
selection of the social partners has particular relevance in light of the importance of 
their role, as they will be recognised as relevant bodies for the EU policy-making 
process. 
As already noted, the Bosman ruling liberalised the players’ market and created the 
conditions for a process of Europeanisation of labour relations in sport, and especially 
in football.707 Following the 2001 Informal Agreement between UEFA, FIFA, and the 
European Commission,708 the EU institution invited the Federation and the clubs to 
make use of the Social Dialogue instruments to enter dialogue with representatives of 
the players on matters related to the employment relationship in the sporting sector.709 
Indeed, the outcome of that negotiation on the transfer system, which involved a 
number of industry stakeholders and European institutions, convinced the Commission 
to offer political support to the instruments of Social Dialogue in the sports sector.710 
The first and so far only example of Social Dialogue in sport was set up in relation to 
professional football. The representative social partners were the European Professional 
                                                     
706 See Article 1, Commission Decision 98/500 of 1998 on the establishment of Sectoral Dialogue 
Committees promoting the dialogue between the social partners at European level. 
707 See Parrish, R. (2011), Social Dialogue in European Professional Football. European Law Journal, 17, p. 
224. 
708 See Garcia, B., (2011), The informal agreement on the international transfer system, European Sports Law 
and Policy Bulletin, I-2011, pp. 17-29. 
709 See ibid, at p. 221 and see Commission of the European Union. Commission White Paper on Sport, COM 
(2007) 391 final, at para. 5.3. The Commission has further expressed its support for the use of Social 
Dialogue in Sport in its 2011 Communication on Developing the European Dimension in Sport. See 
Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Developing the European Dimension in Sport 
{SEC(2011) 66 final} {SEC(2011) 67 final} {SEC(2011) 68 final}, p. 13. 
710 See Parrish, A. (2016) ‘The European Social Dialogue: A New Mode of Governance for European 
Football’, in Duval, A. and Van Rompuy, B. (eds.) The Legacy of Bosman, Revisiting the Relationship 
between EU law and Sport, T.M.C. Asser Press, p. 194. 
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Football Leagues711 and the European Clubs Association712 on the side of the 
employers,713 and FIFPro714 on the side of the employees. After the joint request of 
FIFPro and EPFL, the Commission recognised the existence of the conditions for the 
setting up of an EU Social Dialogue Committee in the professional football sector. The 
social partners agreed to include UEFA in the process, as an associated partner. This is 
an exception, as Governing Bodies are not supposed to have access to the social 
dialogue process.715 The role of the Federation within the Social Dialogue Committee 
may indeed jeopardise the independence of the latter, and hence its legitimacy.716 
In 2012, the Social Dialogue Committee managed to reach an agreement on minimum 
requirements for professional football players’ contracts.717 This agreement establishes 
the basic rights and obligations of clubs and players, and matters that have to be 
included necessarily in the contract, such as the salary and provision of health 
insurance. The substance of the contract will still have to be agreed between clubs and 
players, at least until the social partners reach a further agreement on the subject. 
The impact of the agreement is limited in relation to two main aspects. First of all, the 
social partners agreed merely on minimum standards. These standards are already 
respected in a number of EU Member States, which do not have to implement the 
agreement. Second, the way chosen to implement it was the voluntary one. This 
method of implementation meets the resistance of Member States, which are not bound 
by the agreement. The signatories have to commit to ensure the implementation on 
                                                     
711 EPFL hereinafter. 
712 ECA hereinafter. Originally ECA was not considered as a representative of the clubs. In 2008, UEFA 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with ECA, where its role was established. ECA is constituted by 
clubs representative of the 53 national associations. Membership of ECA depends on the ranking of the 
national associations’ members. 
713 See Pijetlovic for a discussion on the true representative nature of these organisations. The author argues 
that ECA and EFPL are likely to represent adequately only the interests of their top members, regardless of 
their wider constituency. Pijetlovic, K. (2015), EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER 
International Sports Law Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. 
714 FIFPro is the worldwide representative for professional footballers. 
715 See Parrish, R. & Miettinen, S. (2009), The sporting exception in European Union law, T.C.M. Asser 
Instituut. The inclusion of the governing body may cause the ineligibility of the agreements concluded, or of 
some of the aspects that they regulate, under the competition law exemption. 
716 See Pijetlovic, K. (2015), EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International 
Sports Law Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. 
717 Autonomous Agreement on Minimum Requirements Standard Players Contracts, available at 
http://www.ecaeurope.com/Documents/Dialogue%20social%20IX%20Final%20Version.pdf 
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their territory through the most appropriate instruments. However, this results in 
different possible outcomes.718  
In any event, the role and the importance of the Social Dialogue instrument in the 
sporting sector could be significantly expanded in the future.719 Its application in the 
sporting sector responds to a position expressed by the Commission in the White Paper 
on Sport, where the institution argued that governance issues in sport should be dealt 
with according to a self-regulatory approach, provided that the principles of good 
governance are fully respected.720 The use of social dialogue in the sporting sector is 
also supported by EU primary legislation, as Article 165 TFEU states that the action of 
the Union shall be aimed at promoting cooperation between bodies responsible for 
sports. 
On the other hand, the institution of Social Dialogue, rather than enhancing the self-
regulatory approach in sport, confirms a shift from the logic of pure autonomy and 
hegemony of Governing Bodies over the sports system, toward an acceptance of a co-
regulation approach.721 In relation to this, a number of stakeholders would take part in 
the regulatory process, whereby EU law would provide the framework allowing the 
expression of autonomy within boundaries.722 The absence of a strong EU competence 
over sport reduces the number of alternatives available to regulate the system. Social 
Dialogue may therefore be seen as the most effective way of co-regulating the sporting 
sector.  
It is for this reason necessary that both the European institutions and Governing Bodies 
vigorously support Social Dialogue, as the most effective and viable tool to achieve 
                                                     
718 See Parrish, A. (2016) ‘The European Social Dialogue: A New Mode of Governance for European 
Football’, in Duval, A. and Van Rompuy, B. (eds.) The Legacy of Bosman, Revisiting the Relationship 
between EU law and Sport, T.M.C. Asser Press, p. 200. 
719 The Study on the Transfer of Players recommended that the Committee should consider amongst the others 
the matters of protection of minors, excessive transfer fees, fair and balanced competitions and rules related to 
non-EU players. See KEA/CDES, ‘Study on the Economic and Legal Aspects of Transfers of Players’ 
(European Commission, 2013), at p. 8. 
720 See Commission of the European Communities. Commission White Paper on Sport, COM (2007) 391 
final, at para. 4. 
721 See Geeraert, A. (2015), The European sectoral social dialogue committee in professional football: power 
relations, legitimacy and control, Soccer & Society, 16, 1. 
722 See Foster, K, (2011), The Juridification of Sport. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959909 
Parrish, R. (2011), Social Dialogue in European Professional Football. European Law Journal, 17: 213–229. 
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favourable results in the area of European sports policy. It is also important to convince 
national affiliates and Member States to give a strong mandate to negotiate at EU level, 
by identifying clearly the added value for their members. This effort would help to 
achieve two results. First, it would allow Governing Bodies to retain some level of 
control and autonomy over the regulation of the sector. Second, it would strengthen the 
cooperative relationship with the EU institutions, which would provide the overarching 
framework for the instrument. Under the Social Dialogue umbrella, regulatory rules 
may be strengthened and find further legitimisation. Indeed, so long as the matter 
pertains to the employment relationship between clubs and players, an agreement could 
provide a regulative framework for the transfer of players, contractual issues, image 
rights and solidarity payments to name but a few.723  
However, the need of ensuring a true representative nature of the participants cannot be 
ignored. The role of UEFA and Governing Bodies has to be limited: at this stage, 
UEFA is capable of exercising a significant level of control on the activity of the Social 
Dialogue Committee on professional football. Indeed, the Association not only chairs 
the Committee in light of its expertise, but every item discussed in the Committee has 
to be approved by the Professional Football Strategy Council, a consultative body 
within UEFA created to build a network for social dialogue and consultation in the 
governance of professional football.724 Finally, Social Dialogue does not require the 
inclusion in the process of all the possible stakeholders of a specific industry. Indeed, in 
relation to sport, fans, final consumers and other investors at various stages of the 
production are not adequately represented. It is, therefore, clear that commercial 
arrangements that would affect them negatively could not be justified even if agreed 
within the process of Social Dialogue. 
                                                     
723 See T.M.C. Asser Institute, Edge Hill University and the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Study into the 
Identification of Themes and Issues which can be Dealt with in a Social Dialogue in the European 
Professional Football Sector, Report for the European Commission (May 2008). Other objectives may be 
considered as well, as the goals outlined in Article 165 TFEU, such as fairness and openness in sporting 
competitions, cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and the protection of the physical and moral 
integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen. See Parrish, R. (2011), Social Dialogue in European Professional 
Football. European Law Journal, 17: 213–229. 
724 See Geeraert, A. (2015), The European sectoral social dialogue committee in professional football: power 
relations, legitimacy and control, Soccer & Society, 16, 1. 
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4. The Transfer System in Football 
While areas of the sports labour market have been left to the regulatory autonomy of 
Governing Bodies, other aspects have instead been regulated through agreements 
between Regulatory Bodies and the European Commission. One example of this form 
of cooperation725 is the 2001 Informal Agreement on the International Transfer System, 
which was struck between the European Commission and UEFA.726 This measure, a 
non-legally binding settlement, was the result of a dispute that started some time before 
with Bosman.727 Prior to the judgment of the Court, the FIFA players’ registration 
system allowed clubs to retain the registration of their players even after the expiry of 
their contract, unless a transfer fee was paid by the new club. In its judgment, the Court 
maintained that the transfer system in place at the time was inadequate to achieve its 
legitimate objectives, namely protecting the competitive balance between clubs, as it 
restricted the freedom of movement of players in a way that was disproportionate to 
them.728 However, the decision of the Court considered only out-of-contract players: 
the legality of transfer fees for players under contract was not assessed.729  
After the Court established that the transfer system in place at the time was in breach of 
EU law, the Commission put pressure on UEFA to amend it, in order to avoid any 
further legal action. Hence, in 1998 the Commission opened an investigation against 
FIFA, which at the time was responsible for the regulation of the international football 
                                                     
725 This form of cooperation is vertically imposed by the authorities. It can be better defined as a form of 
condition autonomy, whereby the activity of the regulator is steered through the use of Decisions and 
investigations. 
726 See European Commission, Press Release IP/01/314, Outcome of discussions between the Commission 
and FIFA/UEFA on FIFA Regulations on international football transfers, Brussels, 5 March 2001. For a 
complete overview of the agreement and the process that lead to its conclusion, see Garcia, B., (2011), The 
2001 informal agreement on the international transfer system. European Sports Law and Policy Bulletin, I-
2011, pp. 17-29. 
727 See supra Sporting Value chapter,  ¶ 7. 
728 See Weatherill, S. (2000), Resisting the Pressure of Americanization: The Influence of European 
Community Law on the European Sports Model, Williamette Journal of International Law & Dispute 
Resolution, 8, 37, and Bosman, at para. 107. 
729 See Pearson, G. (2015). Sporting justifications under EU free movement and competition law: The case of 
the football ‘Transfer system’. European Law Journal, 21(2), 220-238. On the other hand, it could be argued 
that the Commission has accepted a fee based transfer system for players under contract through the 2001 
Agreement. See Berry, A. (2012), Challenging Football Transfer Windows: A disproportionate response to a 
legitimate aim, Sport & Law Journal, 20, 1. 
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transfer system that was in place in Europe, as well as in the rest of the world.730 
Indeed, the system presented a number of features that were capable of breaching 
Article 101 TFEU. First, unilateral termination of the contract was prohibited: even 
after a player had broken his contract with a club, and paid damages for the breach, he 
was still not allowed to register with another club in another country.731 Second, the 
transfer fee, which was agreed freely by the parties involved, did not have to be in any 
way related to the costs borne for the training or the development of the player, thereby 
possibly leading to excessively high fees. Finally, national associations were obliged to 
implement the same system within their domestic transfer regime, and clubs and 
players were prevented from taking disputes related to transfers to civil courts. The 
arrangement could thus be considered as a decision of an association of undertakings 
that distorted the competition on the market for signing players. 
The investigation had the effect of convincing FIFA, UEFA and a number of national 
leagues to initiate a dialogue with the European Commission.732 The discussion led to 
the adoption of the new FIFA rules on International Transfers.733 This constitutes an 
example of the shift that has started to occur from a vertical and hierarchical system, to 
a horizontal model where networks of stakeholders collaborate to define the rules.734  
The Commission then closed its investigation, satisfied by the amendments put in place 
by FIFA.735 The institution, however, did not expressly exempt the arrangement under 
Article 101(3) TFEU, and it did not hold that the arrangement was inherent to the 
                                                     
730 See Garcia, B. and Meier, H. (2012), Limits of Interest Empowerment in the European Union: The Case of 
Football, Journal of European Integration, 34/4, p. 363. 
731 See Parrish, R. (2003), Sports Law and Policy in the European Union, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, p.141. 
732 They were later joined by the FIFPro, as the representative of Football players. 
733 FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, July 2001. The latest version can be found here 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/regulations_on_the_status_and_transfer_of_p
layers_en_33410.pdf [last accessed on 06 May 2016]. 
734 See Duval, A. (2016) ‘The FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: Transnational Law-
Making in the Shadow of Bosman’, in Duval, A. and Van Rompuy, B. (eds.) The Legacy of Bosman, 
Revisiting the Relationship between EU law and Sport, T.M.C. Asser Press, p. 91. 
735 See European Commission (2002), Commission Closes Investigations into FIFA Regulations on 
International Football Transfers, IP/02/824, 05/06/2002. By this time, however, FIFPro had withdrawn from 
the negotiation and was not part of the final agreement. 
 153
pursuit of a legitimate objective either, but it simply discontinued the procedure.736 
According to the Press Release, the new rules struck a balance between the freedom of 
movement of players and the need to protect the integrity of sport, the stability of 
contracts, and the stability of championships. 
The new arrangement abolished transfer fees for players who move to a club in a 
different Member State at the expiration of their contract. The Regulations hence 
replaced the old transfer fees, declared illegal in Bosman, with a training compensation 
scheme.737 Indeed, as the Court had recognised the training of young players as a 
legitimate objective,738 FIFA decided to link that specific aim to the payment of a fee. 
This has to be paid to the club that lost the player at the end of the contract, but it has to 
be calculated in relation to the real costs incurred for his training. Furthermore, in order 
to protect contract stability, the system created one transfer period per season, with a 
mid-season window, and imposed a limit of one transfer per player per season. 
Sanctions were provided against unilateral breaches of contract, whether carried out by 
the players or the clubs. 
 
4.1 Transfer Windows 
One of the first aspects that should be considered in relation to the sports labour market 
is the existence of transfer windows. In football, players can move from one club to 
another, and be registered by the latter, only during two fixed periods, one during the 
summer break and a short one in winter.739 As previously discussed, FIFA made 
                                                     
736 See Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2014), Sport: law and practice, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath, 
West Sussex, p. 1177. 
737 In his opinion in Bosman, A.G. Lenz considered that transfer rules in football were disproportionate to the 
objective of ensuring the competitive balance between clubs, and that training compensations were more 
likely to achieve those aims. See Case C-415/93, Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) 
and others v Jean-Marc Bosman, [1995] ECR I-04921, Opinion of AG Lenz, para. 239. 
738 See Bosman, para. 106. However, the Court held in that instance that the specific form taken by the 
transfer system was neither capable of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players, nor it 
constituted an adequate means to finance such activities. See ibid, para. 109. 
739 See Articles 6(1) and 6(2) of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. In basketball, 
instead there is a transfer deadline, after which players cannot be registered by teams. See KEA/CDES, ‘Study 
on the Economic and Legal Aspects of Transfers of Players’ (European Commission, 2013), p. 67. 
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transfer windows compulsory starting from the 2002/2003 season.740 Furthermore, the 
same regulations establish that a player may be registered with a maximum of three 
clubs during one season, but play official matches only for two of these clubs.741 
Finally, for knock-out European competitions there are even more stringent rules: 
indeed, a player cannot be fielded to take part in the competition for more than one club 
in the course of the same season.742  
The main aim of transfer windows, or registration periods, is to avoid disruptions of the 
championship.743 In their absence, a club could sign the best players on the market the 
day before the final match of the competition and significantly increase its chances of 
winning. Hence, transfer windows pursue the aim of protecting seasonal stability and 
competitive balance, but also the integrity of the competition and its perception by fans. 
Furthermore, it may be argued that this kind of rule protects the interests of all the 
stakeholders in sport, including fans, broadcasters, teams and Governing Bodies.744  
On the other hand, it may be argued that transfer windows run against the goal of 
competitive balance. Indeed, the time restriction imposed on the activity of clubs 
constricts the market and inflates the prices, thereby favouring clubs that can afford to 
spend high sums in a short span.745 Moreover, small sides have in their players their 
main assets, and limiting their ability to sell them may have a significant impact on 
their finances. This may be considered yet another inherent characteristic of sport, as in 
any other business a cash-flow problem could be easily resolved by selling some of the 
assets. 
Applying a Meca-Medina approach, the restrictions caused by a registration period may 
be seen as inherent to the organisation of the competition itself and to the pursuit of 
                                                     
740 This was part of the 2001 Agreement between FIFA and the European Commission on the transfer system. 
See Garcia, B., (2011), The 2001 informal agreement on the international transfer system. European Sports 
Law and Policy Bulletin, I-2011, pp. 17-29. 
741 See Article 5(3) FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. 
742 See Art 42.07 of the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League 2015/16. 
743 See Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2014), Sport: law and practice, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath, 
West Sussex, p. 1173. 
744 See Berry, A. (2012), Challenging Football Transfer Windows: A disproportionate response to a 
legitimate aim, Sport & Law Journal, 20, 1.  
745 See Pearson, G. (2015). Sporting justifications under EU free movement and competition law: The case of 
the football ‘Transfer system’. European Law Journal, 21(2), 220-238. 
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those objectives. It thus appears that these objectives can be deemed legitimate, and 
hence the question to be addressed is related to the proportionality of the restrictions 
that they cause. In this sense, it may be argued that the distortion caused and the 
restriction imposed are not proportionate to the objective pursued, and that less 
restrictive means could meet the same goals.746 In particular, a less restrictive 
arrangement would prohibit transfers in the last part of the season. Hence, if the 
restrictions go beyond what is necessary to achieve the legitimate objective, their 
legality may be contested. Similarly, the system does not appear to create economic 
efficiency, which would allow it to meet the main requirement of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
Nevertheless, the legality of registration periods has been confirmed in few instances 
by the European authorities. The Commission has maintained that the regulation of 
transfer periods is likely to constitute a sporting rule that would not infringe 
competition law.747 Furthermore, transfer windows have already been assessed in 
Lehtonen, although only under the provisions on free movement. It has to be reminded, 
in any event, that the Court in that case adopted an approach, which now may seem 
outdated, that was distinguishing between the economic and non-economic nature of 
the rule in object.748 
 
4.2 Contract Stability 
The main provisions aiming at guaranteeing the stability of contracts in football can be 
found in Articles 13–18 of the FIFA Regulations on Status and Transfer of Players. In 
                                                     
746 See Berry, A. (2012), Challenging Football Transfer Windows: A disproportionate response to a 
legitimate aim, Sport & Law Journal, 20, 1. 
747 See Commission Staff Working Document - Action Plan ‘Pierre de Coubertin’ - Accompanying document 
to the White Paper on Sport {COM(2007) 391 final} {SEC(2007)932} {SEC(2007)935} {SEC(2007)936}, at 
p.72 and See Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2014), Sport: law and practice, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards 
Heath, West Sussex, p. 1515. However, in its Communication on Developing European Dimension in Sport, 
the Commission has also pointed out that the transfer of players may raise concerns about the legality of the 
system and the transparency of financial flows. See Communication From the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
Developing the European Dimension in Sport {SEC(2011) 66 final} {SEC(2011) 67 final} {SEC(2011) 68 
final}, at para 4.4. 
748 This approach was later frowned upon (although the phrase is a little informal) by the Court of Justice in 
Meca Medina, where such a distinction was disregarded. See Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor 
Majcen v Commission of the European Communities. [2006] ECR I-6991, para. 27, and Anderson, J., (2013), 
Leading cases in sports law, Asser Press, The Hague. p. 141. 
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particular, Article 17 establishes that players themselves may have to pay 
compensation749 in the event of a termination of the contract without just cause, on the 
basis of their market value.750 Moreover, the Regulations introduce a so-called 
protected period. This corresponds to the first three years from the entry into force of 
the contract between a player and a club, or two years if the player is older than 28, 
during which sporting sanctions will be imposed on the athlete in the event of a 
unilateral breach of contract on his side.751 This protected period starts again every time 
the contract is renewed, and its duration extended. Once this period has expired, the 
player will be able to terminate the contract with no sanctions, provided that 
compensation is paid to his current club.752 
The introduction of Article 17 allowed the system to respond to the liberalisation that 
occurred with Bosman: while players can move freely at the end of their contract, clubs 
tend now to extend contracts more regularly, thereby renewing the protected period as 
well. The consequence is that clubs will retain a high level of control over players.753 It 
is apparent how these rules can still cause a restriction on the market. The Regulations 
have been subject to amendments since 2001, but the substance has remained 
untouched.  The elements that characterised the transfer system in the pre-Bosman era 
are still present.754 As opposed to the transfer fees due for players after the expiry of 
                                                     
749 The amount of compensation for the unilateral breach of contract has been subject of a number of CAS 
awards. In Webster, the Court held that the damages to be paid should have been calculated on the basis of the 
outstanding remuneration due until the expiry of the contract. See CAS 2007/A/1298/1299/1300. In 
Matuzalem, instead, the Court stated that the payment had to be based on the costs of replacing the player who 
has left the club, and hence his transfer value. See CAS 2008/A/159. Through these developments, however, 
the system managed to reintroduce transfer fees in cases of unilateral breach of contract. See Pearson, G. 
(2015). Sporting justifications under EU free movement and competition law: The case of the football 
‘Transfer system’. European Law Journal, 21(2), 220-238. 
750 This can be inferred from the second paragraph of Article 17, FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer 
of Players. 
751 The sanction may range from 4 to 6 months’ suspension from playing in official matches. 
752 See Gardiner, S. and Welch, R., (2007), The Contractual Dynamics of Team Stability Versus Player 
Mobility: Who Rules 'The Beautiful Game'?, Entertainment and Sports Law Journal. 
753 Another consequence is the leverage power that players may have during the negotiation of the new 
contract. This partially explains the increase in players’ wages from the pre-Bosman era. See Parrish, R, 
(2015), Article 17 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: Compatibility with EU Law, 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 22(2) 256-282. 
754 I.e. provisions protecting contractual stability and transfer fees. The only exception is the introduction of 
the new training compensation. 
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their contract, the system now features compensation payments and protected periods, 
but the effect is similar. 
It should then be assumed that the assessment made by the Court of Justice in Bosman 
is still applicable and correct today,755 and that the transfer system persists in breach of 
EU law. This is especially true when Article 165 TFEU is taken into account. The 
promotion of openness and fairness can hardly be considered compatible with a transfer 
system that restricts the ability of players to move and of clubs to sign them. An 
effective solution would be to engage FIFPro in the discussion, and make better use of 
the possibilities offered by the Social Dialogue instrument, in order to come to a 
satisfying arrangement for all the parties involved.  
A lack of effective involvement of FIFPro may indeed be considered as one of the 
reasons that triggered the complaint lodged by the players’ union with the European 
Commission.756 It must be noticed that one of the aims of the complaint is to develop a 
better governance policy that may achieve the objectives of solidarity amongst clubs 
and training of young athletes. It therefore recognises some of the goals pursued by the 
system itself, while criticising the methods. The complaint deals with a number of 
aspects related to the international transfer system, including the training compensation 
scheme, and the provisions on contract stability.757 In particular, the introduction of a 
protected period after the renewal of the contract goes beyond the restriction that is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the rules.758 The complainant submitted that the 
transfer system reduces the ability of clubs to compete for players, and constitutes a 
disincentive to recruitment. Furthermore, players are affected as well, as it reduces their 
opportunities to find employment and it conditions the terms under which the 
                                                     
755 See Egger, A. and Stix-Hackl, C. (2002), Sports and Competition Law: A Never-Ending Story?, European 
Competition Law Review, 23/2, p. 89. 
756 See the press release at https://www.fifpro.org/en/news/fifpro-takes-legal-action-against-fifa-transfer-
system. 
757 See Parrish, R, (2015), Article 17 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: 
Compatibility with EU Law, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 22(2) 256-282. 
758 See Duval, A., (2015) Interview with Wil van Megen (Legal Director of FIFPro) on FIFPro’s EU 
Competition Law complaint against the FIFA Transfer System, Asser International Sports Law Blog, 29 
September 2015, available at http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/interview-with-wil-van-megen-legal-
director-of-fifpro-on-fifpro-s-eu-competition-law-complaint-against-the-fifa-transfer-system#_ftn1 [last 
accessed 9 February 2016]. 
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employment is offered. It is finally argued that the Commission has failed to evaluate 
the impact of the transfer system, after the informal agreement struck in 2001.759 
While the sporting movement has often fought for the recognition of a right to self-
regulation, it is the very self-regulation of labour relationships that has distorted the 
market, through the imposition of constraints on the freedom of athletes and the 
inflation of transfer fees.760 In this context, the complaint is particularly significant as it 
comes from one of the main stakeholders in sport, the athletes. FIFPro has been 
involved in the discussions to give input to the decision-making and the regulatory 
process of the system, and, to some extent, also in the setting up of the current transfer 
system itself.761 It is, therefore, unlikely that the complaint will result in anything more 
than a bargaining tool, which FIFPro will use to discuss the issues around the transfer 
system. 
However, the importance of this action should not be underestimated, as it may 
represent a statement against the notion of a pure autonomy granted to sporting bodies 
that comes from within the system. In turn, this is a call for a co-regulatory approach, 
whereby the power of the Governing Bodies is constrained and somewhat channeled by 
the authorities. FIFPro’s complaint may also be interpreted as a request to limit the 
recourse to the notion of specificity of sport, under which the labour market mobility of 
athletes has been controlled and reduced.762 
 
5. Third Party Ownership 
One of the main consequences of the liberalisation of the sports players’ market after 
Bosman has been the enormous increase in transfer fees and players’ wages paid by 
                                                     
759 See FIFPro, executive summary of the complaint, available at 
https://www.fifpro.org/attachments/article/6156/FIFPro%20Complaint%20Executive%20Summary.pdf [last 
accessed 06/06/2016]. 
760 See Gardiner, S. and Welch, R., (2007), ‘The Contractual Dynamics of Team Stability Versus Player 
Mobility: Who Rules 'The Beautiful Game'?’, Entertainment and Sports Law Journal. 
761 See Pijetlovic, K. (2015), EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International 
Sports Law Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. 
762 See De Marco, N. and Mills, A. (2016), FIFPro challenge the football transfer system, Sports Law 
Bulletin, 9 February 2016, available at http://sportslawbulletin.org/2016/02/09/fifpro-challenge-the-football-
transfer-system/ [last accessed 15 March 2016]. 
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clubs.763 The financial crisis that has spread over Europe in the last decade has hit the 
sport system hard, and clubs had to come up with alternative ways to face the costs of 
the market. 
This is the framework and the background from which third party ownership764 of 
players began to take place. This expression defines a situation whereby a third party 
provides a club with money in exchange for a percentage of the future transfer fee of a 
specific player.765 Hence, the club that has registered the player will receive a sum and 
promise that, in the event of a future transfer of the player, the third party will receive a 
percentage of the payment received.766 No third parties ‘own’ a player, but only a share 
of the economic rights attached to him,767 and only insofar as the contract between the 
player and the club is valid. Individual investors, investment funds and private 
companies can all be third parties in this scenario. This system allows smaller clubs, or 
clubs with a difficult economic situation, to finance their activities on the market by 
having access to short term liquidity. They are therefore able to sign players that they 
could not afford otherwise, as the third party share the risks of the investment and the 
financial burden.768 
                                                     
763 See European Commission, Press Release IP 13-95, Commission blows the whistle over inflated football 
transfer fees and lack of level playing field, Brussels, 7 February 2013. 
764  TPO hereinafter. 
765 See KPMG, (2013) Report on Third Party Ownership, p. 5. The Report defines TPO and identifies the 
main types of TPO agreements in Europe. 
766 In most of the cases, the TPO agreement established that, in the event that the player is not traded the club 
Duval, A. (2015) Unpacking Doyen’s TPO Deals: FC Twente's Game of Maltese Roulette., Asser 
International Sports Law Blog, 2 December 2015, available at 
http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/unpacking-doyen-s-tpo-deals-fc-twente-s-game-of-maltese-roulette-
by-antoine-duval-and-oskar-van-maren [last accessed 9 February 2016].will have to purchase back the share 
of the economic rights held by the third party plus an agreed-upon interest rate, or the higher price that was 
offer in a deal rejected by the club. Furthermore, if the agreement has set a minimum return, the club will 
need to pay that amount to the third party even if the transfer fee received is lower, or if the club breaches its 
contract. See Lindholm, J. (2016), Can I please have a slice of Ronaldo? The legality of FIFA’s ban on third-
party ownership under European Union law, The International Sports Law Journal, 15, 3, pp. 137 – 148. 
767 See Van Maren, O. et al. (2016) Debating FIFA’s TPO ban: ASSER International Sports Law Blog 
symposium, The International Sports Law Journal, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp 233-252. 
768 The case of F.C. Twente, however, demonstrates how a football club in economic difficulties may found 
itself in even worse conditions after having agreed to a TPO. See Duval, A. (2015) Unpacking Doyen’s TPO 
Deals: FC Twente's Game of Maltese Roulette., Asser International Sports Law Blog, 2 December 2015, 
available at http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/unpacking-doyen-s-tpo-deals-fc-twente-s-game-of-
maltese-roulette-by-antoine-duval-and-oskar-van-maren [last accessed 9 February 2016]. 
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The system of third-party ownership has been contested in the past by UEFA and 
FIFPro in relation to a number of questions. On one hand it has been argued that TPO 
may encroach the freedom of athletes, who may lose control of their own career if 
subject to pressure from a third party to transfer to another club, as this will be 
profitable for the third party itself.769 On the other hand, the continental football 
association has maintained that in the event that the same third party holds rights on 
players competing against each other, this may represent a threat to the integrity of the 
game.770 Furthermore, third party ownership follows a short-term profit maximisation 
that is contrary to the goals of financial stability in football and of the development of 
young players.771 As the third party investors aim at recouping their investments 
through transfer fees paid for the players, the system is also likely to impair contractual 
stability, which was the objective pursued by the Transfer system and accepted by the 
Commission in 2001.772 
TPO has been banned by a number of national federations, including the English 
Premier League.773 Finally, in 2015 FIFA decided to impose a worldwide ban on TPO 
in football.774 The ban is effective only on new agreements: the TPO signed before the 
Regulations entered into force remain valid. In response to the decision of FIFA, the 
Spanish and Portuguese Leagues, two of the leagues that were using TPO most 
frequently, filed a complaint with the Commission arguing that the ban is capable of 
infringing freedom of movement of labour and capital and the rules of competition 
                                                     
769 See Poli, R. (2016) in Debating FIFA’s TPO ban: ASSER International Sports Law Blog symposium, The 
International Sports Law Journal, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp. 233-252. 
770 See CDES-CIES (2014) Third-party ownership of players’ economic rights, Part II. In practical 
terms, UEFA relies on the acceptance of a restrictive conduct under the need to preserve the integrity of the 
game, as it was the case in ENIC. See Case COMP/37 806: ENIC/ UEFA. 
771 See Poli, R. (2016) in Debating FIFA’s TPO ban: ASSER International Sports Law Blog symposium, The 
International Sports Law Journal, Volume 15, Issue 3-4, pp 233-252. 
772 See infra, § 3, and Duval, A., (2015) Unpacking Doyen’s TPO Deals: In defence of the compatibility of 
FIFA’s TPO ban with EU law, Asser International Sports Law Blog, 18 December 2015, available at 
http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/unpacking-doyen-s-tpo-deals-in-defence-of-the-compatibility-of-
fifa-s-tpo-ban-with-eu-law [last accessed 9 February 2016]. 
773 Premier League Rules U39-40. TPO are not allowed in France and Poland either. See KPMG (2013) 
Report on Third Party Ownership, p. 6. 
774 Article 18 ter of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. FIFA has previously adopted 
Article 18 bis, prohibiting a third party owner from influencing a club’s employment or transfer related 
matters. 
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law.775 Indeed, FIFA rules constitute a decision by an Association of undertakings, 
which is capable of restricting the ability of players to move from one club to another, 
but also the freedom of investors and their activity on the market. 
While a full application of EU law to the issue could lead to establishing an 
infringement of competition,776 the objective pursued and the proportionality of the 
restriction caused have to be carefully assessed.777 The TPO ban pursues a number of 
legitimate aims, such as the integrity of competition, the independence of clubs and the 
financial stability of the system.778 These regulatory objectives have been accepted by 
the institutions of the EU, as they are capable of affecting the perception of fans and 
their willingness to follow the League.779 
Although they recognise that some form of regulation of the TPO instrument is needed, 
the complainants have stressed that third-party ownership is a useful and sometimes 
essential practice for clubs. Indeed, it could be argued that third-party ownership has 
pro-competitive effects, as it provides financial means to economically weaker clubs, 
which can then better face the disparity existing in the system and enhance the 
uncertainty of results. Conversely, the ban may constitute a disproportionate 
measure.780 In relation to this, the necessity of the ban has to be considered,781 where 
                                                     
775 See The Spanish and Portuguese Leagues denounce FIFA’s TPO ban to the European Commission, at 
http://www.laliga.es/en/news/the-spanish-and-portuguese-leagues-denounce-fifas-tpo-ban-to-the-european-
commission. 
776 See Siekmann, R.C.R. (2013), Social dialogue in professional sports: on some topics about European 
sports law: emphasis on ‘old and new’ EU member states, Shaker Verlag, Aachen. 
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suspend the effects of the ban. In this instance, the Court held that it cannot be assessed with sufficient 
certainty that the ban would be contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU. See Cour d’appel Bruxelles, Doyen Sports et 
ASBL RFC Seraing United c. URBSFA, FIFA et UEFA, 2015/KR/54, 10 mars 2016. 
778 By restricting the clubs’ sources of finance, the ban aims at preventing them from over-investing on the 
players’ market. This is a similar objective to the one pursued through the Financial Fair Play rules. See infra. 
779 See Decision in Case COMP/37 806: ENIC/ UEFA, para. 38. See also Weatherill, S. (2012) EU Sports 
Law: The Effect of the Lisbon Treaty. Oxford University Press, and Parrish, R. (2012), Lex Sportiva and EU 
Sports Law, European Law Review, 37, Dec, pp. 716-733. 
780 See La Liga (2016), in Debating FIFA’s TPO ban: ASSER International Sports Law Blog symposium, The 
International Sports Law Journal, Volume 15, Issue 3-4, pp 233-252. 
781 The complainants have also argued that the practice of loaning players to other clubs should raise 
comparable if not higher concerns. This position is also maintained in the Report prepared for the 
Commission on the transfer of players. KEA-CDES (2013) Study on the economic and legal aspects of 
transfers of players, December 2013, pp. 193 et seq. 
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FIFA had already adopted a provision prohibiting third parties from exercising 
influence on club’s employment or transfer related matters.782 FIFA should then 
demonstrate that Article 18bis was not effective in achieving its goals, and that what 
was needed was a more stringent provision. Furthermore, the ban must be the least 
restrictive means available to successfully achieve the objective. Hence, it has to be 
demonstrated that a more transparent form of regulation, which would be less 
restrictive, would not be capable of achieving the same objectives.783 
This last aspect is of particular relevance. Indeed, the ban itself may not be too 
effective in achieving its objectives. The peculiarity of this system is that third party 
investors are not necessarily bound by FIFA regulations.784 This means that, while 
clubs dealing with TPO investors would face sanctions, the investors themselves could 
still enforce the TPO agreement before a national court.785 
Two main considerations have to be put forward in relation to the TPO ban. Firstly, a 
comparison can be drawn between the TPO ban and the ENIC case,786 where the 
Commission considered only the legality of a rule prohibiting one entity from 
controlling multiple clubs, but not the acquisition of minority stakes in them. Indeed, 
UEFA considered that holding a minority stake in a club would not have a severe effect 
on the fans in terms of their perception of the integrity of the competition. On the other 
                                                     
782 See Article 18 bis of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. 
783 See in this sense the recommendations made in the Report for the Commission. KEA-CDES (2013) Study 
on the economic and legal aspects of transfers of players, December 2013, p. 8, and Lindholm, J. (2016), Can 
I please have a slice of Ronaldo? The legality of FIFA’s ban on third-party ownership under European Union 
law, The International Sports Law Journal, 15, 3, pp. 137 – 148. For a discussion of possible alternatives, see 
La Liga (2016), in Debating FIFA’s TPO ban: ASSER International Sports Law Blog symposium, The 
International Sports Law Journal, Volume 15, Issue 3-4, pp 233-252. Finally, Duval argues that less 
restrictive means would not be as effective as a ban. See Duval, A., (2015) Unpacking Doyen’s TPO Deals: 
In defence of the compatibility of FIFA’s TPO ban with EU law, Asser International Sports Law Blog, 18 
December 2015, available at http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/unpacking-doyen-s-tpo-deals-in-
defence-of-the-compatibility-of-fifa-s-tpo-ban-with-eu-law [last accessed 9 February 2016]. 
784 Unless they themsleves are subject to FIFA jurisdiction, as players’ agents, clubs, other athletes and so on.  
785 However, the Agreement between the club and the third party may establish that CAS has jurisdiction over 
disputes related to the contract. This is what has happened in the case between Doyen, a Maltese company 
that owns rights on a number of players around the world, and Sporting Lisbon. See Duval, A., (2015) 
Unpacking Doyen’s TPO Deals – Sporting Lisbon’s rebellion in the Rojo case, Asser International Sports 
Law Blog, 9 December 2015, available at http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/unpacking-doyen-s-tpo-
deals-sporting-lisbon-s-rebellion-in-the-rojo-case-by-antoine-duval-and-oskar-van-maren [last accessed 9 
February 2016]. 
786 See supra, Integrity and Regulatory rules chapter, § 2.2. 
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hand, holding a minority stake in the economic rights of a player is considered a major 
cause of concern. This is a matter that has to be considered when the rule will be 
assessed under the proportionality test. 
The second point that may be stressed here is the relevance of the objective of the 
financial stability of the system. This aim underlies a number of Regulations and 
arrangements that have been adopted by Governing Bodies starting from the year 
2000.787 Although this has been recognised as legitimate by the Commission,788 this 
objective is purely economic in nature, and it is hardly justifiable under a purely 
sporting interest. It is however a regulatory interest that Governing Bodies may try to 
protect for the viability of the system. On the other hand, the pursuit of financial 
stability is likely to run against the competitive balance of a league, as it would 
sanction weaker teams, which would overspend to fill the gap with more powerful 
clubs. In turn, the competitive balance would be enhanced by a greater degree of 
solidarity payments between clubs. The limited impact that solidarity compensation has 
on the system contributes to reinforce the existing hegemony of elite clubs and does not 
address the issue of competitive balance.789 
The financial instability of the system represents an inefficiency of the market, which 
the market itself has created through its transfer system. Rules that restrict the ability of 
undertakings to compete cannot solve the situation. Competition law should therefore 
intervene and tackle the inefficiency by preventing these types of restrictions. 
However, this does not mean that the specificity of sport would be disregarded. Rules 
that, despite imposing restrictions on the market, are capable of achieving a greater 
degree of solidarity are also more likely to satisfy the efficiency tests and the inherency 
test. Indeed, the main reason behind the need to impose rules that guarantee financial 
                                                     
787 The ban on third party ownership, Financial Fair Play Rules, the stricter control on State aid and the 
Transfer system itself aimed, amongst other things, to the stability of the competition and of the financial 
situation of clubs. 
788 See C(2014) 7378 final, Commission Decision of 14.10.2014 adopting the Arrangement for Cooperation 
between the European Commission and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), at para 2.7. 
789 According to the Study on the transfers of players, in 2013 solidarity payments amounted only to 1.84% of 
the total transfer fees paid in European football. Furthermore, clubs that do not play in the Champions League 
receive only 6% of the revenues granted to the 32 clubs that participate in the Competition. See KEA-CDES 
(2013) Study on the economic and legal aspects of transfers of players, December 2013, p. 7. 
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stability is to be found in the costs of the market for players, and the lack of a sufficient 
degree of solidarity in the system. Ultimately, the solidarity amongst clubs should be 
promoted to protect the specific nature of sport and the openness and fairness of the 
system.790  
 
6. Mandatory Player Release 
One specific characteristic of sport is the possibility for athletes to represent their own 
country in international competitions. This is not only a matter of national pride, and a 
way to boost the sense of belonging and citizenship. It also involves the possibility for 
the athletes to enhance their media exposure, and hence market value and bargaining 
power, when it comes to signing a contract. 
In team sports, however, clubs tend not to look with favour on the idea of releasing 
their players - workers that they pay a considerable wage - to play for the national 
team, with all the risks of possible injuries connected to it. Many sporting bodies, 
therefore, have decided to impose a mandatory and non-compensated player release 
clause to their clubs, with pecuniary and sporting sanctions in the event of non-
compliance. 
Hence, under the FIFA Regulation for the Status and Transfer of Players, it is 
mandatory for football clubs to release their players for matches of their respective 
national teams.791 Under the original rule, the clubs themselves had to provide an 
appropriate insurance cover for their players during the release period, without being 
entitled to any form of financial compensation in the event of injuries. 
Football clubs did not accept this rule peacefully, as they were losing control of their 
players without being able to profit from redistribution of the revenues of the 
Federation, and still had to bear the risks associated with injuries occurred to players 
while playing for the national team. Furthermore, clubs were not consulted over the 
setting of the rules and over the match calendar.  
                                                     
790 For a discussion on players’ agents, see supra, Integrity and Regulatory rules chapter. 
791 See Article 1, Annex 1, FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of players. 
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However, the existence of a mandatory release rule may be considered necessary to 
guaranteee national team competitions. Moreover, being released for international 
duties is a legitimate expectation of the players as this may raise interest in their 
performance. Indeed, as international competitions constitute the perfect platform to 
advertise the players’ skills and talents to the market, playing for a national team is a 
lucrative opportunity for the athletes.792 
The tension between clubs and national teams reached its peak in 2004, when the G-
14793 lodged a complaint with the Commission and the Swiss Competition Authority 
arguing that FIFA rules on players’ release were in breach of Article 101 and 102 
TFEU. In 2006, the Belgian football club Charleroi challenged the rule before the 
national court, after having had to bear the loss of its Moroccan player Oulmers for an 
injury sustained during an international friendly match played with his national team. 
The main issue related to the obligation resting on clubs to provide medical insurance 
for their players even during the period they were spending with the national team, with 
no possibility of obtaining financial compensation for the damages possibly 
sustained.794 The clubs also argued that the injury of the player impaired their chances 
to succeed in the national championship. 
The National Court made a preliminary reference to the CJEU, asking to decide on the 
compatibility with Article 101 and 102 TFEU of the mandatory release clause, 
combined with the authority of Governing Bodies to set the international calendar. 
FIFA finally reached an agreement with the G-14, which joined the existing action 
brought by Charleroi, according to which UEFA committed to distribute every four 
years a sum to national associations to be passed on to their clubs which have 
                                                     
792 In this regard, the Court of Justice has long recognised that even individual athletes may be considered to 
carry out their economic activities when involved in international competitions, even when some of the 
services they perform are not paid. See Case C-51/96, Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et 
disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo, [2000], ECR I-02549, at 
para. 56. 
793 The G-14 was the group of the 14 leading football clubs in Europe. After the negotiated agreement with 
FIFA on the mandatory release clause, G-14 has been disbanded and replaced by ECA, which formally 
represents all the clubs in Europe. See Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2014), Sport: law and practice, Bloomsbury 
Professional, Haywards Heath, West Sussex, p. 1159. 
794 See Pijetlovic, K. (2015), EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International 
Sports Law Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. 
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contributed to the staging of the European Championship.795 In turn, the complaint was 
withdrawn and G-14 was disbanded. 
Therefore, the Court of Justice did not have the chance to pronounce itself on the 
matter. In any event, it could be argued that the mandatory player release rule could 
produce some efficiencies likely to grant it an exemption from EU competition law. 
Indeed, the complaint of G-14 was merely based on protecting their own economic 
activity and their wealth, to the possible expense of smaller clubs, and to the detriment 
of the public interest. As the mandatory release could be argued to enhance consumers’ 
welfare by promoting high-quality international competitions for the benefit of fans, it 
would have been difficult to sustain the legality of a prohibition of this scheme under 
Article 101 TFEU. Furthermore, the existence of a release rule may be considered 
indispensable for the system in light of its effect on competitive balance and overall 
solidarity between clubs.796 
While the release in itself is acceptable, the system of compensation is actually likely to 
increase the competitive imbalance of a league, as it provides payments for teams 
which have given their players to national selections. These athletes tend to play for the 
best teams in the league, which, on top of their normal revenues, also receive a 
compensation for the release, thereby possibly increasing the gap with smaller teams. 
This outcome would, in fact, run against the solidarity principle that has been upheld by 
the European institutions in more than one instance.797 
The process that led to the adoption of the mandatory players’ release rule forms part of 
a decentralisation process, where much decision-making power has been left to a small 
number of elite European teams. This presents a question of legitimacy in relation to 
the lack of representation of all stakeholders that suffer the impact of these types of 
                                                     
795 See Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2014), Sport: law and practice, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath, 
West Sussex, p. 1160. 
796 See Pijetlovic, K. (2015), EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International 
Sports Law Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. 
797 See amongst the others the Council Nice Declaration on Sport and the Commission White Paper on Sport, 
at paras. 4.1 and 4.8. 
 167
decisions.798 An efficient form of co-regulation cannot exclude or forget relevant 
stakeholders from the discussion and from the decision-making process. The 
involvement of the various stakeholders would enhance the legitimacy of the rules and 
strengthen the governance of the system. On the other hand, the mandatory player 
release rule is the best example of an employment-related aspect that could be subject 
of discussion under the Social Dialogue umbrella. 
 
7. Home Grown Players Rules 
As previously mentioned, the Court of Justice assessed the legality of restrictions on 
the movement of athletes in Bosman. The main question to be answered in that case 
concerned the proportionality of the restrictions imposed by the transfer system in 
relation to the ability of rich clubs to recruit the best players and undermine the 
competitive balance in the league.799 However, the perceived consequences arising 
from the judgment,800 and in particular the possible effects on the economic situation of 
the system, convinced UEFA to introduce a number of regulatory measures, including 
the ‘home grown players rule’.801 According to this regulation, clubs participating in 
UEFA competitions need to have in their squad a minimum number of locally trained 
players. In particular, clubs are required to field a squad comprising club-trained 
players and association-trained players. This definition comprises players, irrespective 
of their nationality and age, who have been trained by the club or by another club in the 
                                                     
798 See Pijetlovic, K. (2015), EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International 
Sports Law Series, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. 
799 See Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belges des Societes de Football Association and others v Bosman and 
others, [1995] ECR I-4921, at para 135 and KEA/CDES, ‘Study on the Economic and Legal Aspects of 
Transfers of Players’ (European Commission, 2013), at p. 3. 
800 See Miettinen, S. and Parrish, R., (2007), Nationality Discrimination in Community Law: An Assessment of 
UEFA Regulations Governing Player Eligibility for European Club Competitions (The Home-Grown Player 
Rule), Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, 5, 13. Perceived consequences included aggregation of top 
talents in elite clubs, aggregation of talents in elite leagues and consequent competitive imbalance, and a 
decrease in indigenous talents in elite leagues. See also Gardiner S. and Welch, R. (2016) ‘Nationality based 
quotas and International Transfers’, in Duval, A. and Van Rompuy, B. (eds.) The Legacy of Bosman, 
Revisiting the Relationship between EU law and Sport, T.M.C. Asser Press, p. 64.  
801 The rule is now located in Article 43 of the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League, Season 
2015/2016, and in Article 42 of the Regulations of the UEFA Europa League, Season 2015/2016. 
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same national association for at least 3 years between the age of 15 and 21. In its final 
formulation, the rule requires clubs to have at least 8 locally trained players out of a 
squad of 25. If a club does not include in the list the minimum number of locally 
trained players, the list of players on the squad is reduced accordingly.802 
The ‘home-grown players’ rule aims at enhancing the development and training of 
young players.803 It is argued that this would also increase the balance of the 
competition, as it would restrict the ability of richer clubs to fill their squad with 
expensive players developed and trained elsewhere.804 On the other hand, the rule is 
likely to restrict the ability of clubs to recruit players, and, in turn, the ability of players 
to find employment in the European market. Furthermore, it poses conditions for the 
participation in European Competitions, thereby regulating the access to a series of 
sporting events, which consequently affects the level of economic competition on the 
exploitation market.805  
The rule does not mention the nationality of locally trained players, thereby avoiding a 
direct discrimination. However, it can be considered indirectly discriminatory, as the 
condition of being locally trained is more likely to be satisfied by a national of the 
Member State where the club itself is established. This form of indirect discrimination 
is not only relevant under the free movement provisions, but it may also affect the 
supply market. Indeed, the rule obliges clubs to recruit a share of their players from 
their own national market, restricting the pool of talents from which to choose and 
thereby foreclosing the inter-states competition in that relation.806  
                                                     
802 See Article 43.06 of the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League, Season 2015/2016. 
803 See Geeraert, A. (2013). The role of the EU in better governance in International sports organisations. In: 
Alm J. (Eds.), Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organisations. Copenhagen: Play the 
Game/ Danish Institute for Sports Studies, 25-37. 
804 See Weatherill, S. (2011), EU Sports Law: The Effect of the Lisbon Treaty, Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 3/2011. 
805 See Manville, A. (2009), The UEFA, the Home Grown Player Rule, and the Meca-Medina Judgment of the 
European Court of Justice, International Sports Law Journal, 1-2, pp. 25 – 34. 
806 See Manville, A. (2009), The UEFA, the Home Grown Player Rule, and the Meca-Medina Judgment of the 
European Court of Justice, International Sports Law Journal, 1-2, p. 27. The foreclosure of the market, and 
the partitioning of the market alongside national border are prohibited under EU competition law even in 
relation to the sporting industry. See in relation to this Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08. Football Association 
Premier League and Others v QC Leisure and Others Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] 
ECR I-09083, para. 139., para 139. 
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Nevertheless, the rule has received support from the Commission807 and the European 
Parliament.808 In particular, the development of young athletes has a significant value 
for the institutions of the European Union, and may also be considered to pursue the 
objectives highlighted by Article 165 TFEU. However, despite the legitimate objectives 
pursued, it could be argued that the restrictions caused by the rule are not capable of 
achieving the set goals, and hence, fail the proportionality test. Indeed, the independent 
study issued by the Commission on the legality of the rule found little evidence of a 
significant impact on the quality of the training and development of young players, on 
the related investments and on competitive balance.809 It appears that the rule was not 
formulated in a way that was able to guarantee its effectiveness. The objectives were in 
fact related to the European football system in its entirety, but the rule imposes only 
conditions for the participation in European competitions. It therefore means that it 
does not apply to all those clubs that have not secured a place in those events.810 
Furthermore, the competitive balance argument is not fully convincing, as the rule itself 
does not prevent richer clubs from recruiting the best players, while the poorer ones 
have to select their players from a range that is restricted by the requirement of the 
regulations.811 
A thorough assessment of the rule and its effects would also find it not inherent in the 
organisation of the competition812 and disproportionate with respect to the legitimate 
                                                     
807 See European Commission, Press Release IP/08/807, UEFA rule on ‘home-grown players’: compatibility 
with the principle of free movement of persons, Brussels, 28 May 2008. 
808 See European Parliament, Resolution of 8 May 2008 on the White Paper on Sport, 2007/2261(INI), and the 
European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on the European dimension in sport 2011/2087(INI), at 
para. 72. 
809 The results of the Report have been summarised by the authors in an article. See Parrish, R, et al (2014), 
An Assessment of the Compatibility of UEFA’s Home Grown Player Rule with Article 45 TFEU, European 
Law Review, 2014, 39(4), pp. 493-510. 
810 See Manville, A. (2009), The UEFA, the Home Grown Player Rule, and the Meca-Medina Judgment of the 
European Court of Justice, International Sports Law Journal, 1-2, p. 30. This will be the case, unless the 
national association has implemented a similar rule in relation to the domestic competition. 
811 See Weatherill, S. (2011), EU Sports Law: The Effect of the Lisbon Treaty, Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 3/2011. However, the Study on the Assessment of UEFA’s ‘Home Grown Player Rule’ indicated 
that the rule had some marginal positive effect on competitive balance, by forcing amendments on the 
recruiting strategies of the larger clubs. See Study on the Assessment of UEFA’s ‘Home Grown Player Rule’ 
(2013) p. 100. 
812 See Parrish, R, et al (2014), An Assessment of the Compatibility of UEFA’s Home Grown Player Rule with 
Article 45 TFEU, European Law Review, 2014, 39(4), p. 500. 
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objectives pursued. The assessment would therefore need to be carried out under 
Article 101(3) TFEU. The Study on the ‘home-grown players’ rule found it capable of 
producing a marginal positive effect in terms of competitive balance, but it did not 
definitely establish that the efficiency created were outweighing the restrictive effects. 
Despite the findings of the Study, a reasoned opinion813 of the Commission has 
maintained that the UEFA ‘home-grown players’ rule was an example of proportionate 
restriction imposed in the pursuit of a legitimate objective.814 
Clearly, this is another area where the European institutions should seek to influence 
the discussion and push the relationship dynamic between Governing Bodies and 
stakeholders towards a more inclusive approach. Social Dialogue would again suit the 
discussion in this area by involving the main stakeholders that are interested in the 
debate, namely clubs and players. 
 
8. Salary Caps – Financial Fair Play Rules 
One last question that can be discussed in relation to the sports labour market is the 
adoption of rules that regulate the salary of players, such as salary caps. This measure 
limits how much money teams can spend on players’ wages,815 by setting a maximum 
amount that is the same for all the clubs taking part in the competition.  
The introduction of a salary cap may be one of the most effective means to pursue the 
objective of competitive balance, as it punishes those who exceed in spending and 
promotes conduct that complies with the rules.816 Where all the competitors have to 
operate within the same spending limit, they all have similar chances of triumphing. A 
                                                     
813 A reasoned opinion is one of the preliminary stages of an infringement procedure. However, reasoned 
opinion cannot be challenged, as it does not produce legal effects.  
814 See European Commission, Mapping and Analysis of the Specificity of Sport, June 2016, p. 18 and 
Commission reasoned opinion, 16 April 2014, Basketball: Commission asks Spain to end indirect 
discrimination towards players from other Member States. 
815 See Commission of the European Communities. Commission White Paper on Sport, at note 210, COM 
(2007) 391 final. 
816 This is in particular the case of luxury taxes, which are common in the North American Sports System. 
Luxury taxes is a financial levy imposed to teams that spend beyond a set threshold. The proceeds of the tax 
are normally redistributed to the virtuous teams. See KEA/CDES, Study on the Economic and Legal Aspects 
of Transfers of Players, (European Commission, 2013), at pp. 238 
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salary cap is however likely to restrict the ability of clubs to sign players on the market, 
as they will be limited in the amount they can spend. This type of regulation is also 
likely to affect players’ ability to get signed and find employment opportunities, 
thereby conditioning the market for players’ services in its entirety. As such, salary 
caps are likely to cause restrictions on the market and hence fall under the prohibition 
set by Article 101(1) TFEU. Indeed, these types of measure may be construed as 
decisions by an association of undertakings, fixing the trading conditions and 
controlling the investments on the market. 
Salary Caps are very common in the North American sports system. They are normally 
agreed by players as part of the collective labour agreement signed by the Leagues and 
the players’ unions. In that context, if an arrangement is the result of a collective 
bargaining process and it affects only the parties involved, it will escape the application 
of competition law.817 The same could occur within the European Union, where 
through collective agreements and the use of Social Dialogue, employers could seek 
the approval of the players and eliminate the antitrust concerns raised by the 
regulation.818 
Salary caps may be hard when the spending limit is fixed and the amount is the same 
for all the clubs, or soft. In the latter case, the limit is flexible as it depends on the 
revenues of each club and it is calculated as a percentage of that sum.819 In some 
instances, salary caps take the form of a luxury tax, whereby clubs that exceed the 
spending limit will have to pay a sum corresponding to their excess spending to the 
league, which will then share the fund amongst virtuous teams.820  
There are few examples of Salary Caps in Europe,821 the main one being that 
implemented by the Rugby League.822 In relation to football, UEFA has decided to put 
                                                     
817 See the U.S. Case Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614–15 (8th Cir. 1976). 
818 See Case C-67/79, Albany International v Stichting [1999] ECR I-5751. 
819 See Wise A. and Meyer, B. (1997) International Sports Law and Business, Volume 3, Kluwer Law 
International, p.112. 
820 See Andreff, W., and Szymansky, S. (2006), Handbook on the Economics of Sport, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, p. 652. 
821 See Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2014), Sport: law and practice, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath, 
West Sussex, p. 1182 citing the example of Rugby League, Rugby Union, Basketball and Ice Hockey. 
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in place a system which presents some similarities with a salary cap, as well as some 
relevant differences. In 2010, the Governing Body, with the agreement of ECA, 
adopted the Financial Fair Play rules,823 as part of the Clubs Licensing Regulations. 
The rules aim at increasing the financial responsibility of European football clubs with 
the objective of making the European football system stable and self-sufficient. 
The rule sanctions those clubs that cannot reach a financial break-even between 
expenses paid and revenues collected.824 A club will be punished if, within a three-year 
period, its expenses will exceed the relevant incomes by more than €5 million. 
Therefore, a club that wanted to obtain a licence for the 2016/2017 season had to break 
even on the aggregate accounts of the three previous seasons.825 
The system provided for some exceptions, and some leniency during the first three 
years of its adoption. Clubs were allowed to exceed the boundaries within certain 
limits,826 and even fall outside the acceptable deviation, if they were able to report a 
positive trend in their annual results. They would have avoided the sanctions as they 
were showing the intention of reaching the break-even threshold in the near future.827 
Other provisions regulate the relevant income that could be taken into account in the 
assessment. Indeed, there was the risk that owners and shareholders would have tried to 
circumvent the regulations and keep financing their clubs by overpaying sponsorships 
or by injecting capitals. Hence, transactions with related parties are subject to a strict 
control: terms and conditions have to be equivalent to those prevailing in normal arm’s 
                                                                                                                                                                 
822 See Howarth, A. and Robinson, T.A. (2008), The impact of the Salary Cap in the European Rugby Super 
League, International Journal of Business and Management, 3(6): 3-7. 
823 UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, FFP hereinafter. The last edition published at 
the moment of writing is accessible at  
http://www.uefa.org/MultimediaFiles/Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/02/26/77/91/2267791_DOWNLOAD.
pdf [last accessed on 4 April 2016]. 
824 A similar system exists at national level for the English Premier League and the Football League. This 
system aims at guaranteeing the payments of transfer fees between clubs and ensure financial and accounting 
transparency. 
825 Article 57 of UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations. The acceptable deviation may be 
exceeding up to EUR 30 million, if the excess is entirely covered through equity injections from shareholders 
or related parties. See Article 61 of UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations. 
826 In the season 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 the acceptable losses were below €45 Million (phase 1), while in 
the following three season the limit was reduced to €30 Million (phase 2). 
827 For an overview of the regulations, see Bastianon, S. (2015), The Striani Challenge to UEFA Financial 
Fair-Play. A New Era after Bosman or Just a Washout?, Competition Law Review, vol. 11/1, pp. 7-39. 
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length transactions and they will be adjusted accordingly if they exceed the fair value 
standard.828 Conversely, clubs are allowed to use as part of their relevant incomes the 
revenues derived from non-football activities,829 provided that they have some 
connection with the activities of the clubs, their location or brand. This is consistent 
with one of the objectives of the rule, which is to encourage investments on facilities 
and activities profitable for the long term benefit of the clubs.830 
The Financial Fair Play Regulations form part of the UEFA licensing scheme, which 
clubs must hold in order to compete at European level. UEFA can impose a number of 
different penalties on those clubs that do not respect the rules, and even refuse them the 
licence to take part in European Competitions.831 Clubs that are found to have breached 
the regulations can decide to settle the question with the Association through 
confidential agreements.832 
In the same way as salary caps, the main objective and consequence of the FFP rules is 
the reduction of expenses incurred by the clubs in players’ wages. While these 
regulations prevent clubs from spending at a level that is not sustainable, they also 
constrain their ability to sign players on the market, as well as affect the ability of 
players to earn and sign a contract. The Rules of FFP are therefore capable of 
infringing Article 101 TFEU and should be assessed in relation to their objectives and 
effects.  
UEFA has argued that the rules aim at ensuring the integrity and the continuity of 
international competitions for the entire season, thereby pursuing the long-term 
financial viability of European football.833 As it has been seen, these objectives have 
                                                     
828 See UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, Annex VI. 
829 Such as income derived from hospitality activities. 
830 Ibid, Annex X, C. 
831 Such as economic sanctions, squad reduction, or ineligibility to participate in European competitions. 
832 Manchester City, Paris Saint German and Inter Milan were amongst the clubs sanctioned by UEFA. When 
settlement is not possible the matter will be referred to an Adjudicatory body, whose decision can be appealed 
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport. One of the few example occurred in April 2015, when the situation 
of Dynamo Moscow FC was referred to the Adjudicatory Body which issued a Decision in June 2015. 
833 Furthermore, the rules aim also at protecting clubs’ creditors and ensuring that clubs settle their liability 
with players, tax authorities and other clubs. See Article 2(2) C of the UEFA Clubs Licensing and Fair Play 
Regulations. 
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already been recognised as legitimate by the European institutions.834 However, while 
the rules do not aim at enhancing the competitive balance of the league, they are in fact 
likely to reduce it. Indeed, they make it more difficult for less successful clubs to 
compete with teams that are traditionally strong on and off the pitch, and that can count 
on a wider and solid fan base. Indeed, the former will have less revenues at their 
disposal and would tend to be dependent on overinvesting to improve the performance 
on the field, and consequently on their financial books. Rather than promote fairness 
and competitive balance, FFP is likely to strengthen and crystallise the existing 
hegemony of European top-flight clubs.835 However, the fact that the regulations have 
been adopted with the agreement of ECA is likely to prevent any successful complaint 
from the clubs themselves.836 
In any event, while the objective might be legitimate under EU law, the proportionality 
of the rules poses concerns. To pass the proportionality test, the rules must be necessary 
to achieve their goals and limited to the least restrictive means available to reach them. 
In this context, it should thus be demonstrated that the survival of one team is necessary 
and directly linked with the existence of all the other competitors and to the 
competition itself.837 For these reasons, a number of entities have lodged a complaint 
with the EU Commission against the FFP rules. The Commission first decided not to 
examine the complaint as this matter was also the subject of a case before the national 
Court in Brussels which would have been fully capable of assessing the legality of the 
rules under EU competition law.838 In the meantime, the Commission has accepted that 
                                                     
834 See ENIC in relation to the integrity of the competition, and more specifically in relation to the perception 
of fans. See Bosman, at paras 105-106 in relation to the need to maintain the financial viability of clubs. 
835 See Flanagan, C. (2013), ‘A Tricky European Fixture: an Assessment of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play 
Regulations and Their Compatibility with EU Law’, The International Sports Law Journal, p. 148. 
836 See Geey, D. (2011) ‘The UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules: A Difficult Balancing Act’, Entertainment and 
Sports Law Journal, p. 50.   
837 See Lindholm, J., (2010), ‘The Problem With salary Caps Under European Union Law: The Case Against 
Financial Fair Play’, Texas Review Entertainment & Sports Law, p. 189. 
838 The Court held that, if necessary, the Belgian National Court would have referred the matter to the Court 
of Justice instead. See Case AT.40105, UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules, Commission Decision rejecting the 
complaint, SG-Greffe (2014 15691 C(2014) 8028 final. However, it has to be reminded that the Commission 
is still best placed to assess an arrangement that has effect on more than one Member State. See Joint 
Statement on the Functioning of the Network of Competition Authorities, para. 19. In particular, only the 
Commission may adopt a decision finding that there is no infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. See 
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it is in the interest of sports teams, clubs and athletes to protect the economic viability 
of other teams, athletes and clubs as competitors, thereby implicitly justifying the FFP 
system.839 Subsequently, the institution has also expressly stated that the objective of 
financial stability can be legitimately pursued through measures such as the FFP rules, 
which are considered to contribute to the sustainable development and healthy growth 
of sport in Europe.840 It has to be clear that the adoption of such a Decision does not 
bind the Court of Justice in a possible assessment of the FFP rules, and it does not 
prevent legal challenges from any stakeholder.841 However, it is extremely unlikely that 
the Commission will take any action, as by doing so it would infringe the legitimate 
expectation that UEFA has developed in this regard.842 
The position held by the Commission, and in some relation confirmed by the Court of 
Justice, may be interpreted as a refusal to assess the legitimacy of a system, which the 
Commission itself has supported in a number of instances.843 Similar to the rules 
regulating the ownership of clubs, the FFP regulations are economic in nature, but they 
pursue a different objective. Indeed, while in ENIC the rules were deemed to protect 
the integrity of the system and the perception of fans, FFP aims at guaranteeing the 
financial stability of clubs. Hence, the objective itself is particularly connected with an 
economic regulation. Therefore, the question should be focused on the level of 
efficiency created by the regulations in light of the necessity of the restrictions and its 
proportionality. These regulations do not appear to be capable of creating efficiency to 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Rizzuto, F. (2011) Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003: the limits to national procedural autonomy, in European 
Competition Law Review, 32 (11). pp. 564-572. 
839 See Joint Statement by Joaquín Almunia, Vice President, European Commission, and Michael Platini, 
President, UEFA (Mar. 21, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/joint_statement_en.pdf. 
840 See C(2014) 7378 final, Commission Decision of 14.10.2014 adopting the Arrangement for Cooperation 
between the European Commission and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), at para 2.7. 
841 Except where such a power has been specifically conferred to it, the Commission cannot give guarantees 
concerning the compatibility of specific practices with the Treaty. See Case 415/93, Bosman, at para 136. 
842 Although the Agreement mentions that the recognition of the compatibility of FFP is subject to compliance 
with competition law, the Commission has in practice tied its hand, and will not initiate a procedure against 
the rules. See Duval, A. (2014) The new ‘Arrangement’ between the European Commission and UEFA: A 
political capitulation of the EU, Asser International Sports Law Blog, 15 October 2014, available at 
http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/the-new-arrangement-between-the-european-commission-and-uefa-
a-political-capitulation-of-the-eu [last accessed 9 February 2016]. 
843 See Bastianon, S. (2015) ‘The Striani Challenge to UEFA Financial Fair-Play. A New Era after Bosman 
or Just a Washout?’, Competition Law Review, vol 11/1, pp. 7-39. 
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such an extent that could justify the restrictions imposed on the activity of the clubs and 
players. 
However, the political impasse that characterises the situation confirms the ability of 
UEFA to deal with the Commission.844 The political strength of UEFA may render the 
discussion on the legality of the use of its regulatory power to just an academic debate. 
As mentioned above, the FFP rules have also been challenged before a national court in 
Brussels as a possible infringement of competition law. Indeed, the Decision of the 
Commission in this regard did not stop the complaint, as the institution did not express 
any position on its merit. Hence, the Belgian Court of First instance has accepted the 
thesis of the complainants,845 and referred a question to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling on the compatibility of the FFP break-even rule with competition law, freedom 
of movement of capital, freedom to invest and freedom of movement of workers and 
services. 
The Court of Justice has however rejected the question as manifestly inadmissible, as it 
considered itself incompetent to deal with it.846 Indeed, as UEFA is based in 
Switzerland, according to the Lugano Convention the CJEU would have been able to 
pronounce itself on the legality of FFP, and the recovery of possible damages suffered, 
only where the complainant would have demonstrated a direct interest to act.847 The 
Court of Justice has therefore based its decision on a procedural rule, and it refused to 
assess the legality of the FFP. Nevertheless, before the decision of the Court, UEFA 
had already decided to amend the rules and relax the application of the sanctions.848 
Under these new amended Regulations, clubs that are in financial difficulties will be 
allowed to seek approval from UEFA through a ‘voluntary settlement’. This will allow 
                                                     
844 See García B. and Weatherill, S. (2012) ‘Engaging with the EU in order to minimise its impact: sport and 
the negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon’, Journal of European Public Policy, 19 (2). 
845 Football Agent Daniel Striani, and groups of Manchester City and PSG fans. 
846 Court of Justice of the European Union, Order of the Court - 16 July 2015, Case C-299/15, Striani and 
Others, nyr. 
847 As Switzerland is not a Member State of the EU, the Lugano II Convention on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters regulates the matter. As mentioned 
before, the complainant in this case was a football agent, only indirectly affected by the regulations. 




them to move beyond the limits of the break-even rule, provided that they have a solid 
plan to improve their situation. Moreover, exceptions may be made for clubs from 
countries where the market is considered to have structural economic deficiencies. 
This is a further example of the way chosen by the Commission to deal with Sports 
Governing Bodies. The mere threat of an investigation, or a complaint, has steered the 
conduct of Governing Bodies towards positions more in line with principles of good 
governance. The shift towards a horizontal system of rule-setting would be further 
enhanced if there was greater use of Social Dialogue. 
 
9. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the main restrictions that Sports Governing Bodies place on 
the sports labour market. These arrangements are capable of affecting all the three 
markets that have been identified in relation to the sports industry. Indeed, they firstly 
affect the labour market, which is the supply market, where clubs purchase or sell the 
players. As they have an impact on the conduct of clubs on the players’ market, the 
regulations discussed in this chapter are also likely to produce an effect on the upstream 
market where the sporting event is produced. Finally, as the quality of the product 
offered may be affected by these arrangements, they can also have spin-off effects on 
the exploitation market, where the product is placed on the market. 
The chapter has demonstrated how easily the conduct of Sports Governing Bodies on 
the labour market may infringe competition law. The way Sports Governing Bodies 
exercise their regulatory power over the sports labour market represents the epitome of 
the specificity of sport. The level of control and the restrictions imposed on players and 
clubs cannot be found in any other industry.849 However, not every arrangement can be 
considered inherent to sport, and hence it is argued that this system may fail the Meca-
Medina test. The exceptions could be represented by the existence of transfer windows 
and the adoption of mandatory release clauses. In this regard, however, the 
                                                     
849 Arguably, a comparison could be drawn only between the regulation of the activity of players’ agents and 
other professions which require a certain standard and the fulfilment of conditions. 
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proportionality test should be applied to assess whether the restrictions caused go 
beyond the pursuit of legitimate aims.  
Nevertheless, it has been highlighted how the European Commission has showed a 
significant level of understanding of the economic and regulatory objectives pursued by 
Governing Bodies.850 This may have to be related to the political ability of the Sports 
Associations rather than based on the legal acumen of their arguments. 
The chapter has tried to provide an original contribution to the body of knowledge by 
identifying an objective that is inherent to the sport system and that certainly represents 
one of its specific features. The solidarity between clubs should constitute the 
foundation of the sport system: regulations that pursue the aim of enhancing the 
competitive balance should also impose a greater degree of solidarity amongst teams 
and perhaps leagues. Indeed, despite all the rhetoric behind restrictive rules and the 
pursuit of competitive balance, inequality could be easily addressed through solidarity 
payments. 
In this regard, it is apparent how the reference to Article 165 TFEU in this area has 
been limited.851 It is in this very context that the chapter has highlighted how the 
recourse to Social Dialogue would help to effectively pursue both aims of improving 
working conditions and employment relations, and provide an exemption blanket under 
Antitrust law for the arrangements agreed through the instrument. Institutions, 
Governing Bodies and stakeholders need to commit and promote more strongly this 
tool as a form of regulation. The fairness, the openness and the particular nature of 
sport could find the perfect venue for an informed and fruitful discussion where the 
majority of sports stakeholders would be able to make their voices heard. 
 
 
                                                     
850 See the Commission Decision on the Cooperation with UEFA and the position therein expressed in 
relation to the Financial Fair Play rule. See C(2014) 7378 final, Commission Decision of 14.10.2014 adopting 
the Arrangement for Cooperation between the European Commission and the Union of European Football 
Associations (UEFA). 
851 It is acknowledged that this may be attributed to the limited number of cases analysed by the European 
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1. Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is to discuss the area of commercial rules and exploitation of 
commercial rights in sport. In particular, the example of sports broadcasting rights will 
be considered. Within the landscape of sports rights, broadcasting rights have 
progressively gained importance in the last few decades: sport leagues and associations 
have realised that these can be assets to be exploited. As supplier of the product, 
leagues and associations have therefore become an important player in the sports 
broadcasting market.852 Most of them have thus decided to commercialise their product 
collectively, and share the revenues between the teams. Similarly, on the other side of 
the market, some broadcasters have managed to come together into an association, to 
counterbalance the power of sport Associations and Federations, and purchase jointly 
the rights to sporting events. 
                                                     
852 A forecast of the turnover for the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil estimated a 66% increase of revenues 
from the previous edition (Forbes.com). The 2010 FIFA South Africa World Cup had a commercial value 
estimated of EUR 3.5 Billions, and it had generated an increasing of 2% of the turnovers in advertising at a 
global level (Sportseconomy.it). 
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The commercial aspects that so strongly characterise the exploitation of broadcasting 
rights cannot be underestimated, and they will help shedding a light on the fundamental 
questions that underlie this research. The analysis of the application of competition law 
to sports related matters finds a fertile ground in this sector, where economic 
considerations have to be balanced with social, cultural and even political values.853 
That of broadcasting rights represent therefore the best arena to test the relevance of the 
specificity of sport, in order to establish whether the nature of the activity has affected 
the assessment carried out by antitrust authorities, and to evaluate the impact of Article 
165 TFEU with its reference to the openness and fairness for sport. In parallel, this 
chapter will endeavour to establish whether the economic analysis undertaken by the 
European institutions has respected the letter of the norm. In this context, this research 
will try to provide an original contribution to the body of knowledge in relation to the 
role of consumers’ interest and its importance for an exemption under Article 101(3) 
TFEU. As opposed to other areas, in relation to commercial rights the role of Social 
Dialogue is necessarily limited. However, it is submitted that the involvement of a 
broad range of industry stakeholders, including fans, could help guaranteeing that the 
way chosen by Governing Bodies to pursue their objective is legitimate. 
The collective selling of sports broadcasting rights is a type of conduct capable of 
raising legal concerns in an antitrust perspective, since it clearly implies a restriction of 
the competition. Arrangements of this kind prevent single clubs from operating freely 
on the market, and impose on the broadcasters an obligation to bargain with an entity 
provided with a monopoly, or quasi-monopoly power. Moreover, this type of conduct 
is also capable of affecting the final consumers. Indeed, collective selling may restrict 
their ability of choosing the supplier and the product, the type of subscription and the 
prices that they will have to pay, and it could ultimately entail a constraint of their right 
to access information. Similarly, also a system of joint purchasing might lead to 
restrictions in relation to the freedom of its members, and the mode of exploitation of 
the rights. In this context, the freedom of broadcasters and sporting organisations is 
                                                     
853 See Evens, T., Smith, P., & Iosifidis, P., (2013), The Political Economy Of Television Sports Rights, 
[Basingstoke]: Palgrave Macmillan, p.69. 
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further constrained where European institutions have decided to protect some major 
events in light of their importance for the society. While the cultural importance of 
these events may justify measures of this sort, they clearly limit the ability of 
broadcaster of exploiting these rights. 
The restrictions produced by collective agreements are often counterbalanced with 
some positive and pro-competitive effects. These are usually defined in terms of 
economic efficiency, but they could also entail other forms of benefit for the system.854 
Moreover, in order to justify collective selling agreements and the restriction they are 
capable of creating, sporting bodies claim a positive effect on the competitive balance 
of the leagues and competitions they organise, as a result of the sharing of the revenues 
obtained.855 In turn, this would ultimately lead to a more profitable product when 
placed on the market, and a more effective promotion of clubs in smaller markets. 
However, it has to be stressed that these effects are neither an immediate consequence 
of the collective selling, nor they can be obtained exclusively through restrictive 
conduct of the type in question.856 
The objective of this section is to analyse the current approach of the European 
institutions in regard to this topic, and outline common trends and problems, while 
keeping into account the theme of sporting specificities. 
 
2. Multiple Markets, multiple restrictions 
In order to fully understand the complexities characterising the collective selling of 
broadcasting rights, it is first necessary to understand which markets may be interested 
                                                     
854 Other aspects might be related to externalities connected to the cultural aspect of accessing to sports 
content, as a means to catalyse the national identity and build social cohesion, but also as a way to promote 
physical activity and enhance the health condition of the citizen. See Jeanrenaud, C. & Késenne, S. (2006), 
The economics of sport and the media, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
855 See Szymanski, S., (2003), The economic design of sporting contests, in Journal of Economic Literature, 
41, pp. 1137–1187 for a study on the relation between collective selling of broadcasting rights and 
competitive balance.  
856 In particular, it is not the collective selling that is capable of enhancing the competitive balance of a 
League, but a redistributive mechanism of the revenue. And collective selling is not the only possible way to 
share revenues between teams taking part to the competition. See the Decision of the European Commission 
in Case 37398, Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League, OJ 2003 L 291/25, 
para 131. 
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by collusive conduct, and thus also the parties that might be negatively affected by the 
restriction. As for any other competition law matter, in fact, the framework in which to 
consider a conduct is the specific relevant market in which the latter produces its 
effects.857 
The first market that will be affected by a collective selling of broadcasting rights is the 
upstream market,858 where media operators purchase the rights from the right-owners, 
the Leagues or Associations. The Commission has identified different upstream product 
markets for the acquisition of sports media rights on the basis of some specific criteria, 
such as the attractiveness of the event transmitted, both for the viewers and the 
advertisers, the characteristics of the event itself and also national preferences.859 
On the upstream market a possible restriction resulting from the collective selling will 
mainly affect broadcasters and media operators, but it might also have an impact on the 
clubs. When the clubs associated in a league entrust the selling of their media rights to 
the association itself, such a horizontal agreement prevents individual clubs from 
competing with each other in the sale of those rights. Furthermore, the setting of one 
price for all the rights constitutes a form of price fixing, a type of conduct explicitly 
prohibited under Article 101 TFEU.860 Moreover, as a consequence of joint selling 
agreements, the number of rights available to be purchased might be reduced,861 and 
therefore the system could also lead to output restrictions.862  
                                                     
857 See Jones, A. & Sufrin, B.E. (2013), EU competition law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 5th ed., p.62. 
858 Decision of the European Commission in Case 37398, Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA 
Champions League, OJ 2003 L 291/25, para. 56 and for a summary Kienapfel P, Stein A, (2007). The 
Application of Articles 81 and 82 EC in the sport sector, Competition Policy Newsletter 3: 6-14. 
859 See Decision of the European Commission in Case 37398, Joint selling of the commercial rights of the 
UEFA Champions League, OJ 2003 L 291/25, Section 4.1.3. and Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2014), Sport: law 
and practice, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath, West Sussex. 
860 See supra chapter 2. Article 101 TFEU explicitly mentions as prohibited those agreements […] which 
‘directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading condition’. 
861 Toft, R., (2006), Sports Law and Business Competition Law Review Key Developments and the Latest 
Cases, European Commission; Articles about Competition Law, Comp/C.2/TT/hvds D(2005), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2006_001_en.pdf. 
862 Geeraert, A., (2013). Limits to the autonomy of sport: EU law, in: J. Alm, ed. Action for good governance 
in international sports organisations. Copenhagen: Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies, 151–
184. 
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On the other side, on the downstream markets, media operators have to compete for 
audience and advertising revenues: this is where they deliver the product to the 
public.863 The conditions of the market at the upstream level affect also the competitive 
structure at the downstream level.864 A system of collective commercialisation might 
create barriers to entry in the downstream market, especially where an undertaking 
holds a dominant position, with a subsequent effect of access foreclosure for new 
media operators.  
Against this background, there is a further element to be considered. Indeed, there is a 
difference between broadcasters that operate free to air, and pay TV broadcasters, in 
light of the characteristics of the transmission of the signal and the funding available to 
them.865 While pay TV operators are normally funded through subscription fees, 
therefore paid directly by their customers, free to air television can rely on the only 
source of income provided by their ability to sell advertising slots on their channels, 
and State contributions.866 Despite this difference, however, for both types of 
broadcaster sports rights represent an indispensable input in order to attract the 
audience.867 
The Commission has consistently held that the downstream market for sports media 
content has a national character, due to linguistic barriers, preferences and legislative 
                                                     
863 See Decision of the European Commission in Case 37398, Joint selling of the commercial rights of the 
UEFA Champions League, OJ 2003 L 291/25, para. 80. 
864 Gérardin, D. (2004), Access to Content by new Media Platforms: A Review of the Competition Law 
Problems, GCLC Working Paper. 
865 Furthermore, with the development of the internet, New Media Operators should be taken into account as 
well, as important players on the downstream market. For a discussion on the role of the New Media in the 
framework of sports rights, see Lefever, K (2012), New Media And Sport: International Legal Aspects, The 
Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, p.10. 
866 Such as licence fees or taxes. See Recital 53 of the Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council. See also European Commission (2000) Notification of 14 July 2000 pursuant to Article 4 of 
Council Regulation No 4064/89 (Case COMP/M.2050 – Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram) 13 Oct 2000, and Lefever, 
K (2012), New Media And Sport: International Legal Aspects, The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 
p.242. 
867 See the famous quote from Mr Murdoch, which in 1996 explained the strategy behind his pay TV empire: 
‘use sports as a 'battering ram' and a lead offering in all our pay television operations’, see 
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/sport-is-murdochs-battering-ram-for-pay-tv-1358686.html. This 
consideration was later confirmed in the Decision of the European Commission in Case 37398, Joint selling 
of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League, OJ 2003 L 291/25, para. 20. For a discussion about 
the importance of sports rights for broadcasters, see Evens, T, Smith, P, & Iosifidis, P., (2013), The Political 
Economy Of Television Sports Rights, [Basingstoke]: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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measures.868 This consideration, however, could be the object of further assessment in 
light of the development of the market for broadcasting rights and the evolution of 
customers’ preferences.869 
 
3. Collective Selling: Restrictions and Efficiencies 
A league that sells collectively the broadcasting rights related to the competition it 
organises behaves as a cartel, or as an association of undertakings. In fact, the clubs 
that constitute the league are by all means undertakings within the scope of Article 101 
TFEU, as they carry out economic activities.870  
In general terms, a collective selling arrangement between a League or an Association 
of Leagues and broadcasters is likely to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU, as it is capable 
to lead to the setting of uniform prices, if compared with a system of individual selling 
of rights, and is also likely to inflate prices for both broadcasters and consumers.871 
Moreover, this type of agreement restricts football clubs from exploiting their rights 
individually and freely.872 
If the agreement falls under the scope of Article 101, and the restriction of the 
competition is appreciable, the conduct itself can be exempted from the prohibition 
                                                     
868 See the Decision of the Commission in Case 37398, Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA 
Champions League, OJ 2003 L 291/25, para. 90, and also in Case COMP/38.173, Collective selling of FA 
Premier League’s broadcasting rights, at para. 23, and finally in Case COMP/C-2/37.214 - Joint selling of the 
media rights to the German Bundesliga at para. 19. 
869 In the case Case QC Leisure (C-403/08) /Murphy (C-429/08) [2011] ECR I-09083 at para. 140, and, Case 
62/79 Coditel and Others (‘Coditel I’) [1980] ECR 881 (see infra), the Court of Justice held that national 
territorial exclusivity in licensing broadcasting rights is capable of partitioning the common market and thus 
contrary to the freedom to provide services protected by Article 56 TFEU. It has to be noted also that at para. 
43 of the Judgment in the mentioned Joint Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, the Court referred to the submission 
of the FAPL, which hold that in the context of the licensing of broadcasting rights on a territorial basis ‘the 
broadcaster selling the cheapest decoder cards has the potential to become, in practice, the broadcaster at 
European level, which would result in broadcast rights in the European Union having to be granted at 
European level.’ 
870 See supra, Market Values chapter for the definition of undertaking under EU competition law, and Case C-
41/90 Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 23 April 1991 - Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron 
GmbH, [1991] ECR I-1979, para. 21. 
871 See the speech 00/152 of European Commissioner Mario Monti ‘Sport and Competition’, at a Commission 
organised conference on Sport, Press Release 17th April 2000. 
872 See Study on sports organisers’ rights in the European Union, T.M.C. Asser Instituut / Asser International 
Sports Law Centre Institute for Information Law - University of Amsterdam, February 2014, for the European 
Commission, DG Education and Culture, at p. 77. 
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only when the four conditions laid down by Article 101(3) TFEU are fulfilled. This 
means that, in order to exempt a restrictive arrangement, the relevant authority should 
carry out an analysis which weighs up its anticompetitive and pro-competitive effects, 
and considers that the latter prevail over the former.873 It is possible that an agreement 
presents pro-competitive effects that are overall capable of outweighing the 
anticompetitive nature of the restriction, even when only some of the conditions 
previously stated are fulfilled.874 However, in light of the cumulative requirement 
expressed by the Commission in its Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) 
TFEU,875 all the conditions provided for in the article have to be present in order to 
exempt the agreement. 
The following section will discuss the case law and the decision practice of the EU 
institutions in this sector. 
 
3.1. The Case Law 
3.1.1 The UEFA Champions League – Decision COMP/C.2-37.398 
The most important case that has been subject to assessment by the EU institutions in  
relation to this concerns the mode of selling used by UEFA for the rights of the 
Champions League.876 In this regard, the Commission has recognised the legality under 
EU law of a cartelization of the market for broadcasting rights related to the most 
prestigious competition for clubs organised by UEFA.877 
                                                     
873 See Case T-112/99, Métropole télévision (M6) and others, [2001] ECR II-2459, paragraph 74, and Case T-
328/03, O2, [2006] ECR II-1231, paragraphs 69 et seq. See for a discussion in relation to the application of 
this principle in sport Budzinski, O., (2011), The Institutional Framework for Doing Sports Business: 
Principles of EU Competition Policy in Sports Markets. University of Southern Denmark Department of 
Environmental and Business Economics - Markets and Competition Working Paper No. 2011-0124. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1746948. 
874 Especially in relation to the benefit that the restriction should grant to consumers. See Rompuy, B. V., 
(2012). Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust policy?: Non-efficiency considerations 
under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International. 
875 As from Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty [Official Journal No C 101 of 27.4.2004]. 
876 Commission Decision COMP/C.2-37.398 — Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA 
Champions League. 
877 Although for the European Championship, ‘EURO’, UEFA is usually able to collect higher revenues, this 
competition is only staged every four years. The Champions League, on the other hand, is a competition 
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The Champions League is divided in a preliminary stage, a group stage and the final 
phase. UEFA distributed the broadcasting rights of the group stage and of the final 
phase on behalf of the teams taking part to the competition.878 Through this 
arrangement, the Association sold free to air and pay TV rights on an exclusive basis to 
a single TV broadcaster per territory, in a multi-year package.879 On one hand buyers 
had only one source of supply, UEFA, and on the other the system made it possible for 
a single large broadcaster per Member State to acquire all the rights, without any 
differentiation related to the platform to which they were destined or the form of 
exploitation they involved.880 Hence, this system prevented clubs from exploiting the 
rights individually, and it also had the potential to foreclose the market, by excluding 
other interested broadcasters, in light of the duration of the exclusive deal concluded. 
Since all the rights were sold in one bundle, it could also result in a number of rights 
left unexploited, therefore causing output restrictions on the downstream market.881 In 
this instance, the Commission identified the relevant market as the market for the 
acquisition and resale of broadcasting rights for high-level football events played 
regularly throughout the year, and considered it separated from the market related to 
other events taking place in different periods.882 
                                                                                                                                                                 
amongst European clubs organised every year by UEFA, hence the greater relevance of the revenues related 
to the latter.  
See UEFA 2012/2013 Financial Report, available at 
http://www.uefa.org/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/Administration/02/07/89/16/2078916_DOWNLOA
D.pdf, Accessed on 05/01/2015. 
878 The exploitation of the rights related to the preliminary stage was left to the clubs. This arrangement was 
established within the UEFA Regulations: it was a condition for entry into the Champions League that all the 
Associations and Football Clubs agreed to the UEFA Statutes and Regulations, thereby including the joint 
selling system. See the Decision COMP/C.2-37.398 at para. 2. 
879 See idem, at para. 3.2. 
880 Broadcasting rights might grant the possibility to show the live match, or the highlights, or the 
transmission of the images after the expiration of a certain time. 
881 See the Decision COMP/C.2-37.398 at para 3.2 and for a discussion on the restrictive effects of joint 
selling on the market see the Study on sports organisers’ rights in the European Union, T.M.C. Asser 
Instituut / Asser International Sports Law Centre Institute for Information Law - University of Amsterdam, 
February 2014, for the European Commission, DG Education and Culture, p. 77, and Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. 
(2014), Sport: law and practice, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath, West Sussex. 
882 Such as the World Cup, or the EURO European Championship, which take place every four years. See 
Decision COMP/C.2-37.398 — Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League, para 
4.1.3. 
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Despite the restrictive nature of the arrangement, the Commission exempted the 
conduct under Article 101(3) TFEU, in light of a number of pro-competitive benefits 
created, although subject to certain conditions. Indeed, the Commission recognised that 
a collective system allows for a single point of sale and this facilitates the efficient 
exploitation of rights, by reducing transaction costs that have to be borne by the 
broadcasters, as the negotiations will take place only with one partner.883 The system 
also contributes to the creation of a well-known brand, managed independently of the 
interests of individual clubs, and it provides a more effective system to protect and 
enforce trademark rights.884 Moreover, broadcasters can plan their programming in 
advance, rather than having to wait for the individual progress of a club in the 
competition, with the financial risks that this would involve.885 The system might also 
guarantee a higher degree of satisfaction of consumers’ demand, as it provides 
coverage of the entire tournament.886 
However, in order to curb the anti-competitive effects of the system, the Commission 
required a number of amendments to the arrangement. First, it imposed a competitive 
bidding process for the acquisition of the rights. The process would have to be carried 
out under non-discriminatory and transparent terms, in order to give all potential buyers 
an opportunity to compete.887 Moreover, to prevent and limit possible positions of 
dominance on the downstream market, and consequent foreclosure effects, UEFA had 
to limit the duration of exclusive deals to a period not exceeding three Champions 
League seasons.888 Furthermore, the rights could not be sold in a bundle, but had to be 
fragmented into different packages, each conferring the right to broadcast specific 
                                                     
883 See idem, at para. 148. 
884 See idem, at paras 154-157 and 179. For a discussion related to these aspects see Daly, K, Walch, J (2012) 
Sports and competition law: An overview of EU and national case law, e-Competitions, No42447, and 
Parrish, R., & Miettinen, S. (2009) The Sporting Exception in European Union Law. T.C.M. Asser Instituut, 
and also Van der Wolk, A (2006), Sports broadcasting: fair play from a EU competition perspective 
(European Commission) (Case study)', The International Sports Law Journal, 1-2, p. 8. 
885 See Decision COMP/C.2-37.398 — Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League 
at para. 149. 
886 See idem, at para. 145. 
887 See idem at para 3.4.1.2, and for a summary of these aspects see Kienapfel P, Stein A, (2007) The 
Application of Articles 81 and 82 EC in the sport sector, Competition Policy Newsletter 3: 6-14. 
888 See the Decision COMP/C.2-37.398 at para 3. 
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contents on different platforms.889 Accordingly, to reduce possible output restrictions, 
UEFA had to assure that no rights would have been left unused, by allowing the clubs 
to individually sell certain rights that UEFA was not able to commercialise.890 
Similarly, for other less valuable rights, such as deferred highlights and new media 
rights, the Commission required a parallel exploitation by the clubs and UEFA.891 
From the analysis of the Decision, it becomes apparent that the assessment was not 
made precisely and exclusively in light of the specific features of sport. Indeed, despite 
a mention of the specificity of sport, the Commission considered the arrangement 
merely under an antitrust perspective,892 and explicitly held that further reasoning 
related to the solidarity893 of the system was not necessary, in light of the other pro-
competitive effects of the system.894 The remedies identified by the Commission in the 
Champions League case, although valid as guidance for future cases, were not 
exhaustive. Depending on the circumstances of each case and the market analysed, new 
and different remedies could be adopted.895 
 
                                                     
889 See idem at para 3.4.1.3. For a discussion on the subdivision of the right in packages see Weatherill, S 
(2006), The sale of rights to broadcast sporting events under EC law (European Community)', The 
International Sports Law Journal, 3-4, p. 3, and Geey, D. (2004), Collectivity v Exclusivity: Conflict in the 
Broadcasting Arena, Entertainment Law Review, 15, pp. 7-11. 
890 The so-called fall back option. 
891 See the Decision COMP/C.2-37.398 at para 3.4.1.3 (38) and for a discussion related to this aspect 
Geeraert, A., (2013). Limits to the autonomy of sport: EU law, in: J. Alm, ed. Action for good governance in 
international sports organisations. Copenhagen: Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies, 151–184. 
892 See Decision COMP/C.2-37.398 — Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League 
at para. 131. The Commission, after having mentioned the specificity as a factor taken into account, asked 
UEFA to demonstrate the necessary nature of the restriction, revealing the orthodox and economic nature of 
the assessment. This was confirmed also by Kienapfel and Stein, according to whom the financial solidarity 
argument had no impact on the Assessment under Article 101(3). See Kienapfel P, Stein A, (2007) The 
Application of Articles 81 and 82 EC in the sport sector, Competition Policy Newsletter 3, at p. 12. 
893 Advocate General Lenz in Bosman held that in order to maintain or increase the competitive balance of the 
league an acceptable alternative to the transfer system could have been the collective selling of broadcasting 
rights. See Case Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc 
Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de 
football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR 1995 Page I-0492, Opinion of AG Lenz. 
894 See Decision COMP/C.2-37.398 — Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League 
at para. 167. 
895 This type of approach was confirmed in the Commission Staff Working Document - Action Plan ‘Pierre de 
Coubertin’ - Accompanying document to the White Paper on Sport {COM(2007) 391 final} {SEC(2007)932} 
{SEC(2007)935} {SEC(2007)936} at para 3.1.3.2. For a discussion see Lefever, K (2012), New Media And 
Sport: International Legal Aspects, The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, c2012, p.140. 
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3.1.2 Bundesliga and Premier League  
Following the Champions League Case, the Commission analysed the system of 
collective selling of rights adopted by the German Bundesliga and the English Premier 
League.896 The Decision discussed above was still used as a model to shape the 
amendments that were imposed in these cases.897 However, as a point of difference 
from the decision in Champions League, these cases were concluded with Commitment 
Decisions,898 by which the Commission simply accepted and made binding the 
amendments proposed by the Bundesliga and the Premier League.899 In relation to the 
German Bundesliga case, in particular, there was no need to impose further conditions, 
in respect of those already established in Champions League.900 
 
3.1.2.1 Bundesliga – Case COMP/C-2/37.214 
The Liga-Fuβballverband e.V901 is the Football League Association in Germany and it 
is entitled to organise the competition and commercially exploit the rights related to the 
matches of the first and second national football division.902 The DFB applied for a 
negative clearance under Council Regulation 17/1962,903 or an exemption under Article 
101(3) TFEU. The Commission, in a preliminary assessment, considered that the 
collective selling system adopted by the League Association, amounting to a decision 
of an association of undertakings under Article 101(1) TFEU, was capable of 
restricting the competition between the member clubs and raised concerns similar to 
                                                     
896 See Case COMP/38.173, Collective selling of FA Premier League’s broadcasting rights, and Case No 
IV/37.214 - DFB - Central marketing of TV and radio broadcasting rights for certain football competitions in 
Germany. 
897 Iosifidis, P. & Smith, P. (2011). The European Television Sports Rights Market: Balancing Culture and 
Commerce. Paper presented at the Private Television in Europe, 28 - 29 Apr 2011, Brussels, Belgium. 
898 As from Article 9 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. See supra, chapter 1. 
899 Rompuy, B. V., (2012). Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust policy?: Non-efficiency 
considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International. 
900 However, the National Competition Authority held that such a system was not effectively granting the 
required share of the benefits to consumers. See infra para. 4.2. 
901 The League Association is a registered association and ordinary member of the Deutscher Fuβlballbund 
‘DFB’, the German Football Association. The League Association is the sole shareholder in Deutsche 
Fuβlball Liga GmbH, ‘DFL’, which conduct the operational business of the League Association. The clubs 
are contractually bound to the League Association and the DFB. See Commission Decision in Case COMP/C-
2/37.214 - Joint selling of the media rights to the German Bundesliga, para. 2. 
902 Bundesliga 1 and Bundesliga 2. 
903 Subsequently replaced by Regulation 1/2003. See supra chapter 1. 
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those discussed in the Champions League case.904 Moreover, possible efficiencies 
created by the joint selling system were held to be outweighed by the restrictive 
effects.905  
The League Association hence had to propose a number of amendments, in order to 
placate the concerns raised by the system, enhance the transparency of the tendering 
procedure and grant the possibility to individual clubs of exploiting some of the 
rights.906 The Commission accepted these commitments as sufficient to address the 
antitrust concern under Article 101(1) TFEU, and made them binding.907 From the 
analysis of the Decision it is possible to observe how the argument of the specificity of 
sport did not arise in this instance either, and the Commitments were exclusively put in 
place to address antitrust concerns. 
 
3.1.2.2 Premier League – Case COMP/38.173 
The Football Association Premier League908 organises the top flight football 
competition for club in England. Through its Rules and regulations, FAPL sold media 
rights909 packages on behalf of its clubs to broadcasters on an exclusive basis. Clubs 
were prevented from selling rights individually, even those rights not included in the 
packages on sale. In June 2001, the Commission opened an investigation on the selling 
of Premier League’s rights, leading to a statement of objections, issued in December 
2002.910 The Commission concluded that the selling arrangement was in breach of 
                                                     
904 Commission Decision on the case COMP/C-2/37.214, para. 17. 
905 See idem, para. 24. 
906 As in the Champions League case, the amendments were related to the tendering procedure, the limitation 
of the duration of exclusive contracts, and the limitation of their scope through the unbundling of the rights. 
See idem, para. 27- 35. 
907 See idem, Article 1.  
908 The Football Association Premier League, ‘FAPL’, is a private company created in 1992, owned by its 20 
member clubs. These clubs, alongside with the Football Association, are the shareholder of the League and 
are entitled to propose and vote amendments to the Premier League Rule Book. The Premier League Rule 
Book serves as a contract between the League, the Member Clubs and one another, defining the structure and 
running of the competition. See the official website http://www.premierleague.com. 
909 According to para. 1 of the Commission Decision COMP/38.173, Media Rights are the rights to make 
available audio-visual content of play during Premier League matches in any form and using any method of 
transmission or distribution. 
910 See Press Release IP/02/1951 - Commission opens proceedings into joint selling of media rights to the 
English Premier League. 
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Article 101 TFEU, and did not fulfil the criteria for an exemption.911 The system was 
held not to comply with the rules of competition law, as it prevented clubs from 
undertaking independent commercial activity in relation to broadcasting rights,912 and 
the exclusive sale of large packages created barriers to entry on the market, leading to 
concentrations between operators and hampering the competition. Finally, the 
arrangement led also to output restrictions and foreclosure on the downstream 
market.913 
The FAPL reacted to the complaint by proposing a number of amendments to the 
system, with the aim of reducing the output restrictions and enhance the transparency 
of the tendering system.914 As mentioned before, most of the amendments replicated 
the changes imposed in the Champions League case. However, for the Premier League 
the Commission required some further commitments,915 as the relevant market 
presented some significant differences with the one analysed in the Champions League 
Case, in particular in relation to the position held by the incumbent broadcaster on the 
market. Indeed, despite the subdivision in packages, the dominant player BskyB was 
still able to purchase all the packages, therefore creating an entry barrier on the market. 
The Commission required the imposition of a ban on the acquisition of all the packages 
by a single broadcaster, the so-called no single buyer rule.916 Furthermore, the practice 
of BskyB of offering a bonus to the seller on the condition that all valuable rights 
would have been sold to it was considered unacceptable. The Commission thus 
required an obligation on the seller to accept only stand-alone unconditional bids for 
each individual package, and that the tender procedure was to be overseen by a trustee 
which then had to report back to the Commission.917 
                                                     
911 See Commission Decision COMP/38.173, para. 12. 
912 See Notice published pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 concerning case COMP/ 
C.2/38.173 and 38.453 - joint selling of the media rights of the FA Premier League on an exclusive basis, at 
para. 4. 
913 See idem, at para. 7. 
914 See Commission Decision COMP/38.173, paras. 32 and 33. 
915 See idem, at para.36. 
916 See idem, at para. 32. 
917 See idem, para 36(e), and Kienapfel P, Stein A, (2007), The Application of Articles 81 and 82 EC in the 
sport sector, Competition Policy Newsletter 3: 6-14. 
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It must be noticed that in the press release announcing the opening of the investigation, 
the Commission mentioned the specific features of sport and the objective of pursuing 
the solidarity of the system.918 However, the institution already held that the joint 
selling system was not indispensable for guaranteeing the solidarity between Premier 
League clubs. On the other hand, in the Decision accepting the commitment undertaken 
by the FAPL there is no reference to the specific features of sport. The fact that the 
object of the broadcasting rights is a sporting competition is taken into account only as 
a characteristic of the product sold on a specific market.919 
 
3.1.3. Murphy - Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 
The theme of collective selling and broadcasting rights arose again in Murphy.920 The 
Court of Justice was called to assess a number of issues related to the broadcasting 
sales policy of the Premier League, which granted national licensees the exclusive right 
to broadcast matches on a country-by-country basis.921 
In order to maximise the value of the rights, FAPL sold them on a territorial basis, 
granting the purchasing broadcaster the exclusive right for the live transmission of the 
matches in the area. Accordingly, the awarded broadcasters had to ensure that their 
transmission was safe from any attempt of decryption from any viewer outside the 
territory of the Member State for which they had acquired the rights.922 In the UK, the 
licensed broadcaster was BskyB, and anyone who wanted to access Premier League 
matches had to subscribe to this pay TV operator. However, a number of bars and 
restaurants started to use foreign devices to access Premier League matches, because 
they are substantially cheaper than the subscription with BskyB. These devices, 
                                                     
918 See Press Release IP/02/1951 - Commission opens proceedings into joint selling of media rights to the 
English Premier League. 
919 See Decision COMP/38.173, section 5.2. 
920 Judgment of the CJEU in Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08. Football Association Premier League and Others 
v QC Leisure and Others Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] ECR I-09083. 
921 See idem, at para. 30. For a discussion see also Parrish, R., (2012), Lex sportiva and EU sports law, in 
European Law Review, 6, pp. 11 et seq. 
922 See Judgment of the CJEU in Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, paras. 36 -37. 
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alongside the subscription to a foreign satellite channel, were legitimately purchased, 
but used in an unauthorised manner as contrary to the licensing conditions.923 
To protect its territorial model, FAPL took enforcement actions in civil proceeding and 
private prosecutions against the suppliers of the equipment and devices to the public 
houses,924 and an owner of a public house, Ms. Murphy, that was using a Greek 
decoder, legitimately purchased, to broadcast Premier League matches in her pub.925  
The High Court of Justice decided to stay the proceedings pending before it and refer a 
series of questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in relation to the 
compliance of the licensing policy with EU law. In particular, and besides the questions 
related to the application of copyright to sports broadcasting rights, which are not 
relevant in the context of this research,926 the Court of Justice was called to rule on the 
legality of the licensing system under freedom to provide services and competition law. 
The Court therefore held that the system restricted the cross-border provision of 
services, which is protected under Article 56 TFEU.927 A legislation that prevents the 
use of a device in a Member State, different from the one where it has been purchased, 
has the effect of preventing the access to the service, which is prohibited unless 
objectively justified.928 
                                                     
923 See idem, para. 42. 
924 Case C-403/08, before the High Court of England and Wales, Chancery Division, for the infringement of 
their rights protected under Section 298 of the Copyright Design and Patents Act, by trading in or being in 
possession for commercial purposes of foreign decoding devices designed or adapted to give access to the 
services of FAPL and others without authorisation. See Case QC Leisure (C-403/08) /Murphy (C-429/08), 
para. 46. 
925 Case C-429/08. The FAPL brought Ms Murphy before Portsmouth Magistrates’ Court, and had her 
convicted of two offences under section 297(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, as she had 
dishonestly received a programme with intent to avoid the due payment. Ms. Murphy subsequently appealed 
the decision before the Crown Court and, by way of case stated, before the High Court. See Case QC Leisure 
(C-403/08) /Murphy (C-429/08), paras. 52 - 53. 
926 To summarise the main finding in this regard, the Court held that FAPL cannot claim copyright protection 
on the Premier League matches themselves. See Case QC Leisure (C-403/08) /Murphy (C-429/08), paras. 96 
et seq. For a discussion of these aspects see Study on sports organisers’ rights in the European Union, T.M.C. 
Asser Instituut / Asser International Sports Law Centre Institute for Information Law - University of 
Amsterdam, February 2014, for the European Commission, DG Education and Culture, pp. 29 et seq. 
927 Article 56 of TFEU requires the abolition of all restrictions to the freedom to provide services within the 
internal market; this freedom is for the benefit of both providers and recipients of services. See Cases C-
403/08 and C-429/08 para. 85.   
928 See idem, para. 87. 
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It is in this context that the Court has mentioned Article 165 TFEU and its prescription 
of taking into account the specific features of sport.929 In the interpretation of the Court, 
this provision would allow Member States to grant protection to a sporting event and its 
organiser, but not to the point of creating a new set of rights.930 Any measure of this 
kind, though, has to be proportionate and necessary to achieve the goals of public 
interest,931 which were not present in the case in question.932 
The Court then moved on to assess the compliance of the system with the provision of 
competition law. It held that, while exclusive licensing agreements are not in principle 
incompatible with EU law,933 the arrangement in object constituted a restriction of the 
competition running contrary to the objectives of the Treaty, as it was capable of 
partitioning the market along national borders.934 As the system restricted the cross-
border provision of services, it had consequently the anti-competitive object of 
eliminating the competition between European broadcasters, prohibited under Article 
101 TFEU.935 The Court subsequently held that the arrangement could not fulfil the 
criteria set by Article 101(3) TFEU, as the obligations it involved were not necessary  
to pursue a legitimate objective.936 
In its assessment under competition law, the Court did not specifically consider the 
content of the transmission, and therefore its relation to sport, as a matter capable of 
                                                     
929 See idem, para. 101. 
930  As pointed out in Parrish, R, (2012), 'Lex sportiva and EU sports law', in European Law Review, 6, pp. 11 
et seq. 
931 See Case QC Leisure (C-403/08) /Murphy (C-429/08) [2011] ECR I-09083 at para. 105, and, Case 
62/79 Coditel and Others (‘Coditel I’) [1980] ECR 881, paras 15 and 16. 
932 See Case QC Leisure (C-403/08) /Murphy (C-429/08) [2011] ECR I-09083, at para. 125. However, in her 
Opinion, Advocate General Kokott held that the reason put forward by the FAPL in relation to the closed 
period of transmission, which would justify the restriction of the provision of services, does not merely 
respond to a commercial interest, but it pursues a sporting interest protected by Article 6(e) and Article 165 
TFEU. Nevertheless, the AG Kokott stressed that FAPL had not demonstrated the need of such a form of 
protection. See Case QC Leisure (C-403/08) /Murphy (C-429/08) [2011] ECR I-09083, Opinion of AG, paras. 
207 – 210. 
933 See Case QC Leisure (C-403/08) /Murphy (C-429/08) [2011] ECR I-09083, paras 137-138, citing Case 
262/81 Coditel SA et al v Ciné-Vog Films SA et al (Coditel II) [1982] ECR 3381, para 15. 
934 See idem, at para. 139. 
935 See idem, at paras 140 – 144. 
936 See idem, at para 145 and see Lindholm, J and Kaburakis, A, (2013), Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 FA 
Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others; and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services 
Ltd, 4 Oct 2011. In Anderson, J. (Ed.) Leading Cases in Sports Law. Heidelberg, Germany: TMC Asser 
Press/Springer-Verlag, pp. 271-286. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2288917. 
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affecting its finding. Similarly, the theme of the specificity of sport did not arise in this 
instance.937 The CJEU took no particular account of the specificities of the market for 
sports broadcasting rights, which had been earlier recognised by the Commission. In 
UEFA, the Commission had indeed stated that this peculiar market was still anchored 
to national preferences, and therefore closed and limited.938 The prohibition of 
territorial exclusivity affirmed in Murphy might imply that the market for broadcasting 
right has now a more European dimension.939 
 
4. Consumers’ Welfare 
A point of interest in relation to the assessment of the cases discussed before is related 
to the benefit of consumers. The theme of consumers’ welfare has indeed a 
fundamental relevance in connection with the exploitation of sport broadcasting rights, 
and in the context of the implementation and application of competition law.940 Indeed, 
one of the conditions posed by Article 101(3) TFEU in order to exempt a restrictive 
agreement from the prohibition set is that consumers are able to enjoy a fair share of 
the benefits resulting from it. 
In the case law of the European institutions, however, the analysis related to the 
realisation of this last condition has always been somewhat neglected. The benefit of 
consumers is frequently considered to exist when the other requirements posed by the 
norm are fulfilled, under the assumption that any economic efficiency created on the 
upstream market would automatically be passed on to final consumers.941 
                                                     
937 The Court however mentioned the specificity of sport, and Article 165 TFEU, in relation to the assessment 
of the conduct under Article 56 TFEU. See supra and Case QC Leisure (C-403/08) /Murphy (C-429/08), para. 
101. 
938 See supra, note 18. 
939 Moya Izquierdo, S. and Troncoso Ferrer, M., (2014), Football broadcasting business in the EU: towards 
fairer competition?, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice.                                                                                       
940 The interest of consumers should be protected through Article 101(3) TFEU and 102 TFEU, as one of the 
main objective of EU competition law. See the Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [OJ No C 101 of 27.4.2004], at para. 13, but also the speech of the 
then Vice President of the Commission Competition – what's in it for consumers? – Almunia, Vice President 
of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy, European Competition and Consumer Day 
Poznan, 24 November 2011. 
941 Rompuy, B. V. (2012). Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust policy?: Non-efficiency 
considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International. 
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As mentioned before, the definition of consumer can be stretched to include those 
customers, such as wholesalers or retailers, which are not on the last link of the chain, 
final consumers in a strict sense.942 The Guidelines of the Commission on the 
application of Article 101(3) TFEU state that this notion encompasses all the customers 
of the parties to the agreement, which might be direct and indirect users of the product, 
therefore including producers that use the good as an input, wholesalers, retailers and, 
lastly, also final consumers.943 Indeed, as established in T-mobile Netherlands BV,944 
Article 101 TFEU, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is designed to protect 
not only the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers, but also to 
safeguard the structure of the market, and thus competition as such.945 
On the other hand, consumer protection is one of those supreme goals of the Union, 
which was established by the Lisbon Treaty and crystallised in Article 12 TFEU. This 
provision is a horizontal clause and clearly affirms that consumer protection should be 
taken into account in defining and implementing any other Union policies and 
activities. It therefore mandates the EU institutions to respect these obligations in the 
exercise of other Treaty competences, including those related to the application of 
competition law.946 And in the context of consumer law, as opposed to antitrust law, 
the term consumers is intended to include only the final consumers. To further clarify 
the scope of such a protection, Article 169 TFEU specifies that the protection of 
                                                     
942 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [OJ 
No C 101 of 27.4.2004], para. 84.  
943 See ibid. 
944 See Case C-8/08, T-mobile Netherlands and Others (2009) ECR I-04529, para. 38. 
945 Similarly, Vice-President of the Commission Almunia in his speech at the Consumer Day held in Poznan 
in 2011 pointed out that the role of competition authorities is not to deliver benefits directly to consumers, but 
to create the best conditions for a well-functioning market. However, he also stressed that the purpose of 
competition law in recent antitrust cases is to allow the final consumer to benefit from lower prices and a 
wider choice of supply. Competition – what's in it for consumers? – Almunia, Vice President of the European 
Commission responsible for Competition Policy, European Competition and Consumer Day Poznan, 24 
November 2011. 
946 See Weatherill, S. (Ed.) (2013). EU Consumer Law and Policy, Second Edition. Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, p. 68, and Lianos, I (2013), Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU 
Competition Law. CLES Working Paper Series 3/2013. Available at SSRN: 
 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2235875. 
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consumers must be broken down into the protection of health, safety, and more 
importantly for this discussion, the economic interests of consumers.947 
In the context of the antitrust analysis, the granting of an exemption might be justified 
where the efficiencies generated by the restrictive agreement within a relevant market 
are sufficient to outweigh the anti-competitive effects produced by the agreement itself 
within that same relevant market.948 The passing on of the benefits has to compensate 
consumers for the negative effects they have suffered, and the greater the time lag from 
the restriction to the pass on, the greater the benefit has to be.949 This approach, 
however, might pose problems in relation to the way this prospective gains can be 
effectively assessed.950 
The Guidelines also affirm that when the restrictive effects are relatively limited in 
relation to the efficiencies created, it is likely that a fair share of the cost saving will be 
passed on to the consumers.951 However, the latter is merely an assumption, and the 
Commission might be proven wrong in specific circumstances.952 Finally, the 
Guidelines specify the nature of the benefit that consumers should receive: the 
restrictive agreement must result in fact in lower prices for the consumer, or new and 
improved products must outweigh the increase in price for the consumer.953 
                                                     
947 Chirita, AD, (2010) Undistorted, (Un)Fair Competition, Consumer Welfare and the Interpretation of 
Article 102 TFEU, in World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2010. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1726344. 
948 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [OJ No C 101 of 27.4.2004], para. 43. 
949 See idem, para 87. 
950 See the debate on this aspect on Article 101(3) – A Discussion of narrow versus broad definition of 
benefits – Discussion note for OFT breakfast roundtable (2010), p.42. 
951 Para. 90 of the Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty [OJ No C 101 of 27.4.2004], and Rompuy, B. V. (2012), Economic efficiency: the sole concern of 
modern antitrust policy?: Non-efficiency considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, 
Kluwer Law International. 
952 An undertaking that holds market power might decide not to pass on to consumers the cost saving 
obtained, but to simply retain it as rents. See Cseres, K, (2006), The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare 
Standard, Competition Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 121-173, Available at  
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015292 
953 See Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
[OJ No C 101 of 27.4.2004] at paras. 95 et seq. and 102. For a discussion on these aspects see Marsden, P. & 
Whelan, P. (2006), Consumer detriment’ and its application in EC and UK competition law, European 
Competition Law Review, vol. 27, no. 10, pp. 569 et seq. 
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Although these Guidelines cannot bind the Court of Justice954 or go against a Treaty 
provision, since they are merely supposed to give guidance to the activity of the 
Commission, the combination of these provisions, at times conflicting, renders this 
analysis more complicated. 
 
4.1 The Interest of Consumers in the analyses of the Commission 
As it was said before, the analysis of the Commission under Article 101(3) TFEU is 
often lacking of a proper assessment of the benefit of consumers. In Champions 
League, the Commission held that the collective selling arrangement fulfilled the 
conditions set by Article 101(3) TFEU, as it was capable of creating efficiency gains in 
terms of production and distribution of the product.955 In relation to the benefit of 
consumers, however, the Commission merely assumed that the efficiencies created by 
the agreement would have allowed media operators to invest more in new and 
improved transmission technologies, quality television coverage, quality production 
and presentation, which would have likely represented a benefit for the consumers.956 
While this last consideration of the Commission was simply an assumption, it is sure 
that, as collective selling has increased the value of broadcasting rights, the cost 
sustained by broadcasters have been passed on to final consumers.957 Furthermore, the 
Commission identified expressly in media operators those consumers receiving a fair 
share of the main benefits created by the agreement.958 
                                                     
954 Townley, C., (2011), Which Goals Count in Article 101 TFEU?: Public Policy and its Discontent, 
European Competition Law Review, citing GlaxoSmithKline as an example of a case where the CJEU has 
decided to not follow the approach of the Commission as stated in its Guidelines. See CJEU, Joined Cases 
501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline [2009] ECR I-9291, para. 63. 
955 See supra, Commission Decision COMP/C.2-37.398 — Joint selling of the commercial rights of the 
UEFA Champions League. 
956 See Decision COMP/C.2-37.398 at paras. 152 and 171. The assumption taken from the Commission is also 
reflected in the Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty [OJ No C 101 of 27.4.2004] at para. 90. See also Rompuy, B. V. (2012). Economic efficiency: the sole 
concern of modern antitrust policy?: Non-efficiency considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den 
Rijn, Kluwer Law International. 
957 See Parrish, R., & Miettinen, S. (2009) The sporting exception in european union law. T.C.M. Asser 
Instituut, p.151. 
958 Commission Decision UEFA Champions League COMP/C.2-37.398 para. 179. 
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In the subsequent DFBL and FAPL cases, by issuing two Commitment Decisions, the 
Commission accepted and made binding the amendments proposed by the leagues to 
their respective arrangements. This measure allowed the Commission to issue the 
Decisions without having to clarify which efficiencies were created and how the 
benefits were effectively passed on to consumers.959 In the press releases of these 
decisions, the Commission stressed that the amendments were aimed at fostering the 
competition within the market, and increasing consumers’ choice.960 However, the 
analyses undertaken by the Commission itself do not show a similar intent.961 
From an analytical perspective, it can be said that consumers’ choice increases when 
the amount and variety of premium contents available for consumption increases, and 
their prices decreases.962 Conversely, exclusive contracts create a situation where the 
public is unable to exercise a real choice between different platform operators, and the 
inflated price that will be paid by the broadcasters for the exclusivity will surely be 
passed on to the consumers. 
 
4.2 The impulse of National Competition Authorities 
                                                     
959 Rompuy, B. V. (2012). Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust policy? : Non-efficiency 
considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International 
960 See the Press Release IP/03/1105 - Commission clears UEFA's new policy regarding the sale of the media 
rights to the Champions League, where Competition Commissioner Mario Monti said: ‘The Commission's 
action will provide a broader and more varied offer of football on television. It will allow clubs to develop the 
rights for their own fan base’, and the Press Release IP/05/62 - German Football League commitments to 
liberalise joint selling of Bundesliga media rights made legally binding by Commission decision, in which 
Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes commented: ‘This decision benefits both football fans and the 
game. Fans benefit from new products and greater choice.’ Finally, see the Press Release IP/06/356 - 
Commission makes commitments from FA Premier League legally binding, where Competition 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes commented: ‘The solution we have reached will benefit football fans while 
allowing the Premier League to maintain its timetable for the sale of its rights.’ 
961 Conversely, a case in which such an assessment was made by the Commission is the Eurovision, see infra 
¶ 7, where the institution attempted to exempt a system of collective purchasing of broadcasting rights, in 
light of its procompetitive effects. In that case, the larger choice of content available for consumers, and the 
possibility to access also to minority sports were made subject of analysis and effectively considered as a 
benefit for final consumers. See Rompuy, B. V. (2012). Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern 
antitrust policy?: Non-efficiency considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International. 
962 Lefever, K., (2012), New Media And Sport: International Legal Aspects, The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. 
Asser Press, c2012. 
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The fact that the benefit of consumers has not been effectively taken into account by 
the Commission may also be inferred from the position taken by a number of National 
Competition Authorities, which have to apply the Article 101 TFEU in its entirety as 
from Regulation 1/2003 EC.963 
One clear example can be drawn from the approach taken by the German Competition 
Authority,964 when it had to examine the central marketing model of the Bundesliga 
rights for the period 2009-2015. In this instance, the Bundeskartellamt held that the 
consumers’ share of the benefits resulting from the arrangement was inadequate.965 The 
Authority took into consideration two options to resolve the impasse: one was to 
impose that pay TV packages were to be sold on a non-exclusive basis, so to give a 
choice to the viewers. The other was to guarantee a prompt coverage of the highlights 
on a free to air television. The Bundeskartellamt specifically required that the 
highlights of the matches were to be transmitted at an early hour on Saturday evening 
on free to air television, in order to give the possibility to access the images also to 
those consumers who chose not to subscribe to the incumbent pay TV holding the live 
rights.966 
More recently, the Bundeskartellamt delivered another decision regarding the joint 
selling of media rights for the Bundesliga for the period commencing from the season 
2013/2014.967 The authority confirmed the usual arrangement, but it also pointed out 
that, in order to guarantee consumers a fair share of the benefit, it must be in principle 
possible for all interested parties to acquire the rights. In turn, this means that, 
                                                     
963 See supra, Chap. 1. 
964 The German Competition Authority is the Bundeskartellamt, an independent federal authority which is 
assigned to the Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy. More information are available on its website, 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/EN/Home/home_node.html 
965 For an overview of the proceeding see the Note by the German Delegation in Roundtable on Competition 
and Sport, 2010, available at: 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Diskussions_Hintergrundpapiere/OECD_2010.0
6.08-Competition_Sports.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5 
966 See Lefever, K., (2012), New Media And Sport: International Legal Aspects, The Hague, Netherlands: 
T.M.C. Asser Press. 
967 Joint selling of media rights for the games of the 1st and 2nd German football leagues (Bundesliga) from 




alongside a transparent and non-discriminatory awarding procedure, there has to be a 
broad range of rights packages on offer.968 The Authority terminated the proceedings 
holding that the system guaranteed access of consumers to the highlights through 
different transmission channels, such as traditional TV, but also internet and Mobile 
TV. 
In England, the Office of Communications969 has always been active in relation to the 
application of competition law to the broadcasting sector. The Authority has 
progressively decided to abandon the idea of imposing a ‘no single buyer rule’ to the 
selling of Premier League broadcasting rights. Despite the Decision of the 
Commission,970 Ofcom has stated that any remedy that is capable of preventing or 
restricting the activity of an undertaking and its market power is also likely to reduce 
the benefits it creates. Furthermore, such a system could lead to a situation where 
consumers have to sustain higher costs, since they would have to subscribe to various 
broadcasters to get the desired content.971 The importance of the ‘no single buyer rule’ 
is however attested by the fact that the National Competition Authorities of Belgium 
and France respectively had the chance to evaluate its legitimacy and whether it was 
appropriate for the national market they were analysing.972 
 
                                                     
968 Moya Izquierdo, S. and Troncoso Ferrer, M., (2014), Football broadcasting business in the EU: towards 
fairer competition?, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice.                                                                                       
969 The Office of Communications, hereafter Ofcom, is the Communication Regulator in the UK, which 
operates mainly under the Communications Act 2003, and is funded by fees from industry for regulating 
broadcasting and communications networks, and grant-in-aid from the Government. The Communications 
Act says that Ofcom’s principal duty is to further the interests of citizens and of consumers, where appropriate 
by promoting competition. Ofcom is accountable to the Parliament and it enforces regulatory rules and 
competition law in the sectors for which it has responsibility. More information on the Ofcom website, 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/ 
970 See supra, Case COMP/38.173, Collective selling of FA Premier League’s broadcasting rights. 
971 Ofcom, (2008) Pay TV second consultation: Access to premium content, London.   
972 Both the Authorities held the view that such a provision would have been detrimental for the consumers. 
See Study on sports organisers’ rights in the European Union, T.M.C. Asser Instituut / Asser International 
Sports Law Centre Institute for Information Law - University of Amsterdam, February 2014, for the European 
Commission, DG Education and Culture at page 88, and the two decisions:  Council of Competition (Belgian 
Competition Authority) The selling by the Liga Beroepsvoetbal (LBV) of the broadcasting rights of games of 
the national football competition for the seasons 2005-2006, 2006-2007, and 2007-2008 (Joined Cases 
MEDE-I/O- 05/0025 and MEDE-P/K-05/0036) Decision No. 2005-I/0-40 of 29 July 2005, and Autorité de la 
concurrence (French Competition Authority) Opinion 04-A-09 relative to a draft decree on the sale by 
professional leagues of rights for broadcasting sporting events of competitions, 28 May 2004.   
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4.3 Consumers and Exclusivity 
Although free to air broadcasters are the only providers effectively capable of 
guaranteeing a wide access of the public to sport programmes, imposing the acquisition 
of the rights or the transmission of the matches to those operators might not meet the 
interest of consumers.973 Indeed, this approach would decrease the value of such rights, 
in light of the limited spending ability of these broadcasters, with a subsequent impact 
on the quality of the product offered by the clubs and the leagues, which have in the 
selling of those rights the main source of income.974 In addition, pay TV broadcasters 
place the greatest value on the exclusive nature of an agreement, a factor that 
maximises profitability, allows them to recover the costs they have sustained for the 
acquisition of the rights, and invest in innovative programming.975 On the other hand, 
free-to-air broadcasters cannot compete with pay TV or subscription channels anymore, 
and they are confined to a marginal role in sports broadcasting.976 They would also not 
be able to transmit all the events that can be shown by the pay TV, in light of the other 
programmes that they are demanded to show. 
The exclusivity cannot be challenged in itself,977 but the restrictive effects that it 
produces have to find an actual counterbalance. When the interest of consumers has to 
be effectively pursued, National Competition Authorities have tried to implement 
conditions that can guarantee a broad access to some contents on a free-to-air basis, 
without impairing the value of the rights and therefore the role of pay TV broadcasters. 
In this perspective, Ofcom has suggested that the exclusivity included in selling 
                                                     
973 For a discussion on the importance of the role of free to air broadcasters, and the benefit of the advent of 
pay TV in relation to sport see Evens, T, Smith, P, & Iosifidis, P (2013), The Political Economy Of Television 
Sports Rights, [Basingstoke]: Palgrave Macmillan. 
974 See Jeanrenaud, C. & Késenne, S. (2006), The economics of sport and the media, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham. Furthermore, to mention only the data available in relation to the top 20 earning football clubs in 
Europe, broadcasting rights revenues account for a range that goes from the 22% of the total revenues (Paris 
Saint Germain) to the 73% (Everton). See Deloitte, Football Money League, January 2015, available at 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/sports-business-group/deloitte-football-
money-league-2015.PDF. 
975 See Parrish, R., & Miettinen, S. (2009) The sporting exception in european union law. T.C.M. Asser 
Instituut, p.147. 
976 Parrish, R. (2008) Access to Major Events on Television under European Law, in Journal of Consumer 
Policy, Volume 31, Number 1, Page 79. 
977 See supra, Coditel II. 
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arrangements might be restrained in the future, for example by making some matches 
available on multiple platforms,978 in order to enhance the benefits received by 
consumers.979 
In other circumstances the focus was placed instead on the duration of the exclusive 
deal. Toft has argued that a standard duration for these clauses cannot be determined, 
but the analysis of each agreement in the context of the relevant market should inform 
the decision on a case by case basis.980 Thus, a duration longer than 3 years could be 
justified under specific circumstances, particularly when there is a new operator 
entering the market offering an innovative service or new technology.981 In this regard, 
the Spanish Competition Authority982 has held that any arrangement granting media 
rights on an exclusive basis for a period exceeding three football seasons would have 
been considered an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU. In this regard, the CNMC 
gave a fine to Mediapro, the broadcaster involved, and several football clubs, 
calculated on the basis of the profit these clubs gained through the agreement and the 
turnover of each individual club.983 
Similarly, in September 2009 the French Competition Authority984 delivered a decision 
in a case concerning an agreement signed between the French Football Federation and 
the broadcaster Sportfive, which granted the latter exclusivity over certain sport rights 
for a period exceeding three years.985 The main aspect of the Authority’s reasoning 
concerned the length of the deal in relation to its objectives: the period should be short 
                                                     
978 Ofcom (2009) Pay TV: Phase Three Document: Proposed Remedies, London: Ofcom. 
979 Iosifidis, P. and Smith, P., (2011), The European Television Sports Rights Market: Balancing Culture and 
Commerce. Paper presented at the Private Television in Europe, 28 - 29 Apr 2011, Brussels, Belgium. 
980 Toft, T, (2003), TV rights of sports events. 15 January 2003, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_002_en.pdf 
981 See Lefever, K., (2012), New Media And Sport: International Legal Aspects, The Hague, Netherlands: 
T.M.C. Asser Press, c2012. 
982 The Comision Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia, CNMC hereafter, is the Spanish Competition 
Authority. It is a public body operating since 2013, independent from the government and subject to the 
scrutiny of the Parliament. See the official site at http://www.cnmc.es/es-es/inicio.aspx. 
983 The final decision was delivered on 28 November 2013 by the CNMC41 and resulted in an overall fine of 
15 million EUR: 6.5 million to Mediapro; 3.9 million to Real Madrid; 3.6 million to Barcelona; EUR 900,000 
to Sevilla and EUR 30,000 to Racing Santander. See SNC/0029/13 Mediapro y Clubs de Futblol II. 
984 The Autorite´ de la Concurrence is the French Competition Authority, an independent administrative body 
established in 2009 to replace the Counseil de la Concurrence. 
985 Decision n.09-D-31 of the Autorite´ de la Concurrence of 30 September 2009. 
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enough to prevent the creation of entry barriers on the market, but it should also cover 
enough time as necessary to ensure that the buyer could recover its investments. This 
finding required an amendment to the French Sport Code in order to allow exclusive 
licenses for a period of 4 years, in light of the specific market structure and other 
incident circumstances of each individual case.986 In a subsequent decision the 
Autorite’ de la Concurrence has suspended the licensing agreement signed between the 
National Rugby League and Canal Plus that granted the pay TV broadcaster exclusive 
rights to broadcast matches in the Top 14 rugby championship for five seasons.987 Due 
to the ‘premium’ nature of these rights, their marketing is allowed only for a limited 
period, under transparent and non-discriminatory terms.988 In this regard, the Authority 
also took in consideration the interest of consumers, since the suspension will be 
effective only from the 2015/2016 season, thereby guaranteeing the viewers the 
transmission of the matches on the channels to which they had already subscribed. 
Finally, from the 2009-2012 cycle, UEFA has once again amended its broadcasting 
rights selling system, and it now distributes the rights on a neutral platform basis. 
Accordingly, successful bidders for live match rights will benefit from exclusivity 
across all media platforms, including television, Internet and mobile, throughout the 
entire live match. Therefore, new media operators have to compete against established 
broadcasters, usually vertically integrated, for media contents that they cannot 
afford.989 This system raises some doubts in relation to its efficiency, since it leaves 
still open the possibility that some rights will be kept off the market, and it does not 
limit the position of power of incumbent broadcasters.990 Hence it is not convincing in 
                                                     
986 Moya Izquierdo, S. and Troncoso Ferrer, M., (2014), Football broadcasting business in the EU: towards 
fairer competition?, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice. 
987 Decision de l’Autorite’ de Concurrence 14-MC-01, Mesure conservatoire du 30 juillet 2014 relative à la 
demande de mesures conservatoires présentée par la société beIN Sports France dans le secteur de la 
télévision payante, 30th July 2014. 
988 The Decision, appealed by Canal Plus and the French National Rugby League, was ultimately confirmed 
by the Paris Court of Appeal. Cour d’Appel de Paris, Arret du 09 October 2014, RG n.14/16759. 
989 Study on sports organisers’ rights in the European Union, T.M.C. Asser Instituut / Asser International 
Sports Law Centre Institute for Information Law - University of Amsterdam, February 2014, for the European 
Commission, DG Education and Culture, pp.78 and 102. 
990 Lefever, K., (2012), New Media And Sport: International Legal Aspects, The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. 
Asser Press, C2012, p. 150. 
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the perspective of the satisfaction of consumers’ interests, and it might also pose 
questions in relation to the protection of competition on the market. 
 
5. Right to Major Events: AVMS Directive 
The importance of broadcasting rights in sport, already stressed in the course of this 
chapter, is further highlighted if it is considered that, while other aspects related to 
sport have received little or no attention by the European institutions, this theme is 
expressly included in the Directive 89/552/CEE.991 This legislation has recognised the 
cultural role that major events have in modern society. The rise of pay TV broadcasters, 
and the fear of a possible migration of all the rights for major sport events in the hands 
of these operators, pushed the European institutions to intervene.992 
Essentially, the Directive establishes that every EU citizen has a right to see freely an 
event considered of major relevance within the respective Member State, including 
sporting events.993 Each Member State has the possibility of drafting a list of events 
that have to be ‘protected’ and freely accessible to the citizens of the respective 
country. In particular, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive states that a major 
event should not be broadcast in such a way that a ‘substantial proportion of the 
public’994 could be deprived of the possibility of following it on free-to-air television. 
The list of events has to be approved by the Commission and communicated to the 
other Member States. In turn, these are obliged to ensure that broadcasters under their 
jurisdiction do not deprive the public of the former Member State of the possibility of 
following these listed events. Once a Member State has drawn up a list, it can no longer 
                                                     
991 The Directive 89/552/CEE, also known as ‘Television Without Frontiers’ and its amendments are now 
included in the Directive Audiovisual Media Services, no.2010/13/EU. 
992 Evens, T, Smith, P, & Iosifidis, P., (2013), The Political Economy Of Television Sports Rights, 
[Basingstoke]: Palgrave Macmillan. 
993 The Recital 49 of the Directive specifically mentions some major sport events, such as the Olympics, the 
football World Cup and the football European Championship. 
994 Article 14(1) of the Directive no.2010/13/EU. 
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restrict the access of the public to a mere deferred coverage of such events without 
special justification.995 
The Directive is not a harmonising measure, since it leaves each Member State the 
possibility of choosing whether to draw up a list, and which events to include in it, 
within certain limits and conditions. However, the great degree of discretion left to 
Member States has created some uncertainty, because the Directive does not define 
some relevant terms, such as ‘substantial proportion of the public’, and it does not state 
what should be intended for ‘event of major importance for society’ either. To fill this 
gap, and also in response to a ruling of the General Court,996 the Commission has 
applied a more systematic approach, using references to Guidelines previously enacted 
by the Council of Europe.997 Accordingly, to be considered of major importance for the 
society, an event must meet at least two of the following criteria:998 it has general 
resonance in the Member State, and it is not significant only for those who ordinarily 
follows that sport or activity; the event is generally recognised for its distinct cultural 
importance for the population of the Member State, especially as a catalyst of cultural 
identity; the event is a competition of international importance and a national team is 
involved; and, finally, the event has been traditionally broadcast on free television and 
has commanded large audiences.999 
                                                     
995 See Lefever, K., (2012), New Media And Sport: International Legal Aspects, The Hague, Netherlands: 
T.M.C. Asser Press, c2012, p. 236, and Scheuer A, Schoenthal M (2008) Article 3a TWFD. In Castendyk O. 
et al (eds) European Media Law. Kluwer Law International, Alphen a/d Rijn, p.423. 
996 Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-33/01, Infront WM AG v Commission of the European 
Communities [2005], ECR II- 05897, where the Court annulled the Approval of the Commission of the List 
drawn up by the UK. See Evens, T, Smith, P, & Iosifidis, P., (2013), The Political Economy Of Television 
Sports Rights, [Basingstoke]: Palgrave Macmillan, page 107. 
997 Council of Europe, 2002, Guidelines for the implementation of Article 9a of the European Convention on 
Transfrontalier Television, para. 10. The European Union, however, is not part of the Convention, and the 
provisions were used only as a source of inspiration. 
998 These criteria have been mentioned in several cases. To name just one example, see the Commission 
Decision 2007/475/EC of 25 June 2007 on the compatibility with Community law of measures taken by Italy 
pursuant to Article 3a(1) of Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television 
broadcasting activities, OJ L 180, at paras. 5 et seq. 
999 The use of these criteria does not eliminate the differences existing in the way each Member State has 
decided to implement the Directive. For example, in relation to the list drafted by the UK, there is a 
subdivision existing in UK between Group A events, that have to be broadcast live by a free-to-air 
broadcaster, and Group B events that may be broadcast on pay TV, as long as the highlight are shown on a 
free to air television. See OJ C 328, 18/11/2000. 
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Similarly, there is no express definition of the concept of ‘substantial proportion of the 
public’, which should have access to the event. It is still a job for the Member States to 
interpret this vague expression, which should be referring to viewers that are able to 
access the transmission, rather than meaning the actual audience of the program.1000 
Another point that needs clarification is related to the access to the event: in the UK the 
Ofcom has held that the interest of the viewers is to participate in the live event, and 
not merely accessing to highlights or deferred transmission, therefore expanding the 
focus of the provision.1001 
 
5.1 The effects of the Directive on the Market 
From this brief overview of the Directive it is already clear that its provisions are 
capable of affecting the market for broadcasting rights. However, it has to be specified 
that the Directive does not prohibit pay TV operators from acquiring exclusive 
broadcasting rights of the listed events, nor does it reserves those rights for free-to-air 
operators. The inclusion of some events in the list of major events is however capable 
of limiting the exclusivity held by the operator that has acquired the rights, since the 
latter has to guarantee to the competitors the possibility to access some of the contents. 
The provisions, hence, impose the free to air transmission of the event, but pay TV 
operators may still exercise the exclusive broadcasting rights when they have offered 
those rights to free to air broadcasters at a market rate, and no free to air operators have 
acquired them.1002 However, the Directive is once again lacking in not setting any rule 
to determine what constitutes a fair price that has to be offered for the rights.1003 
Furthermore, it fails to provide a sanction if pay TV were to refuse to sell the acquired 
                                                     
1000 The lack of harmonisation between Member States have caused some differences in this regard, as in the 
Flemish Community in Belgium the requirement is to reach at least 90% of the population, while in the UK 
the objective is 95% of the household and in Austria the 70% of the viewers. See Lefever, K., (2012), New 
Media And Sport: International Legal Aspects, The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, c2012. 
1001 Ofcom (2008) Code on Sports and Other Listed and Designated Events, para 1.12. 
1002 Lefever, K., (2012), New Media And Sport: International Legal Aspects, The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. 
Asser Press. 
1003 Only the German and the Austrian rules have provided a system to calculate the fair price of those rights: 
in Germany, when parties fail to reach an agreement they have to submit the matter to an arbitrator, which 
will determine the binding conditions in due time before the event takes place. See idem, p. 244. 
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rights, leaving the decision to the Member State. Thus, the mechanism might not be 
effective in guaranteeing the broadcast of these events on a free-to air television. 
The Audiovisual Media Services Directive has a particular intrusive effect in relation to 
the competition on the market, since it restricts the ability of broadcasters of acquiring 
some specific sport rights, or at least it strongly conditions them in their activity. Pay 
TV broadcasters have thus criticised the legislation on the basis that it provides an 
unfair competitive advantage to their free-to-air competitors. At the same time, also 
sporting organisations are affected in their ability to negotiate the selling of their 
broadcasting rights, mainly in consideration of the inferior bidding power of free-to-air 
TV broadcasters.1004 
 
3.2. Challenges to the List of Major Events 
In 2007, FIFA and UEFA challenged before the General Court1005 the list of events 
submitted to the Commission by Belgium1006 and the UK.1007 Both Countries included 
in their lists the final stage of the football World Cup and of the European 
Championship in their entirety. FIFA tried to argue that the mechanism introduced by 
the Directive restricts the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services. Those operators that have only limited penetration on a market, in fact, cannot 
get access to the rights to major events, regardless of their economic possibilities or 
investment plans. On the other hand, UEFA held that the legislation leads to a 
disproportionate and unjustified distortion of the competition for the acquisition of 
                                                     
1004 Evens, T, Smith, P, & Iosifidis, P, (2013), The Political Economy Of Television Sports Rights, 
[Basingstoke]: Palgrave Macmillan. 
1005 Respectively Cases T-385/07, FIFA v Commission, [2011], ECR II-00205 and T-68/08, FIFA v 
Commission [2011], ECR II-00349 and Case T-55/08, UEFA v Commission, [2011], ECR II-00271. 
1006 Application for partial annulment of Commission Decision 2007/479/EC of 25 June 2007 on the 
compatibility with Community law of measures taken by Belgium pursuant to Article 3a(1) of Council 
Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting 
activities (OJ 2007 L 180). 
1007 Application for partial annulment of Commission Decision 2007/730/EC of 16 October 2007 on the 
compatibility with Community law of measures taken by the United Kingdom pursuant to Article 3a(1) of 
Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting 
activities (OJ 2007 L 295). 
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broadcasting rights. In this context, it should be noted that these events are organised 
every four years, and therefore they constitute a poor substitute for sports contents 
offered on pay TV, which are usually competitions held throughout the year. It is thus 
considered that the listed events are unlikely to drive up subscriptions.1008 Moreover, 
the assumption that pay TV broadcasters will certainly spend more than free-to-air 
broadcasters for the acquisition of those rights might be rebutted in some particular 
cases. 
The Associations contended that only the matches that involved the respective national 
teams of the Member States, as well as semi-finals and finals, should have been 
protected as events of major importance for the society.1009 The Commission 
conversely argued that Member States retain a degree of discretion in determining 
which events to protect, as the criteria have not been harmonised at European Level. 
Similarly, the list drawn up was held to be compatible with the provisions of 
competition law, as it was not disproportionate so as to distort the competition on the 
market for the rights.1010 
In this regard, the UK indicated in its guidance to the list that the events included 
should be international competitions pre-eminent in the sport, without requiring the 
participation of the national team.1011 Similarly, the General Court held that not all the 
matches comprised in the competition have to be of major importance in order for the 
World Cup or the EURO to be included in their entirety.1012 In the case examined, 
however, the whole final stage of the Competitions receives enough attention from the 
general public of the said Member States to be protected under the Directive. 
The Court finally recognised that the list of major events mechanism is likely to affect 
the property rights of the organisers and right holders and the freedom of competition 
                                                     
1008 Ofcom (2009) Pay TV phase three document: proposed remedies, paras 4.63 and 4.78. See also Lefever, 
K., (2012), New Media And Sport: International Legal Aspects, The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 
p. 260. 
1009 See Case T-68/08, FIFA v Commission [2011], ECR II-00349, at para. 59. 
1010 See Case T-55/08, UEFA v Commission, [2011], ECR II-00271, at para. 17. 
1011 Ministry for Culture, Media and Sports (1997) Communication – notes for guidance on the listing of 
major sports events, as used in the Commission Decision L295/12, 2007. 
1012 See Case T-55/08, UEFA v Commission, [2011], ECR II-00271, at para 136. 
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on the market.1013 However, a restriction of such rights can be accepted in light of the 
social function of that system. Similarly, the freedom to provide services can be 
restrained against the right of information of the public,1014 provided that the restriction 
is limited to what is necessary to achieve its objectives.1015 
In the appeal proposed by FIFA and UEFA against the Decisions of the General Court, 
the Court of Justice confirmed that it is left to the discretion of Member States to 
determine which are the events of major importance for their own society, while the 
role of the Commission is limited to examine the effects of the selection on the 
freedoms and rights protected under EU Law.1016 The Court also noted that where the 
effects of the major events mechanism do not go beyond their objective, it is not 
necessary for the Commission to require other specific grounds to assess its compliance 
with EU Law.1017 The Court hence dismissed the appeal in its entirety.1018 
 
6. Territorial exclusivity v. the Market 
The European Commission has consistently held that the market for sport broadcasting 
rights in Europe is firmly divided on a national basis.1019 This is largely due to language 
barriers and national regulations that are in place throughout the Union, but it also 
                                                     
1013 See idem, at para. 141. 
1014 The right of information of the public is even protected by Article 10(1) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
1015 See Case T-55/08, UEFA v Commission, [2011], ECR II-00271, at para. 143. It has also to be borne in 
mind that if the events in object are not recognised as of major importance, but they are anyway relevant, the 
broadcaster holding the rights are obliged to grant their competitors the right to use extracts for the purpose of 
short news report, on the basis of the right of European citizens to access information. 
1016 See Joined Cases C-201/11 P, C-204/11 P and C-205/11 P, UEFA and FIFA v Commission [2013], ECR 
2013 -00000., paras. 12 and 19. 
1017 See idem, para. 111. In relation to this, it is relevant to mention also the Judgment of the House of Lord in 
UK in a judicial review procedure against a decision of the Independent Television Commission initiated by a 
Danish broadcaster. The Court held that in the application of the Directive there was no room for 
considerations on free market and competition, as these matters were already addressed within the Directive 
itself, and a balance between the right to access and the previous aspects had already been struck in that 
instance. See R. v. Independent Television Commission, ex parte TV Danmark 1 [2001] UKHL 42 [2001] 
1WLR 1604, HL, para. 33. 
1018 Judgment in Joined Cases C-201/11 P, C-204/11 P and C-205/11 P, UEFA and FIFA v Commission 
[2013], ECR 2013 -00000. 
1019 See Uefa Champions League case, para. 90, Bundesliga case at para.19, and Premier League at para 5.1, 
and also for a discussion Lefever, K, (2012), New Media And Sport: International Legal Aspects, The Hague, 
Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, c2012, p. 108. 
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reflects the preferences of consumers, whose interest is still closely tied to the 
performance of national athletes and teams.1020 This assertion might be corroborated by 
the examination of the AVMS Directive. The analysis of the selection of events that the 
various Member States have chosen to protect shows remarkable differences, mainly 
due to national preferences.1021 
The definition of the relevant market for sports broadcasting rights might still be 
framed in national terms, despite the international implications that could emerge in 
particular cases, such as the type of event, and the general circulation of the television 
signal. Indeed, these factors do not automatically imply the internationality of the 
relevant market, especially for the purpose of antitrust regulations. At the same time, 
considerations related to the widespread interest of the public for some specific events 
or competitions should be taken into account. The fact that the general audience has 
developed an interest no longer limited to national competitions, but rather focused on 
a more international taste cannot be denied. Similarly, the existence of broadcasters 
dominant on multiple European Markets, and members of the same group,1022 should 
affect the analysis of the relevant market taken into consideration. 
European broadcasters have used national exclusive licenses to maintain a division of 
the European markets under national lines. When a sport association is dominant in 
respect to a relevant market, its use of exclusivity clauses in the selling of broadcasting 
rights is likely to entail a partitioning of the market on a national basis, which will be 
both relevant under Article 101 TFEU, and 102 TFEU.1023 However, the legitimacy of 
exclusive arrangements cannot be discussed in general terms, but has to be analysed on 
a case per case basis. As affirmed by the Court of Justice in Coditel II, these clauses are 
                                                     
1020 Geeraert, A., (2013), Limits to the autonomy of sport: EU law. In: Alm J. (Eds.), Action for Good 
Governance in International Sports Organisations. Copenhagen: Play the Game/ Danish Institute for Sports 
Studies, 151-184. 
1021 The lists reflect the preferences of national consumers. For example, the list submitted by Ireland 
includes, amongst other events, the Irish Grand National and the Irish Derby, and The Nations Cup at the 
Dublin Horse Show. The Italian list includes the Italian Grand Prix, and the Sanremo Italian Music Festival. 
The list of measure applied by each Member State is available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/reg/tvwf/implementation/events_list/index_en.htm  
1022 BskyB in the UK, Sky Deutschland in Germany and Sky Italia in Italy are all controlled by News Corp. 
1023 Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2014), Sport: law and practice, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath, West 
Sussex. 
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not per se contrary to Article 101 TFEU, but, depending on the circumstances of the 
case analysed, they can either be deemed to infringe competition law or not be 
relevant.1024 
In Murphy, the granting of exclusive licenses on a national basis was thus not 
challenged per se: although an arrangement of this nature is likely to partition the 
common market, it was considered only as a restriction to the freedom to provide 
services under Article 56 TFEU. The Court has however held that a system of licenses 
for sport broadcasting which grants broadcaster territorial exclusivity on a Member 
State basis, and prohibits viewers from watching the broadcasts in other Member States 
infringes EU law.1025 Indeed, the Court considered that such a system has as its object 
the restriction of competition, and therefore these specific clauses may also constitute a 
restriction under Article 101 TFEU.1026 
In this context, the question is whether the decision in Murphy can be interpreted as 
recognising the existence of a pan-European licensing model for broadcasting football 
rights, and therefore change the landscape established throughout the years.1027 In this 
framework it might be worthwhile to consider that in January 2014 the European 
Commission has launched an investigation into licensing agreements between major 
film studios and pay TV broadcasters.1028 As these operators own most of the rights to 
broadcast sporting events in Europe, the investigation is clearly likely to affect the 
market for sports rights as well. The investigation has led to a statement of objections, 
in which the Commission contested the conduct of Sky UK and six major film studios 
which blocked the access to its pay TV services to consumers outside the licensed 
                                                     
1024 Case 262/81 Coditel II [1982] ECR 3381 at Para.20, the question is ‘whether in a given case the manner 
in which the exclusive right conferred by that contract is exercised is subject to arrangements the object or 
effect of which is to prevent or restrict the distribution of [the works] or to distort competition on the 
[relevant] market, in the light of the specific characteristics of that market’. 
1025 Geeraert, A. (2013). Limits to the autonomy of sport: EU law. In: Alm J. (Eds.), Action for Good 
Governance in International Sports Organisations. Copenhagen: Play the Game/ Danish Institute for Sports 
Studies, 151-184. 
1026 Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08. Football Association Premier League and Others v QC Leisure and 
Others Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] ECR I-09083, para. 139. 
1027 Moya Izquierdo, S. and Troncoso Ferrer, M., (2014), Football broadcasting business in the EU: towards 
fairer competition?, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice. 
1028 Press Release: Antitrust: Commission investigates restrictions affecting cross border provision of pay TV 
services. European Commission - IP/14/15, 13/01/2014. 
 213
territory.1029 This territorial exclusivity has been considered to eliminate cross-border 
competition, prohibited under Article 101 TFEU.1030 Although this procedure might be 
seen as stemming from the decision in the Murphy case and be related to the legality of 
absolute territorial protection clauses, the Vice-President of the Commission Almunia 
pointed out that sports broadcasting rights did not form part of the Commission’s 
investigation. The Vice-President indeed affirmed that sports right holders had already 
taken steps to adjust their contracts and ensure that they did not grant absolute 
territorial protection to their broadcasters.1031 Moreover, Almunia stressed that the 
investigation would not lead to an obligation on the Studios to market their rights on a 
pan-European basis.1032 The main focus was thus placed on possible restrictions that 
prevent the selling of content in response to unsolicited requests from viewers located 
in a Member State different from the one where the signal is produced.1033 
As the length of exclusive agreements has been put under the lens of the Commission, a 
similar approach should be taken also in relation to the territorial dimension of such 
clauses. However, the absolute negation of the pan-European market that has to be 
drawn from the statement of the Vice-President of the Commission appears to be too 
simplistic and not to take fully into account possible developments of the sports 
broadcasting market. 
 
7. Collective Purchasing 
Joint selling is not the only form of arrangement that raises antitrust concerns in 
relation to sport broadcasting rights. Similarly, the collective purchasing of 
                                                     
1029 See European Commission, Press Release IP/15/5432, Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of 
Objections on cross-border provision of pay TV services available in UK and Ireland, Brussels, 23 July 2015. 
1030 At least one of the US film studios involved has made commitments in response to the investigation, 
eliminating the clauses imposing territorial exclusivity to broadcasters acquiring the rights from them. See 
European Commission, Press Release IP/16/2645, Antitrust: Commission accepts commitments by Paramount 
on cross-border pay TV services, Brussels, 26 July 2016. 
1031 Keane, B. (2014), The Application of Competition Law in the Entertainment and Sport Sectors, Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice. 
1032 However, it should be reminded that already in the Eurovision decision, - see infra ¶ 7 - the Commission 
tried to exempt the system of joint acquisition of rights on the basis that, among other things, it contributed to 
the development of a single European broadcasting market. 
1033 Joaquín Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy - 
Statement on opening of investigation into Pay TV services, Brussels 13th January 2014. 
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broadcasting rights has been challenged as a possible infringement of competition law. 
Under certain circumstances, the acquisition and use of exclusive sports media rights 
by an association of undertakings, holding a position of dominance on the market, 
might constitute an abuse under Article 102 TFEU.1034 This may furthermore lead to 
anti-competitive foreclosure effects in neighbouring markets, when the acquisition 
regards the rights for all platforms. In turn, this would subsequently lead to output 
restrictions if the rights would be left unexploited.1035 Being carried out by an 
association of undertakings, the joint acquisition of broadcasting rights is obviously 
relevant under the scope of Article 101 TFEU as well. 
The most important case dealing with collective purchasing of sport broadcasting rights 
is EBU/Eurovision.1036 The European Broadcasting Union is an association of 
European national broadcasters, whose members participate in the joint acquisition of 
broadcasting rights, including the rights for sporting events.1037 EBU negotiates the 
acquisition of the rights on behalf of its members and it subsequently shares rights and 
fees amongst them. Once the negotiations have commenced, the individual members 
cannot engage in separate negotiations for national rights.1038 
The members share the rights among the group on the basis of mutual reciprocity: 
whenever an EBU member covers a particular event taking place on its territory, it has 
to offer the coverage to the other members, free of charge.1039 An important feature of 
the EBU system is that its associates are not competing with each other, since their only 
interest is to acquire broadcasting rights for their respective national market. These 
broadcasters are clearly undertakings under the scope of Article 101 TFEU, although 
                                                     
1034 See the Commission Staff Working Document - Action Plan ‘Pierre de Coubertin’ - Accompanying 
document to the White Paper on Sport {COM(2007) 391 final} {SEC(2007)932} {SEC(2007)935} 
{SEC(2007)936}, para 3.1.4. 
1035 See the Study on sports organisers’ rights in the European Union, T.M.C. Asser Instituut / Asser 
International Sports Law Centre Institute for Information Law - University of Amsterdam, February 2014, for 
the European Commission, DG Education and Culture, p. 77, and Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2014), Sport: law 
and practice, Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath, West Sussex. 
1036 93/403/EEC: Commission Decision of 11 June 1993 relating a proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the 
EEC Treaty (IV/32.150 - EBU/Eurovision System). 
1037 The European Broadcasting Union, EBU hereafter, is the world’s alliance of public service media with 73 
members in 56 countries in Europe and beyond. See the official website at http://www3.ebu.ch/home. 
1038 Jeanrenaud, C. & Késenne, S. (2006), The economics of sport and the media, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
1039 See para. 31 of the Decision 93/403/EEC - IV/32.150 - EBU/Eurovision System. 
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some of them might be formally non-profit public institutions with the purpose of 
providing a public service.1040 
The Commission found that this system was capable of infringing Article 101(1) 
TFEU, as it was reducing the competition between the members of the association.1041 
The system was also particularly concerning as it restricted the possibility to access the 
rights for non-members.1042 Hence, the Commission had to examine the possible pro-
competitive effects that the joint purchasing arrangement could generate, in order to 
assess whether these were capable of outweighing the restriction caused, and therefore 
exempt the system under Article 101(3) TFEU. 
First of all, the Eurovision scheme granted its members the possibility to compete with 
larger and more powerful players on the market. Indeed, the association increases the 
demand power that the individual broadcasters are able to exercise, and it helps 
counterbalancing the strength of the suppliers, which are usually International 
Federations in a position of dominance in the organisation of their respective 
competition.1043 The system was considered to promote cost and distribution 
efficiencies, while promoting the development of a single European broadcasting 
market, by facilitating the cross-border activities of its members. Better purchasing 
conditions could also improve the distribution of services, which in turn might result in 
better and greater coverage of sports events.1044 
The Commission therefore argued that the system had beneficial effects for the 
consumers, with a higher number of sports programmes being produced and shown, 
and the possibility to transmit minority sports, usually neglected by generalist channels. 
Especially for smaller countries this meant the possibility for the viewers to have 
access to international sports events tailored to their specific national interests and with 
                                                     
1040 The non-profit nature of these broadcasters does not affect the fact that they carry out an economic 
activity. Hence they fall under the definition of undertaking. See Case C-41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser 
v Macrotron GmbH. [1991] ECR I-1979, para. 21. 
1041 See para. 47 of the Decision 93/403/EEC - IV/32.150 - EBU/Eurovision System. 
1042 See idem, para. 50. 
1043 See the Commission Staff Working Document - Action Plan ‘Pierre de Coubertin’ - Accompanying 
document to the White Paper on Sport {COM(2007) 391 final} {SEC(2007)932} {SEC(2007)935} 
{SEC(2007)936} para 2.1.4. 
1044 See paras 58 -61 of the Decision 93/403/EEC - IV/32.150 - EBU/Eurovision System. 
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the commentary in their own language.1045 The Commission held that the cost saving 
achieved through the scheme was likely to be passed on to consumers.1046 In this 
regard, it must be noticed that the Commission expressly referred to ‘viewers’ as 
consumers, therefore specifically identifying the final consumers as recipients of the 
benefits created.1047 
The next aspect addressed in the Decision was the indispensability of the restriction. 
The Commission found that the restrictions caused by the agreement were necessary to 
the attainment of its objectives, as these were not achievable through any less 
restrictive means.1048 The institution finally considered that the arrangement was not 
eliminating the competition in the relevant market, in consideration of the fact that the 
joint acquisition was limited to international sports events, which are usually scheduled 
every 2 or 4 years and only represent a minority of the sports covered on TV.1049  
In light of the efficiencies identified, the Commission therefore exempted the 
Eurovision system under Article 101(3) TFEU. The General Court, however, annulled 
the Decision, holding that the Commission had failed to correctly assess the 
indispensability of the restriction through economic analysis, and therefore the 
proportionality of the measure.1050 
The EBU adopted a new set of sublicensing rules and amended the membership rules to 
obtain a new exemption.1051 The new rules excluded pay TV broadcasters from the 
players entitled to be members, and gave access to the rights left unexploited to 
                                                     
1045 See idem, para. 68. 
1046 Rompuy, B. V. (2012). Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust policy? Non-efficiency 
considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International. 
1047 See para. 91 of the Decision of the Commission in the case IV/32.150 — Eurovision. In comparison, in 
the decisions concerning systems of collective selling of broadcasting rights the consumers receiving a share 
of the benefits were the broadcasters themselves. See supra ¶ 4.1. 
1048 See Decision of the Commission in the case IV/32.150 — Eurovision, para. 70 et seq. 
1049 See idem, para. 77. 
1050 Case T-528/93 Métropole télévision and others v Commission [1996] ECR II-649. 
1051 2000/400/EC: Commission Decision of 10 May 2000 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty (Case IV/32.150 – Eurovision). The exempting Decision was based mainly on the same points 
and benefits that were argued in the first Decision, emphasising the benefit that consumers received through 
the arrangement. 
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operators that were not members of the Association.1052 The new exemption was once 
again annulled by the General Court,1053 on the basis that the sublicensing system still 
did not guarantee third parties a fair access to the rights not used by the Members. 
Indeed, the Court observed that non-members could access the rights only if the event 
was not transmitted, even just partially, by the members.1054 The Commission decided 
not to adopt another decision, but simply to close the case in 2007, by stressing that the 
power of EBU on the market had declined in favour of new entrants and commercial 
broadcasters.1055 
These challenges were not aimed to question the joint purchasing system per se, but its 
application, that was not guaranteeing the access to non-members and causing output 
restrictions. Moreover, while joint purchasing arrangements are clearly capable of 
causing restrictions on the market, the Commission stressed the benefit that final 
consumers could receive from them. In this perspective, the role of Article 165 TFEU 
could be important as well: the requirement of the openness and fairness of the sport 
system may be also interpreted in favour of consumers and their possibility to access it. 
Joint purchasing systems, however, have not been assessed under this perspective yet, 
and the importance of these arrangements has decreased throughout the years. Sports 
organisations have indeed progressively preferred to sell their broadcasting rights to 




                                                     
1052 See Lefever, K. (2012), New Media And Sport: International Legal Aspects, The Hague, Netherlands: 
T.M.C. Asser Press, p. 171. 
1053 Judgment of the Court of First Instance Case T-112/99 Métropole télévision and others v Commission 
[2001] ECR II-02459. 
1054 See idem, para. 79. 
1055 Rompuy, B. V. (2012). Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust policy?: Non-efficiency 
considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International. 
1056 See the example given by Lefever in relation to the IOC and the selling of the rights to SportFive. 
Lefever, K. (2012), New Media And Sport: International Legal Aspects, The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. 
Asser Press, p.172. See also Evens, T, Smith, P, & Iosifidis, P., (2013), The Political Economy Of Television 
Sports Rights, [Basingstoke]: Palgrave Macmillan, p.98. 
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This chapter has tried to illustrate how the exploitation of sports broadcasting rights is 
capable of raising antitrust concerns in a number of ways. There are no doubts that 
competition law applies to the matter in object; however, the authorities that consider 
specific conduct in the area of broadcasting rights will have to take into consideration a 
number of different aspects.1057 
In this chapter the promotion of consumer welfare has received specific attention, both 
in relation to the analyses undertaken by European institutions and by national 
authorities. Regardless of the intentions manifested by the Commission,1058 the level of 
consideration given to this aspect is not properly reflected in its decision practice. This 
institution is called upon to apply a variegated set of values to the cases it examines, 
and it appears that, in some instances, it has addressed certain types of conduct in light 
of considerations that differ from the strict application of competition law. On the other 
hand, National Competition Authorities have assumed throughout the years an 
important role in this regard, and particularly in protection of the interest of consumers. 
The NCAs form a network with the Commission to implement and apply the rules of 
competition law within the common market.1059 But this does not exempt the 
Commission from fulfilling its own role when it comes to cases of European 
dimension. 
While the interest of consumers cannot be ignored, it cannot impose unreasonable 
restraints to the activity of pay TV broadcasters and Sport Governing Bodies either. 
Hence, there has to be an approach capable of tackling the anticompetitive tendencies,  
                                                     
1057 At European level, broadcasting cannot be considered only as an economic activity, and its importance in 
a social, cultural and political perspective can therefore influence the regulation of the sector. See Evens, T, 
Smith, P, & Iosifidis, P., (2013), The Political Economy Of Television Sports Rights, [Basingstoke]: Palgrave 
Macmillan, p. 69. 
1058 Consumer welfare has been proclaimed as the primary objective of modern Antitrust policy in many 
circumstances. See for example Competition – what's in it for consumers? – Almunia, Vice President of the 
European Commission responsible for Competition Policy, speech at the European Competition and 
Consumer Day Poznan, 24 November 2011, and Competition policy for consumers’ and citizens’ welfare, 
Italianer, Director-General for Competition, European Commission, speech at the European Competition and 
Consumer Day, Dublin, 24 May 2013.  For a critical analysis of the objectives pursued by the Commission, 
see Rompuy, B. V. (2012), Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust policy?: Non-efficiency 
considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International. 
1059 Study on sports organisers’ rights in the European Union, T.M.C. Asser Instituut / Asser International 
Sports Law Centre Institute for Information Law - University of Amsterdam, February 2014, for the European 
Commission, DG Education and Culture.  
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and providing real benefits to the final consumers, rather than just to the industry 
itself.1060 The theme of consumers’ welfare is also connected with the possibility of 
accessing events of interest, and with the right to receive related information. In this 
perspective, however, the Audio Visual Media Services Directive guarantees the 
protection only in relation to major events, in light of their importance for the citizens. 
The provision is not aimed at granting a benefit to consumers, and thus it should not be 
taken into account in that sense.1061 
Another aspect potentially troublesome for the market and for the consumers is the 
exclusivity connected to some of the selling agreements analysed in the chapter. The 
length of such exclusivity has been assessed by National Competition Authorities on a 
number of occasions. In light of the knowledge of their respective markets they have 
used a stricter or a more flexible approach,1062 and their activity is a useful tool to shape 
the analysis. Not only the duration of such exclusivity, but also its territorial dimension 
is a matter of utmost importance in the context of this study. Indeed, the next step that 
could be taken by the Commission is to reassess the actuality of a division between 
national broadcasting markets in the European framework. Where a single European 
market was already mentioned by the Commission as an objective in relation to the 
exemption of the Eurovision system, there might be room for recognising that the 
events that have to be considered in this market have now increased in number, and 
consequently the scope of analysis has to be expanded. 
The consequences of this consideration might be already inferred from Murphy, but 
future decisions of the Court of Justice might give a better understanding on the matter. 
In conclusion, the analysis undertaken in this chapter has demonstrated that the theme 
related to the specificity of sport has found limited application in relation to the 
exploitation of broadcasting rights. The specific nature of sport has been only 
                                                     
1060 Iosifidis, P. & Smith, P. (2011). The European Television Sports Rights Market: Balancing Culture and 
Commerce. Paper presented at the Private Television in Europe, 28 - 29 Apr 2011, Brussels, Belgium. 
1061 For an analysis of the difference between consumers and citizens in this sense, see Lefever, K., (2012), 
New Media And Sport: International Legal Aspects, The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, p. 77 et 
seq. 
1062 See supra the different approach taken by the French Antitrust Authority and by the Spanish Antitrust 
Authority in relation to collective selling of sports broadcasting rights. 
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mentioned in some instances, but it has been mainly considered as a feature of the 
market analysed, rather than a reason for exemption for restrictive conduct. The 
application of Article 165 TFEU might change the perspective, but it is difficult to 
imagine that the openness and fairness mentioned in the provision could justify 
restrictive arrangements, especially where the interest of consumers is not the object of 
a proper assessment. 
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CHAPTER SIX: State Aid in Sport 
 
1. Introduction; 2. State aid; 3. The Importance of State aid topic in sport; 3.1 The 
reaching of Salience; 4. EU State Aid Policy in Sport; 4.1. The general Block 
Exemption; 5. Case Law; 5.1. Multifunctional Arenas; 5.2. State aid for International 
Events; 5.3. Sport Clubs in Financial Difficulties; 5.4. State aid to Professional Sport 




This chapter will be focused on the application of State aid rules in the sporting sector. In 
the previous chapters of the thesis, the analysis has been focused on conduct capable of 
infringing competition law, carried out by private undertakings active in the sport system. 
However, Member States may intervene on the market as well, and it is equally important 
to assess their conduct, as it might be capable of distorting the competition. Despite being 
comprised under the general umbrella of competition law, academic literature and the 
authorities dealing with the matter tend to consider State aid as a matter on its own.1063  It 
is therefore appropriate to dedicate a separate chapter to discuss the aspects and 
specificities of the application of these norms to sport, in order to be able to fully focus on 
the topic and appreciate its facets. Indeed, it is important to assess the objectives pursued 
by the State when it finances sport and the legitimacy of its intervention on the market. 
This chapter will therefore provide a brief overview of the notion of State aid, and the 
principles that the authorities apply in the context of an assessment of a measure under 
State aid provisions.  
Similar to other sections of this project, this chapter intends to provide an analysis of the 
approach taken by the authorities in the field. The objective is to assess whether in this 
                                                     
1063 See as examples of this Rompuy, B. V., (2012), Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust 
policy?: Non-efficiency considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International, and also the Commission Staff Working Document - The EU and Sport: Background and 
Context - Accompanying document to the White Paper on Sport {COM(2007) 391 final} {SEC(2007)932} 
{SEC(2007)934} {SEC(2007)936}, which deals with State aid in a separate section, para. 3.2.2. 
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regard there might be room for a sport-specific type of approach which recognises the 
characteristics of sport, or whether the only objective pursued by State aid provisions is 
the efficiency of the market and the protection of competition. In particular, whether 
considerations of public policy, and objectives of public interest might comprise 
references to the various aspects of the sport system. 
The chapter will therefore discuss the Decision making practice of the Commission in the 
area of State aid and it will mention the investigation recently concluded. Finally, the 
Market Operator Principle and its application in the sport system will be assessed. 
 
2. State Aid 
As it was briefly mentioned in the introductory chapter,1064 the objective of State aid rules 
is to ensure that the intervention of Member States on the market, although admissible and 
even necessary in some circumstances,1065 does not distort the competition.1066 The State 
and the public authorities connected are therefore entitled to take an active role on the 
market, under certain conditions; however, it is necessary to guarantee that this 
intervention complies with the need to protect the fairness of the competition on the 
market itself.1067 
The provisions related to State aid within the European Union legislation have been 
formulated in general terms, as to reflect a significant degree of discretion retained by the 
EU authorities in this sector.1068 The rationale behind the choice of drafting the legislation 
in such broad terms is to comprise under the umbrella any type of measure that has a 
                                                     
1064 See supra, Chap.2, § 7.2. 
1065 Article 107(2) TFEU establishes that aid with social character, or to make good the damage caused by 
exceptional circumstances have to be allowed by the European Commission. 
1066 The original objective of State aid rules was to avoid subsidy races between Member States, each 
attempting to benefit their own enterprises at the expense of rivals located in other Member States. See Bacon, 
K. (2013) European Union Law of State Aid, 2nd edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
1067 See Braun, JD, (2008) Article 87 EC. In Castendyk, O. et al. (eds), European Media Law. Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen a/d Rijn, pp. 207 – 244. 
1068 See Bluaberger, M. (2008) From Negative to Positive Integration?, Max Planck Institute for the Study of 
Societies, Discussion Paper 04/04. 
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prohibited effect, regardless of the way it is called and which public authority grant it, and 
to prevent Member States from circumventing the rules.1069 
The Treaty provision that regulates State aid is Article 107 TFEU. The first paragraph 
prohibits any type of measures granted by a Member State or through State resources that 
is capable of distorting the competition within the internal market, by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. Hence, any kind of measure might fall 
under the definition provided through the Article, regardless of the form it takes, or the 
way it is defined by the relevant Member State. The second paragraph provides for an 
exception from the prohibition for those measures that are aimed at offering support of a 
social character, where they are granted to individual consumers, or they make good 
damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional circumstances.1070 
The final part of the provision grants the Commission the power to assess the 
compatibility of a specific measure with EU law, in light of an analysis of the positive and 
negative effects that this is capable of causing on the internal market. The provision itself 
sets some examples of measures that are comprised under the norm, due to the objective 
they pursue. A measure may thus be allowed when it promotes the economic development 
of areas suffering from severe economic difficulties, or when it pursues the development 
of certain economic areas or activities, and finally where the aid is aimed at the execution 
of a project of common European interest.1071 The non-exhaustive list provided by the 
Article terminates with aid to promote culture and heritage conservation and other 
categories that may be specifically exempted by a decision of the Council on a proposal of 
the Commission. 
The last paragraph of Article 107 TFEU might therefore justify the belief that the State aid 
rules aim at protecting the social welfare, as well as pursuing other economic 
                                                     
1069 Plender, R, (2003), Definition of Aid. In: Andrea Biondi (ed.), The Law of State Aid in the European 
Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–39. 
1070 The provision includes also an exception for aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal 
Republic of Germany which were negatively affected by the division of Germany. Five years after the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt a 
decision repealing this point. 
1071 In this regard, the objective of general economic interest has to be clearly defined, and the measure 
enacted to pursue it has to be adequate to attain the objective, and proportionate in the restriction that it 
creates. See the State Action Plan COM (2005) 107 final, para. 20. 
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objectives.1072 In this perspective, State aid measures can find justification under non-
economic grounds where they are granted with the objective of reducing social 
disparities.1073 Therefore the common interest clause includes aspects related to economic 
efficiency, equity dimension and any other political objective of the Commission.1074 
The Commission will find a measure to be compatible with Article 107(3) TFEU when it 
satisfies a number of requirements:1075 the measure will have to pursue a common 
objective as previously defined, and it has to be targeted towards situations where the 
intervention of the state is indispensable, as the market cannot remedy the failure and meet 
the same objective otherwise. Moreover, the measure has to be appropriate to address the 
objective of common interest, and consist of the minimum amount necessary to induce the 
market to take action. Where the aid is granted to a specific undertaking, it needs to be 
capable of modifying its behaviour to engage in those activities that it would not carry out 
without the aid itself. Finally, the measure has to be administered transparently and avoid 
undue negative effects, so to guarantee that its overall balance results in positive 
effects.1076 
A measure will be comprised under the notion of State aid where there is a transfer of 
resources from the State to a company, or a relief from charges that normally the company 
has to bear,1077 whereby the financial advantage is received for free, or without adequate 
remuneration.1078 The definition is a general one that includes any type of measure, and 
looks merely at its effects on the market. As the focus of the legislation is on the 
prevention of negative consequences arising from public financing, the measure will fall 
                                                     
1072 As opposed to consumer welfare. See supra, Chap. 2 § 3. 
1073 See Lowe, P. (2008), The design of competition Policy Institutions for the 21st Century – the Experience 
of the European commission and DG Competition, 3 Competition Policy Newsletter 1,6 
1074 See Bacon, K. (2013) European Union Law of State Aid, 2nd edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 14. 
1075 These are inferred from a series of soft law measures part of the new set of Guidelines issued by the 
Commission, in the implementation of the State Aid Modernisation Communication. See Jones, A & Sufrin, 
B., (2011), EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials. Fourth Edition edn, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, State Aid Chapter, p.104. 
1076 Jones, A & Sufrin, B., (2011), EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials. Fourth Edition edn, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, State Aid Chapter, p. 104. 
1077 See Case C-156/98, Germany v. Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, para. 25. 
1078 See Sinnaeve, A. (2001), Competition Policy, State Aid and State Enterprises. In: Hawk, B. & Lang, J.T. 
(eds.), Annual proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute: international antitrust law and policy, 
Juris Publishing, p. 75.  
